Corporate governance and financial performance of Sri Lankan listed companies 2006-2010 by Hewa Wellalage, Nirosha
 
 
 
http://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/ 
 
 
Research Commons at the University of Waikato 
 
Copyright Statement: 
The digital copy of this thesis is protected by the Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand). 
The thesis may be consulted by you, provided you comply with the provisions of the 
Act and the following conditions of use:  
 Any use you make of these documents or images must be for research or private 
study purposes only, and you may not make them available to any other person.  
 Authors control the copyright of their thesis. You will recognise the author’s right 
to be identified as the author of the thesis, and due acknowledgement will be 
made to the author where appropriate.  
 You will obtain the author’s permission before publishing any material from the 
thesis.  
 
  
i 
 
 
 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF SRI 
LANKAN LISTED COMPANIES 2006-2010 
 
 
 
 
A thesis 
submitted in fulfilment  
of the requirements for the degree 
of 
Doctor of Philosophy  
at 
The University of Waikato 
by 
Nirosha Hewa Wellalage 
 
 
 
 
 
2012 
 
 
 
  
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the effect of corporate governance practices have on the 
financial performance and agency costs of multinational subsidiaries and local 
public companies in Sri Lanka. In particular, this study examines (i) the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms of Sri Lankan listed 
companies, financial performance, principal-agent and principal-principal agency 
costs  (ii) corporate governance practices and compliance differences of 
multinational company subsidiaries (MNCs) and local public companies (LPCs) 
in Sri Lanka, (iii) whether voluntary compliance with the new corporate code had 
an effect on firm financial performance and agency costs and (iv) corporate 
governance and firm financial performance differences across quantiles of 
performance proxies in MNCs and LPCs. 
Corporate governance has become a major issue since the collapse of major 
companies around the world.  Additionally, the Asian financial crisis in 1997 
showed the need for legislative reforms to strengthen corporate governance 
practices in that region. Now, it is widely believed that good corporate governance 
is an important factor in improving firm financial performance in both developed 
and developing financial markets.   Until the mid-1990s, corporate governance 
was popularly known in Sri Lanka as, the systems used to control and direct 
companies.  A real effort to codify the principle of corporate governance in a 
structured manner in Sri Lanka was made in 1996.  Since the financial year 
commencing April 2008, Sri Lankan listed firms have been subject to mandated 
rules on corporate governance by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri 
Lanka.  The main purpose of this new mandatory corporate governance rule is 
promoting accountability, transparency and overall efficiency in corporate 
governance best practice. 
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This thesis makes a number of contributions to corporate governance and firm 
financial performance knowledge in several ways.  First, it provides evidence of 
the relationship between corporate governance practices and firm financial 
performance and agency costs.  Second, in contrast to most existing studies that 
use data from developed countries, this research considers how differences in 
institutional and governance systems between countries may impact firm financial 
performance, agency costs and corporate governance relationships. Third, this 
research is the first direct study of firm financial performance, agency costs and 
corporate governance practices for listed Sri Lankan companies.  
Data needed to test various hypotheses are sourced from the Handbook of Listed 
Companies - 2007, Fact Book - 2008 and Data library CD issued by the Colombo 
Stock Exchange  (CSE).  Further data have been collected from companies listed 
on the (CSE) during 2006-2010 that published audited annual reports. For the 
LPCs and MNC subsidiary companies, the sampling period is 2006 through 2010.   
The focus of this thesis is on the governance variables that have been highlighted 
by the Sri Lankan Corporate governance best practice code (2008) and also other 
governance variables that are supported in the literature as providing an 
appropriate structure for the institutions in the environment in which they operate.  
Statistical issues such as controlling the endogenity effect and reverse causality 
effect of corporate governance variables indicate is appropriate to employ 
dynamic panel generalised method of moment estimators to explore the 
relationship between corporate governance variables, financial performance and 
agency costs.   Various other statistical techniques including as ANOVA test, 
panel tobit regression, difference-in-difference method, quantile regression are 
used to check hypotheses relevant in this study.  
  
iv 
 
The findings indicate that there is positive relationship between corporate 
governance and firm financial performance and a negative relationship between 
corporate governance and firm agency costs.  However, the process by which the 
firm financial performance and agency costs affect MNC subsidiaries and LPCs is 
different.  These results also support the central argument in corporate governance 
that the institutional and cultural differences determine the effect of complying 
corporate governance and financial performance and agency costs.    
Although Sri Lanka basically follows an Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance, country institutional and cultural differences create a unique 
corporate governance environment in Sri Lanka.  It is important to further develop 
the corporate governance code incorporating country specific characteristics 
rather than inherit bundles of corporate governance mechanisms from other 
developed countries. However, as this study shows, some mandatory corporate 
governance mechanisms have negative impacts on firm financial performance 
and/or increase company agency conflicts. A corporate governance framework 
appropriate for each organisation structure as “one size does not fit all” seems 
preferable.   Guidelines encompassing an “or explain” exemption clause may be 
particularly beneficial in emerging economies.  
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Chapter 1 
Introducing the study 
 
1.0 Background of the study 
 
The large number of corporate failures that occurred at the beginning of the 21
st
 
century may have damaged confidence in many economies.   Fraud and bribery 
were seen as contributing to company of the collapses.  As a consequence, 
corporate governance has been debated extensively with structures improved in 
several countries.  Although there had been significant corporate failures in 
Europe, it was the Asian financial crisis in 1997 that led to the realisation of the 
need for investor protection and improved corporate governance practices in the 
Asian region (Balachandran & Bliss, 2004).  
Corporate governance in part, is the mechanism to minimise the loss of forgone 
value from the separation of ownership and control.  The Cadbury Report (1992) 
defines corporate governance as a mechanism to use for the direction and control 
of companies.  Morin & Jarrell (2001) argue that corporate governance acts as a 
framework to safeguard and control the relevant players (managers, employees, 
customers, shareholders, executive directors/managers, suppliers and the board of 
directors) in the market.  Becht et al. (2003) suggest that corporate governance 
definitions fall into two categories. The first represents the behavioural pattern.  
The second concerns the normative framework. Capital markets, laws and 
regulations and boards of directors fall into the first category of governance and 
the expertise of managers and large outside shareholders fall into the normative 
framework category.  In studies considering a single country or firms within a 
country, the first type of definition is more logical, but comparative studies more 
toward the second type as more logical.  Different national systems maintain 
different corporate governance mechanisms. The economic environment, national 
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legislation and social and cultural heritage may contribute to the actual form of 
corporate governance mechanisms developed in specific countries. 
The importance of corporate governance for investors is reported in the "Global 
Investor Opinion Survey: Key Findings” (2002) released by McKinsey & 
Company.  It was suggested that 63% of investors avoid companies with 
unreliable corporate governance and 57% of investors fluctuate according to 
corporate governance practices.  This may be advanced corporate governance 
practices ensure quality of decision-making, strategic thinking for senior 
management and enhance the long-term success of companies and its sources of 
finance ("Corporate Governance", 2012). 
The Cadbury Report (1992) is the principal document covering corporate 
governance best practice.  This report seeks to address the financial aspects of 
corporate governance and to develop an appropriate industry code of practice.  
After Cadbury the Greenbury Report (1995) was released.  It addressed the level 
of directors’ remuneration.  The significance of the Cadbury and Greenbury 
reports is that both identified transparency and independence as critical to the 
activities of board of directors.  Furthermore, both reports identified that incentive 
mechanisms needed to be robust and transparent to reduce agency problems.  The 
Hample Report (1998) addressed corporate governance as a distinct problem of 
agency and in 1999, ministers from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) endorsed guidelines for corporate governance. The 
OECD guidelines were subsequently updated in 2004 and 2007.  
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "UNCTAD, World 
Investment Report" (2008) points out that a considerable amount of the world 
output and trade depends on the multinational company subsidiaries (MNCs).  
UNCTAD estimates there was a 21% increase of total sales by MNCs in 2007 
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compared to 2006, representing US$3 trillion.  Also in 2007, the value added of 
worldwide foreign affiliates was estimated at 11% of global GDP, employing 82 
million people.  Multinational companies’ sales and assets have been growing 
faster than the world gross domestic product, world exports and world gross fixed 
capital formations.  The rapid growth in MNCs has encouraged researchers to 
investigate complex relationships between headquarters and subsidiaries. 
Headquarter-subsidiary relationships have a tremendous impact on a wide variety 
of issues, ranging from the competitiveness of multinationals to the amount and 
distribution of wealth created by them.  Not surprisingly, the last decade has seen 
increases in both policy and research devoted to the corporate governance of 
MNCs.  
The OECD guidelines for MNCs provide voluntary codes and principles for 
sustainable and responsible business behaviour in any location in the world, 
consistent with applicable domestic laws.  These guidelines are approved by the 
30 OECD member countries and non-member countries such as Argentina, Brazil, 
and Chile, etc.  The guidelines ensure the basis of mutual understanding between 
business and societies in which they operate to help improve the foreign 
investment culture and to enhance the sustainability of MNC subsidiaries.  These 
guidelines are a set of rules and procedures for responsible business and cover 
several areas, including human resource, environment, taxation, industrial 
relations, science and technology and information disclosures, etc.   They are not 
rigid rules and regulations which control the business, but are internationally 
agreed guidelines to reduce misalignments and to increase mutual understanding 
of business, labour, country law and government.  These new guidelines are 
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inherited from the OECD declaration on international investment and 
multinational enterprises introduced by OECD governments in 1976
1
.   
MNCs play a major role in the Sri Lankan economy and contribute significantly 
to gross domestic products (Athukorala, 2003).  In Sri Lanka, where there is rapid 
rise in the size and number of institutional investors and global funds, the focus on 
good corporate practices is increasing correspondingly.  The number and 
sophistication of investment managers, intermediaries and other specialists has 
also experienced dramatic increases.  Concurrently, there is a need for the 
expansion of appropriate governance mechanisms reflecting the country culture, 
ethnicity and religion.  A goal of this research is to help managers properly 
compare subsidiaries.  All these factors have further fuelled the need for good 
corporate governance practices. Therefore, it is necessary to redefine and analyse 
corporate governance and cultural relationships by incorporating the factors 
relevant for businesses operating in the Sri Lankan market. 
                                                 
1
 The declaration comprises a political commitment, adopted by the governments of OECD 
member countries in 1976 with the aim of facilitating direct investment among OECD 
members. The other major parts of the declaration are aimed at:  providing national treatment 
to foreign-owned enterprises, promoting co-operation among governments in relation to 
international investment incentives and disincentives and minimising the imposition of 
conflicting requirements on MNCs by governments of different countries.  
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1.1 The corporate governance environment in Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka 
 
Figure 1 Figure 1.1. Location of Sri Lanka 
Source: www.marinebuzz.com/.../image.png 
 
Sri Lanka is a tiny, teardrop-shaped fragment in the Indian Ocean (65,610km
2
) 
located off the southeastern coast of India.   The island sits southwest of the Bay 
of Bengal and is separated from the Indian subcontinent by “Palk” Strait and the 
Gulf of Mannar.  As a result of Sri Lanka’s location in a major sea route, it has 
been a strategic naval link since ancient times.  
Prior to colonisation, a tribal governance structure was practised in Sri Lanka, 
where each tribe was responsible for a kingdom.  Due to it being an important port 
and trading post in the ancient world, Sri Lanka’s contact with the outside world 
began early.  A Portuguese colonial mission arrived on the island in 1505.  The 
Dutch arrived in the 17th century and Dutch law remains an important part of Sri 
Lankan jurisprudence. In 1855, the country was taken by Britain which created 
the Crown Colony of Ceylon and established a plantation economy. This led to 
the establishment of the Colombo Share Market in 1986. Ceylon became 
independent in 1948 and while still having an aligned jurisprudence with Britain 
now looks to other Asian regional countries.  Sri Lanka’s population is about 21 
million and the Sinhalese community forms the majority of the population.  
Tamils form the largest ethnic minority and other communities include Muslims, 
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Burghers and the aboriginal “Vedda” people. According to Worldstat.info (2009), 
the female population in Sri Lanka is 50.75%.  Sri Lanka is a lower to middle 
income developing country with a gross domestic products of about US $41 
billion (US Department of State, 2010). However, following the end of the three 
decades of civil war in 2009, the economy was estimated to have grown by 7% in 
the last year (Cabraal, 2011).  According to the CSE chairperson  “beating the 
world’s emerging market price earnings ratio and frontier market price earnings 
ratio CSE makes a riskier market which gives out financially sound returns for 
investors” (Fernando, 2011). Now CSE which had been adjudged as the world’s 
second best performing capital market for two consecutive years in 2010 and as of 
November 2011, 272 companies were listed on the CSE (CSE, 2011). Companies 
listed on the CSE have seen a large increase in foreign investment following the 
liberalising of foreign ownership regulations and the end of three decades of civil 
war. 
1.1.1Corporate governance in Sri Lanka 
Sri Lankan corporate governance initiatives began in 1997 with the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in Sri Lanka publishing a voluntary code of best practices. 
In keeping with the growing shift towards introducing corporate governance 
through regulation through a circular issued by the CSE, it is now mandatory for 
companies to comply with the corporate governance rule that forms part of the 
listing rules of the CSE, with effect from the financial year commencing April 1, 
2008.  Another significant piece of legislation established in Sri Lanka in 2007 
was the Companies Act No 7 of 2007, effective as of March 2007.  The Act, 
which replaced the 25-year-old Companies Act 17 of 1982, is based on the New 
  
7 
 
Zealand Companies Act of 1993 and introduces far-reaching changes to the 
company law regime in Sri Lanka. 
Similar to other Asian countries, the Sri Lankan corporate governance system 
includes features from the Anglo-American model. However, from an ownership 
perspective and a banking relationship perspective, the Sri Lankan corporate 
governance system is significantly different from the Anglo- American system.  In 
many Sri Lankan companies ownership is highly concentrated; usually an 
individual or family members (Manawaduge et al., 2008).  Pyramid ownership, 
cross-shareholding, and dual class shares are common features of this 
concentrated ownership structure.  These ownership features produce corporate 
issues different from the Anglo- American model.   Another characteristic of the 
Sri Lankan corporate structure is a financial sector dominated by banks.  Banks 
are the primary financial supporter of companies and often have complex and long 
relationships with individual companies.  Due to a weak legal structure and an 
undeveloped micro-economic environment, Sri Lankan companies are highly 
dependent on the banks for capital funding and other sources of funds are seldom 
used. Most of the Sri Lankan listed companies exhibit a predominance of equity 
rather than debt in their capital structure. The level of corporate debt in Sri Lanka 
is significantly less than developed countries. Sri Lankan corporate leverage is 
44% of book value and 39% of market value (Colombage, 2005; Rajan & 
Zingales, 1995b).  However, G-7 countries’ corporate leverage ratios range 
between 54% and 73% for book value and 40% to 70% for market value (Rajan & 
Zingales, 1995b).  Furthermore, as a result of complex tax charges by the Sri 
Lankan government, secondary market trading in debt securities has been 
drastically reduced ("Nuisance Tax", 2009).  Another distinguishing characteristic 
of Sri Lankan corporate governance is State intervention. It is relatively higher 
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than Anglo-American model countries (“Investment Climate Statement”, 2009).  
Additionally, the Sri Lankan cultural norms and beliefs significantly influence 
corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka.  Mainly gender issues and ethnic 
minority issues related to the Sri Lankan corporate governance practices differ 
from Anglo-American countries. These characteristics of ownership, banking 
relationship, debt, government intervention and cultural issues create a different 
structure for a micro-economic environment distinguishing the Sri Lankan model 
and creating a unique corporate governance environment.  
The Foreign Investment Advisory Board Act in 1987 opened up investment 
policies in Sri Lanka and attracted foreign investment.  Investment has been 
actively canvassed and the Board of Investment Report (2003) indicated there 
were more than 1000 companies from 55 countries operating in Sri Lanka.  
Furthermore, privatisation and deregulation of policies has helped to attract 
foreign direct investments (FDI) to the country.  Various exemptions including tax 
holidays, duty free imports, and 100% foreign equity ownership are the major 
reasons for the presence of global giants and FDI in Sri Lanka during recent 
decades.    
1.2 Objective of the study 
This study investigates the relationship between governance, financial 
performance and agency costs in MNCs and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  Multiple factors 
such as ownership structure, board composition, board leadership structure, firm 
characteristics and industry may contribute to differences in financial 
performance, level of principal-agent (PA) and principal-principal (PP) agency 
costs incorporations and these will be considered carefully in the modelling of 
governance, financial performance and agency costs.  In emerging economies, 
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multinational companies represent an important component of gross domestic 
product. The extent to which MNCs provide enhanced management and 
governance learning that may be embraced and drawn upon by local companies is 
also of importance in terms of practical contribution to local economies.  
Moreover, the existing Sri Lankan corporate governance code was introduced in 
2007 and was mandatory from 1
st
 April 2008 for all listed companies in Sri 
Lanka.  This study investigates the impact of compliance with the new corporate 
governance code on financial performance and agency costs of listed firms. In 
order to achieve this aim, the following eight specific objectives are established 
for this study: 
1. To determine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms of 
MNCs and financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q, Return on Assets 
(ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). 
2. To determine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms of 
LPCs and financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q, Return on Assets (ROA) 
and Return on Equity (ROE). 
3. To determine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms of 
MNCs and PA and PP agency costs measured by assets utilisation ratio, dividend 
ratio and Q-dummy free cash flow. 
4. To determine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms of 
LPCs and PA and PP agency costs measured by assets utilisation ratio, dividend 
ratio and Q-dummy free cash flow. 
5. To determine whether corporate governance practices differ between MNCs 
and LPCs in Sri Lanka. 
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6. To determine whether there is any significant differences in corporate 
governance compliance of MNCs and LPCs before and after the 2008 introduction 
of the mandatory code of best practice on corporate governance. 
7. To determine whether voluntary compliance with the corporate governance 
code (2007) has an effect on financial performance and agency costs in Sri 
Lankan listed companies.  
8. To determine whether corporate governance variables differ between quantiles 
of financial performance for Sri Lankan companies. 
1.4 Significance of the study 
 
The efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms associated with publicly 
listed companies is the subject of extensive ongoing research in the literature 
(McKnight & Weir, 2009; Singh & Davidson, 2003; Ward & Filatotchev, 2009).  
Prior literature evaluates the relationship between corporate governance and 
company performance as measured by valuation, operating performance and stock 
returns.   Most studies find a positive relationship between corporate governance 
adoption and company financial performance.  Bhagat & Black (2000),  Gompers 
et al. (2003), and Beiner & Schmid (2005) observe that corporate governance 
plays an important role in improving the performance of a company.   
The research in this thesis adds to the empirical evidence concerning the 
relationship of corporate governance practices and company financial 
performance.  By studying a wider range of corporate governance variables than 
prior studies, it will enhance the understanding of how different corporate 
governance mechanisms collaborate with company financial performance.  
Most existing studies use data from US, UK or other mature markets with high 
investor protection.  It is important to consider how differences in institutional and 
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governance systems between countries may contribute to the differences in 
company financial performance and agency costs.  Sri Lanka is a developing 
country with less investor protection and high insider ownership.  There are 
differences in the nature, direction, magnitude and processes of operation between 
developed and emerging financial markets due to differences in their economic, 
social and regulatory frameworks and market behaviour.  Numerous issues such 
as laws and regulations, maturity of the capital market, the market for corporate 
control, capital structure, disclosure requirements, boards of directors and internal 
control systems, may all significantly affect the governance practices in emerging 
economies.   
Following Klapper & Love (2003), Gibson (2003) and Aguilera et al. (2011) this 
study provides empirical evidence concerning the relationship of corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm financial performance in an emerging market.   
When management owns less than 100% of the firm’s equity, shareholders incur 
PA agency costs resulting from management shirking and perquisite 
consumptions.  It is the result of conflicting interests among managers and owners 
and asymmetric information (Chrisman et al., 2004).  This is the common 
scenario for developed market listed companies with strong legal protection.  
Nevertheless, Young et al. (2008) identify PP agency conflict as more significant 
than PA agency costs in emerging economies.  In emerging markets, which are 
characterised by concentrated ownership, family ownership and weak legal 
protection majority shareholders are able to engage in window-dressing, 
tunnelling and expropriate minority shareholders. The concentrated ownership is a 
root cause of PP agency conflict in emerging public listed corporations.   
According to Young et al.(2008) there are two main reasons for prevalent 
concentrated ownership in emerging economies.   The first reason is that founder 
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managed firms are reluctant to share core competences and vital information with 
outsiders (Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004).  Secondly, emerging economy firms rely 
on highly concentrated ownership for corporate governance reasons (Gedajlovic et 
al., 2004). Gelb (2000) indicates that companies with low insider ownership tend 
to provide more extensive disclosures in their annual reports. In emerging 
markets, which are highly uncertain and sometimes corrupted, it is ineffective to 
rely on external corporate governance mechanisms. This study extends the current 
literature by providing an understanding of the nature of corporate governance 
practices in emerging economies (based on Sri Lanka) and the effect such 
practices have on company PA and PP agency costs. Based on agency theory, 
Manawaduge et al. (2008) analyse 45 Sri Lankan listed companies’ ownership 
structure and firm financial performance variations.  This study finds concentrated 
ownership has significant positive impact on Sri Lankan listed firms’ financial 
performance.  Their finding suggests concentrated ownership may ameliorate 
weaknesses in the institutional regulatory framework of the Sri Lankan market. 
In recent literature, Sri Lankan scholars identify relationship between corporate 
governance practices and firm financial performance and agency costs.  However, 
their findings are ambiguous. Heenetigala (2011) using a sample of 37 companies 
from the top 50 CSE listed companies analysed corporate governance practices 
and firm financial performance.  Her study indicates a positive relationship 
between separate leadership, board composition, board committee and return on 
equity. However, the study uses descriptive analysis only. The finding is the 
opposite of  Samarakoon (1999)  who similarly uses descriptive statistics, 
showing a small number of shareholders with large shareholding controls creates 
concentrated ownership problem in corporate governance practices in Sri Lankan 
listed companies.  Recent work by Coloambage (2007) analysed the debt to equity 
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ratio of Sri Lankan companies and found these were low compared to those in 
other markets.  He suggested this was attributable to weak corporate governance 
practices and information asymmetry problems. These works pointed to the need 
to undertake the first robust empirical study of firm performance, agency costs 
and corporate governance mechanisms in listed Sri Lankan companies 
representing all industries except the financial sector.  The financial sector is 
excluded because of the following reasons. I.e. nature of their liabilities that is 
different from those non-financial firms, applicable regulations (shareholding, 
profitability measures and liquidity assessment) from the financial sector are 
vastly different from firms in other industrial sectors. 
A key conceptual, methodological and substantive contribution of this thesis is 
that it defines the concept of corporate governance mechanism as dynamic within 
a multicultural and ethnic diversity relationship in the company.  In multicultural 
countries, specific community values may not reflect the value of the nation, 
because each racial group maintains its own ethnic identity and values.  As such, 
it is important to acknowledge that the values may differ between the ethnic 
groups in a nation. In this thesis, ethnicity and gender diversity are an important 
explanatory factor, from the perspective of countries where there exists 
institutional positive discrimination, especially in terms of job offers and 
concessions such as grants and trade. The research findings may have implications 
for other developing countries that have a special interest in racial, gender and 
business polices, such as India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Fiji and Indonesia.   
MNCs are powerful economic institutions in today’s world.  They make a major 
contribution to global production and to the distribution and flow of capital and 
resources. Since the mid 1980s, the Asia region and other emerging markets have 
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been good prospects for foreign direct investments (FDI) for large multinational 
companies.   
"World Economic Situation and Prospects 2011” (2011) shows South Asia region 
experienced decline trend in FDI inflows since 2010.  Therefore in South Asian 
countries, such as Sri Lanka, which are faced with the double challenge of 
restructuring for greater efficiency and creating a foreign investment-friendly 
environment, good corporate governance and a flourishing culture, are crucial for 
success.  This study extends the current literature by providing an understanding 
of the nature of corporate governance practices in MNCs in Sri Lanka and the 
effect such practices have on company financial performance and agency costs.   
In 2008, Sri Lanka reviewed the combined code of the UK, the NYSE code of the 
US, and codes of corporate governance of Singapore, Australia, Malaysia and 
India and introduced a new mandatory code of best practice on corporate 
governance.  This is first empirical study to examine Sri Lankan listed companies’ 
relationship between corporate governance practices and their financial 
performance after a new mandatory code of best practice on corporate governance 
was introduced in 2008 and the Companies Act No.17 from 2007.   Since initial 
initiatives in the early 1990s, Sri Lanka has continued to progress in developing 
“best” corporate governance practices. This study analyses the relationship of 
corporate governance and company financial performance before and after 
corporate governance reforms in recent years. This is the first empirical study to 
provide clear evidence of the impact of corporate governance practices on 
financial performance in Sri Lanka before and since the reforms were introduced. 
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1.4 Limitations 
Notwithstanding the findings, the current study does have limitations, which point 
to potentially fruitful further research opportunities.  This thesis focuses on the 
corporate governance of Sri Lankan listed companies. Generalisations of these 
findings to other countries or other institutional forms need to done with caution.  
Moreover, this study excluded financial firms, because of their liabilities that are 
different from those of non-financial firms.  Further studies could consider 
financial sector firms, corporate governance and agency costs relationship in Sri 
Lanka. Finally the current study used only some aspects of internal and external 
corporate governance mechanisms.  Further studies could consider other aspects 
of emerging market corporate governance mechanisms, such as demographic 
factors of governance mechanisms.  
1.5 Organisation of the thesis 
 
The reminder of the thesis is organised as follows.  Chapter 2 provides a review of 
the corporate governance literature that is relevant to the focus of this study. 
Based on prior literature, this chapter critically evaluates MNC subsidiaries’ 
corporate governance mechanisms and LPCs’ corporate governance mechanisms 
and their effect on financial performance and agency costs of companies.  Chapter 
3 provides an overview of the corporate governance environment in Sri Lanka 
with a discussion of corporate governance changes over time and the development 
of rules and regulations that have enhanced corporate governance practices in Sri 
Lanka.  It also covers country institution characteristics and their effect on best 
practice governance, and the roles of various organisations which influence the 
standard of corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka.   
  
16 
 
Chapter 4 explains theory, hypotheses and empirical model development related 
in this study. First, it describes the research framework.  Second, it describes the 
conceptual models used for hypotheses development.  Third, the developments of 
hypotheses to be tested in this study in next chapter are discussed. Chapter 5 
provides a methodological and econometric framework for this study. This 
chapter presents the data collection method, a definition of the variables used in 
the study, econometric methods and models for testing the corporate governance, 
financial performance and agency costs in Sri Lankan LPCs and MNCs.   
Chapter 6 describes results of corporate governance practices, financial 
performance and agency costs in MNCs.  This chapter provides a discussion on 
the empirical results for the governance practices in MNCs.  Chapter 7 describes 
results of corporate governance practices, financial performance and agency costs 
in LPCs in Sri Lanka.  Similar to chapter 6, this chapter also provides a discussion 
on the empirical results for the governance practices in LPCs and their effect on 
company financial performance and agency costs.   
Chapter 8 provides the comparison of MNC subsidiaries and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
Chapter 9 includes a summary and conclusion, and consideration of the 
implications of the findings.  Finally a comment on further research opportunities 
completes this study.   
1.6 Conclusion 
 
Despite a wide-ranging corporate governance awareness programme being 
conducted by government and academic bodies in Sri Lanka as a response to the 
financial crisis that hit the emerging economies in recent times, the effectiveness 
of corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka remains unclear. Past studies 
indicate that the unsuccessful implementation of corporate governance 
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mechanisms is due to ignorance of country specific characteristics, organisational 
characteristics, legal, cultural and social factors of the country.  Prior studies have 
focused only on specific features of corporate governance characteristics, which 
make it difficult to understand the actual relationship between corporate 
governance and company financial performance.  The current study aims to 
extend prior research by adding evidence on corporate governance mechanisms, 
agency costs and company financial performance in emerging economies by 
including specific emerging economy characteristics. Furthermore, corporate 
governance mandatory principals (2008) and Companies Act changes are 
relatively new to Sri Lanka.  Therefore, studies related to this field will help to 
enhance further development of corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.0 Introduction 
There is a considerable body of literature that relates to many aspects of corporate 
governance.  This chapter provides a review of the corporate governance literature 
that is relevant to the focus of this study, beginning with an overview. The 
theories are fundamental to establishing the importance of investigating the firm 
financial performance/agency costs and corporate governance relationships.  A 
review of the corporate governance literature emphasising different corporate 
governance mechanisms and corporate governance systems is provided.  
Furthermore, the literature review focuses on the impact of board size, board 
leadership, board composition, firm characteristics on corporate governance 
practices. Attention then focuses on MNCs and the rising importance of their 
corporate governance systems.  Then, the focus turns to corporate governance in 
the Sri Lankan context, followed by the chapter conclusion.   
To date, researchers have identified four different models of corporate 
governance; namely, outsider system (market-centric model), insider system 
(relationship-based model), transition model and emerging governance model.  
Countries such as the US and UK have market-centric corporate governance 
mechanisms.  The main characteristic of the model is firm ownership structures 
that is highly dispersed and in developed capital market more legal protection of 
investors.  In countries such as Japan and Germany where the relationship-based 
mechanisms are operating, there is less reliance on legal protection and higher 
reliance on large investors and banks.   Russia and most of the Eastern European 
countries and other nations there are transitional corporate governance 
mechanisms and emerging mechanisms operating. The distinguishing features of 
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these economies are that ownership is highly concentrated, there is weak legal 
protection and capital markets are undeveloped. A number of studies address 
corporate governance and company performance in the US, UK and other 
developed markets (Mizruchi, 2004; Weir et al., 2002).  Very few studies address 
emerging economies.   In developing economies firms are largely dependent on 
concentrated ownership and consistently suffer from low investor protection and 
weak legal rules and regulations.  Corporate governance has been a central issue 
in developing countries due to the financial crisis and other corporate scandals 
around the world.  Corporate governance and developing countries’ economic 
development are fundamentally linked.   Effective corporate governance systems 
promote foreign investors and the development of strong financial systems, which 
in turn have a positive effect on economic development and poverty reduction.  
Two major issues complicate empirical work on corporate governance.  First, 
most corporate governance research suffers from endogeneity problems that are 
difficult to resolve (Love, 2010).   The main problem is whether better governance 
leads to better performance or alternatively, that better performance leads to better 
governance.  Secondly, many corporate governance empirical results can be 
interpreted as either equilibrium or out-of-equilibrium phenomena (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003). 
Multinational companies (MNCs) are becoming more important in the global 
economy as their foreign direct investments (FDI) have been remarkable in recent 
years.  Recent studies find internationalisation strategies to be associated with 
information asymmetric, moral hazards and other systematic risks, especially 
when MNCs invest in emerging economies with weak legal protection, an 
uncertain business environment and cultural distances of the emerging economies 
(Carpenter & Fedrickso, 2001; Hokisson,  et al., 2005).   Therefore, the last 
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decade has seen increases in both policy and research devoted to corporate 
governance in MNCs.  As a result of that, the OECD provides a guideline for 
multinational enterprises, a voluntary code (2010) for responsible business 
behaviour in a foreign country consistent with home country domestic laws.  
However, the bundle of efficient corporate governance mechanisms varies 
systematically with firm size and industry (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  Moreover, 
many researchers find the efficiency of the bundle of governance mechanisms also 
varies systematically with the institutional structure at country level (Guillen, 
2001; Guillen, 2000a; Suhomlinova, 2006).  
The next section explains agency theory and other relevant economic and business 
management theories. 
2.1 Theories related to the study 
2.1.1 Agency Theory 
Costs associated with a lack of goal congruence between two parties were brought 
to the fore by Ross (1973) and were further explored by Jensen & Meckling 
(1976).  These costs are often referred to as agency costs and can occur between a 
principal and agent (PA) and also between principal and principal (PP).  The 
majority of prior research has concentrated on the PA aspects of agency costs.  An 
awareness of the PP component is relatively more recent.  
Principal Agent Problem (PA) 
 A principal agent problem arises when agents pursue their own goals rather than 
the goals of the principal. It is the result of conflicting interests among managers 
and owners and asymmetric information (Chrisman et al., 2004).  In many 
instances, agents will possess more or better information than the principals about 
strategic and operational decisions and the results of those decisions (Ross, 1973).  
A consequence of this divergence of knowledge about the firm is the potential for 
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moral hazard and adverse selection to occur.  The most significant problems 
which may arise from a principal-agent relationship in large firms can be 
categorised as information asymmetry, moral hazards and adverse selection.    
Principal-Principal Problem (PP) 
The PP cost has been articulated in the context of listed public companies in 
mature capital markets and has recently been tested in emerging markets.  The PP 
problem is best described in a firm with one large shareholder and a fringe of 
small shareholders (Villalonga & Amit, 2006).  In such a firm, the traditional PA 
agency conflict is alleviated due to the large shareholder’s greater incentives to 
monitor the manager, but, a second type of conflict emerges as large shareholders 
exercise their substantial control and influence over firm matters and, as agency 
theory suggests, they have incentives to consume the firm's resources at the 
expense of the minority shareholders (Anderson & Reeb, 2004).  It is important to 
note that the PP problem is more likely to overshadow the PA problem when the 
large shareholder is an individual or a family, as opposed to an institution.  This is 
because an individual or a family will have incentives for both expropriation and 
monitoring, with a potentially greater incentive for expropriation. Families and 
individuals are capable of expropriating wealth from the firm through excessive 
compensation, related-party transactions, or special dividends (Anderson & Reeb, 
2004).  While families/individuals may pursue actions that satisfy their own 
personal goals and happiness, such actions may lead to poor firm performance 
relative to dispersedly owned firms and impact negatively on the firm’s other 
owners, creating PP costs (Anderson & Reeb, 2004).   
2.2 Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship theory was developed by Davis et al. (1997) as a counter strategy to 
agency costs theory.  This is a focused leadership philosophy adopted by the 
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owners of an organisation. A steward who improves the organisational 
performance generally satisfies most of the stakeholder group, because most 
stakeholders’ interests are aligned with organisational performance.  In the 
steward role, managers will make a decision in the best interests of the 
organisation and bring forward collective options rather than individualistic.  The 
steward managers maximise the financial performance of the company and reduce 
the agency conflict. Hofstede & Hofstede (2004) posit that the relevance and 
application of management theories are different in developed and developing 
economies.  Due to weak rules and regulations, weak organisational and 
institutional environment, an optimal ‘steward’ situation is hard to find in the Sri 
Lankan environment.  On the other hand, more than 64% of Sri Lankan listed 
businesses are family businesses (Masulis et al., 2009).  Therefore, the possibility 
of CEO and managers behaving as” stewards” can exist.   
2.3 Transaction Costs/Internationalisation Theory 
“The transaction costs theory deals with the ideal transaction mode of 
corporations arguing that organisations choose this best possible mode between 
the extreme of market exchange and hierarchy, which leads to the lowest possible 
transaction and production costs” (Williamson, 1981, 1988, 1996). Transaction 
costs theory has been primarily introduced to developed economies where there 
are strong regulatory systems, social norms and mutual trust.  However, emerging 
economies due to uncertainty and lower regulatory system increases transaction 
costs (La-Porta et al., 1997). Moreover, transaction costs theory explains that a 
firm’s environment is the main determinant of transaction costs (Williamson, 
1996).   Hoskisson et al. (2000) explain that where market transaction costs are 
high, the hierarchical governance model will enhance efficiency. Similar to other 
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emerging economies in uncertain environments and with an unstable institutional 
environment, Sri Lanka’s transaction costs are high.  However, a hierarchical 
governance model mitigates high transaction costs in Sri Lanka though they do 
have their own bureaucratic costs.  
2.4 Institutional Theory 
“Institutional theory emphasises that organisations, organisational field and 
nations are more than a means to produce goods and services - they are also social 
and cultural systems” (Judge et al., 2008).  Institutions can have a governance 
structure based on rules, norms, understandings and routings (March & Olsen, 
1989) or as social patterns characterised by a standard sequence of interactions 
(Jepperson & Meyer, 1991).  Institutional theory has risen in importance and 
popularity in late 1990s with the increase of MNCs and their subsidiaries.   
However, institutional theory is heterogeneous, and the core concept is related to 
organisations and their adoption of the institutional environment (Scott, 2001) .    
2.5 Tokenism Theory 
The effect of being a minority in a group is for the first time thoroughly discussed 
in Kanter (1977) who examined the workplace experiences of women working in 
a large industrial supply corporation.   Kanter (1977) explains that “tokens” or 
members of a “token” group are likely to have negative experiences in the 
workplace as a result of their low numerical representation.  She defines a token 
group (skew group) as a ratio of 85:15, where the majority members are labelled 
as dominants.  Through observations and interviews with tokens, Kanter identified 
three consequences of being a few among the many.  Assimilation, visibility, and 
contrast (Kanter, 1977).  Assimilation implies that the tokens are forced into 
stereotypical categories defined by the dominants.  In assimilation the tokens are 
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not seen for what they really are. Visibility implies that the tokens are highly 
visible and intensely scrutinised by others.   Contrast implies that the dominant 
group feels threatened or uncomfortable around tokens and therefore boundary 
heightening and exaggeration by dominants emphasises the differences between 
tokens and themselves.   
2.6 Resource Dependency Theory 
This theory explains that firms acquire resources and capabilities, which enables 
them to achieve and uphold a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Barney et al., 
2001).  Inside the firm, resource dependency theory suggests that units have 
different access to the resources and external environment.   Units that control 
resources are critical for managing relationships between firms and their 
environments, and firm success depends on the efficiency of resource control 
strategies of units. Resource dependency theory gives three perspectives of why 
firms acquire other firms (Haleblian et al., 2009).  First, to reduce competition by 
joining well reputed organisations.  Secondly, manage interdependence with either 
source of input and output.  Thirdly, expand diversification and thereby reduce 
dependence on existing firm operations.  The MNC is a scattered firm with 
subsidiaries; decentralised operations, and non-substitutable resources.  In a 
developing country context, resource-based theory is important in 
internationalisation because, scholars have emphasised uncertainty, flexibility and 
the importance of knowledge acquisition in the uncertain environment in 
developing countries (Batjargal, 2003; Meyer & Lieb-Dóczy, 2003).   
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2.2 Corporate Governance mechanisms 
Corporate governance has become a dominant policy issue in developed market 
economies and transitional economies.  A fundamental plank for a corporate 
governance system is to address agency issues.  The expansion of globalisation 
and MNCs gives rise to new challenges, in particular, how to deal with the many 
cross border issues.  This section summarises empirical studies that have been 
based on agency costs and financial performance based on corporate governance 
mechanisms. Blair (1995) studies corporate governance systems in the US 
suggesting the term corporate governance is made-up of the role of the board of 
directors with concern for shareholders’ rights and privileges, and executive 
decisions.  An extension to this view is proposed by Morin & Jarrell (2001) who 
argue that corporate governance acts as a framework to safeguard and control the 
relevant players (managers, employees, customers, shareholders, executive 
directors/managers, suppliers and the board of directors) in the market.  Similarly, 
Monks & Minow (2001) point out that corporate governance is the mechanism 
which is used by the board of directors to improve the value of the shareholders 
by controlling the managers’ actions. The literature of corporate governance 
distinguishes between internal corporate governance mechanisms and institutions 
that are external to firms.  Capital markets are external; an internal example would 
be the board of directors.  Consequently, corporate governance mechanisms are an 
interaction between the institutional structures and individuals who immediately 
or ultimately impact on the decision making process of the companies.  This 
should include an alignment of the interests of shareholders, managers and 
stakeholders.  However, previous research has focused mainly on developed 
economies.  There is very little literature available in emerging economies on 
corporate governance, agency costs and company financial performance.   This 
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tends to imply that the findings from developed markets are automatically 
applicable to other environments.  Therefore, most of the developing economies 
do not get the advantages of corporate governance practices.   Governance 
practices and policies in South Asian countries especially need to address cultural 
and general norms, uncertain capital markets, the pyramid structure of companies 
and laws and regulations of individual countries.  Despite the shortcomings, 
previous literature has come up with many possible governance mechanisms that 
companies can use to mitigate agency costs and increase financial performance.  
This thesis will discuss the alignment of each mechanism, external and internal, 
for local stakeholders and local managers, the overseas headquarters and 
shareholders. 
2.2.1 The Board 
The board is typically considered a shareholder resource and should be motivated 
to ensure managerial performance.  Most firms are required to have a board that 
meets the requirements of state laws, regulations and stock exchange governance.  
Hermalin & Weisback (2003) explain that boards are a market solution to an 
organisational design problem and the board helps to reduce agency problems in 
large organisations.   Zahra & Stanton (1988)  argue that boards are the most 
important and valuable instrument of corporate governance as directors can 
maximise shareholder wealth through the effective control of managerial 
activities.    
In the governance process, boards of directors play varying roles.  According to 
Nikomborirak (2001), the first major function of boards of directors is bonding 
and monitoring performance.  Using existing financial and accounting reports, 
internal directors can make decisions without concern for information asymmetry.  
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The board of directors ensures the “quality” of information.  The second major 
function of the board of directors is to create the separation of decision making by 
management and decision control.  Existing literature also suggests that highly 
diversified boards with different characteristics, qualities and experienced 
individuals tend to be more creative, innovative and have quality decision making 
processes.  Other than a monitoring function, Coles et al. (2008) suggest that 
boards play an important role in advising top management.  This is supported by 
Adams & Ferreira (2008) and Adams & Meharn (2005) who describe the advisory 
role of board.  Most studies that examine board composition look cross-
sectionally at firm level factors associated with boards.  However, this cross-
sectional analysis of board ignores endogeneity.  Denis et al. (1999) show 
evidence that board size, board independence and insider ownership is jointly and 
endogenously determined.   Numerous studies have examined the determinants of 
board composition, but these studies tend to focus on firm-specific characteristics 
and ignore important social, cultural, religious and ethnic factors that may also 
affect board composition.  Moreover most existing literature on boards of 
directors and firm performance focuses on Europe and other developed markets.   
The purpose of this study is to examine the cultural, social, religious and ethnic 
factors that can affect the composition of board directors and is more related to the 
developing market. 
Board size and financial performance 
In late nineteen’s the size and the structure of corporate boards has received much 
more attention in late nineteen’s, fuelled by the financial crisis and business 
failures of large companies.  Board monitoring and controlling activities can 
increase as more directors are added.  However, some empirical studies show a 
robust negative relationship with board size and company financial performance.  
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Jensen, (1993) and Lipton & Lorsch (1992) suggest that larger boards can be less 
efficient and less effective than smaller boards.  Further, they explain that when 
board size is increased the agency problem positively significantly increases 
within the board.  Yermack (1996) studied 452 large US firms from 1984 to 1991 
and found a negative relationship between board size and Tobin's Q value and 
presents evidence that smaller boards are more effective than larger boards.  
Furthermore, he explains smaller boards achieve higher market value.  Grinstein 
& Hribar (2004) also show evidence for the superiority of smaller boards in their 
analysis of mergers and acquisition bonuses.   However, Coles et al. (2008) find a 
positive relationship with board size and firm financial performance (Tobin’s Q) 
ratio in complex environments. In complex environments, larger boards are 
usually more powerful than smaller boards and have necessary expertise in their 
composition.  Furthermore, they explain that CEOs of diversified firms, larger 
firms and high debt firms need more advice and require larger boards with 
expertise managers.  Larger boards usually help to create relationships between 
corporations and their environments, provide guidance in strategic decision 
making and play a crucial role in creating corporate identity (Pearce & Zahra, 
1992).  Carter et al. (2003), posit larger boards have a higher proportion of 
females and minority directors and those firms perform better as measured by 
Tobin’s Q or ROA.  When a company’s board size is smaller than average, it is 
more likely to increase its size.   
Prior studies provide evidence that the optimal board size for US firms is eight to 
nine directors (Denis et al., 1999; Gertner & Kaplan, 1996; Holderness et al., 
1999; Jensen, 1993).  According to Australia and New Zealand findings in top 50 
companies, 86% have between 6 to 11 directors ("Board of Directors Study in 
Australia and New Zealand", 2007).  Consistent with Lipton & Lorsch (1992) who 
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recommended optimal board size as seven or eight.  Hewa-Wellalage & Locke 
(2011) find in Sri Lankan listed non-financial companies average board size is 
7.6. 
 2.2.2 Non-executive directors 
From a legal aspect, the responsibilities of executive and non-executive directors 
are the same.   However, executive directors have an active role in leading the 
company and its affairs for the best interests of stakeholders. The non-executive 
directors play supervisory and balancing roles, controlling the activities of the 
executive directors and the board in general.  Policy statements, namely the 
Cadbury Report (1992), the Greenbury Report (1995) and the Hampel Report 
(1998) emphasise the board monitoring responsibility of non-executive directors.  
Non-executive directors help to ensure managerial accountability of shareholders 
(Young, 2000).  Therefore, increasing trends of non-executive directors can be 
observed in last ten years.  As an example, UK board non-executive directors’ 
percentage changed from 33% in 1990 to 45% in 1996.  The relationship between 
company financial performance and non-executive directors is widely debated and 
controversial. It is preferable for a board to have a balance of executive and non 
executive directors. Non-executive directors’ positions are usually part time; they 
often sit on more than one board, and are typically paid less than executive 
directors (Davies, 2002; Morack et al., 1988).  In last two decades regulation has 
emphasised the importance of board independence and non-executive directors on 
company boards.  The Higgs Report (2003) suggests that non-executive directors 
should comprise the majority of a board.  Holmstrom & Kaplan (2003) outline 
similar requirements for US boards.   Australia and New Zealand also show strong 
support for non-executive directors’ presence on boards.  According to the 2007 
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data, Australian and New Zealand companies with revenue greater than $10 
billion have 82.6% non-executive board members and companies with revenue 
less than $200 million have only 69.1% non-executive board members ("Board of 
Directors Study in Australia and New Zealand", 2007) .   The investors’ becoming 
more aware of non-executive directors on corporate boards has increased in recent 
years in Sri Lanka.  According to the corporate governance survey in Sri Lanka, 
over 90% of participating companies had non-executive directors on their boards 
and among them 87% considered that the balance between executive and non-
executive directors was appropriate (Corporate Governance Survey in Sri Lanka 
2007, 2007). Sri Lanka‘s code of best practice on corporate governance (2008) 
has as its fifth mandatory principal the appointment of non-executive directors on 
the board.  According to that code, a Sri Lankan listed companies’ board should 
include at least two non-executive directors or such number of non-executive 
directors’ equivalent to one third of total number of directors, whichever is higher.  
Further, to avoid individual or small groups of people dominating the board, the 
code states that when CEO duality is present on the board, non-executive directors 
should be in the majority.  
2.2.3 Insider ownership 
It is now well understood that insider ownership has important implications for 
corporate governance.  One solution for the moral-hazard problem is to give 
shareholders control of management, thereby helping to align managers and 
shareholders’ interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
However, an optimal level of insider ownership is determined by firm size, 
industry, investor protection levels and performance of the firm (Hu & Izumida, 
2008).  Previous studies have found mixed results on the relationship between 
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insider ownership and company financial performance.  However, McConnell & 
Servaes (1990) identified an inverse U-shape relationship between insider 
ownership and Tobin’s Q.   Short & Keasey (1999) found a cubic relationship.  
Nevertheless, a number of studies failed to detect any evidence that insider 
ownership affects financial performance (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Loderer & 
Martin, 1997).  The possible explanation for these different results is that some 
studies were not controlled for the endogeneity of the insider ownership variable 
and for endogeneity due to fixed effects.   Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz & Lehn 
(1985)  argue that insider ownership and company financial value have 
endogenous effects and that there should be no systematic relationship.  
Controlling the endogenous effect of insider ownership and company financial 
performance, Beiner & Schmid (2005) find a positive relationship between insider 
ownership and firm value in a Swiss context. Using 648 German firms Kaserer & 
Moldenhauer (2008) also find a positive relationship between insider ownership 
and stock performance.  Insider ownership may improve company performance 
because working owners are less inclined to divert resources away from firm 
value maximisation by decreasing monitoring costs based on the convergence of 
interest hypothesis (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1996).  Recent studies by Ang et al. (2000) and Singh & Davidson (2003) 
confirm higher insider ownership reduces the misalignment between shareholders 
and managers and lower agency costs in firms.  McKnight & Weir (2009) find 
some evidence that higher managerial ownership reduces company agency costs, 
consistent with Henry (2010).  Further, they explain higher personal shareholding 
by directors bonds them to the company and acts as agency costs’ mitigating 
method in listed companies.  
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2.2.4 Board diversity  
There are two ways to describe board diversity: the observable diversity (tangible) 
and non-observable diversity (cognitive).  Board directors’ age, gender and 
ethnicity belong to the tangible diversity group and board directors’ technical 
skills, experience, perceptions and education belong to the cognitive category.   
However, there is no single measure of board diversity ("Diversity on board of 
directors", 2009). There have been number of studies of aspects of board diversity 
on board membership and firm performance.   Some of these studies suggest a 
positive relationship between board gender, racial diversity and firm financial 
performance (Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003).  Watson et al. (1998) 
suggest diversity increases company innovation and creativity and therefore 
becomes a competitive advantage. Using cognitive diversification factors, Simons 
et al. (1999) argue that both educational level and cognitive diversification will 
positively affect organisational performance. Siciliano (1996) using 260 
organisations found that occupational diversity of board members increases the 
social performance of companies.   Moreover, board diversity can further explain 
using behavioural theory of the firm and signalling theory.  Based on behavioural 
theory, a diversified board provides more comprehensive information and has 
quick decision making (Cyert & March, 1963). Amason (1996) found that 
heterogeneous groups have higher quality decision making than homogenous 
groups because the breadth of information availability in heterogeneous teams is 
higher than in homogenous groups. For example, Rodan & Galunic (2004) find 
that heterogeneous managerial knowledge from network structure significantly 
positively affects innovation and firm performance.  
Based on signalling theory, board diversity signals to investors the robustness of 
its corporate governance practices and quality of the firm.  This is confirmed by 
  
33 
 
Turban & Greening (1997) who said “diversity issues are silent messages about 
firms”.   In line with that, Fondas (2000) explains that gender and racial diversity 
on boards signals the company is well positioned to serve diverse markets.   In 
recent research, Miller & Triana (2009) explain board diversity signals the 
following of cultural norms, hence boosts firm financial reputation and firm value.  
However, some studies find a significant negative relationship between board 
diversity and firm financial performance.  Hambrick et al. (1996) find 
heterogenous top management group underperformance when compared with an 
homogenous group.  They explain that due to the heterogenous group being 
slower in their communication and decision making processes; they negatively 
affect the company’s competitive edge.   This is consistent with Knight et al. 
(1999) who finds that demographic diversity to be negatively related to agreement 
in decision making.  Hence diversity slows down the decision making process.   
Miller & Triana (2009) using Fortune 500 companies found there is negative 
relationship between demographic diversity in the boardroom and firm reputation 
and innovation.   In conclusion, though some empirical studies find a positive 
relationship between board diversity and firm financial performance, high board 
diversity increases communication problems.  Hence, diversity increases agency 
conflicts in companies. Moreover, when firms are operating in high uncertainty 
environments this communication problem worsens agency conflicts among 
managers and shareholders and loses a company’s competitive edge.  
2.2.5 Female directors  
In recent years, board gender diversity has become the subject of number of 
empirical studies, though the results are mixed.   Erhardt et al. (2003) find that the 
percentage of female directors is positively related to larger US firms’ two 
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accounting measures; return on assets and return on investments.  In addition, 
recent research in the UK finds that the presence of at least one female board 
director reduces company bankruptcy costs (Wilson & Altanlar, 2009).   Jurkus et 
al. (2008) provide evidence that the proportion of female directors on boards is 
related to firm financial performance as measured by Tobin’s Q, and agency cost 
measured as free cash flow.   Their findings suggest that the positive effects of 
gender diversity exist only in women-exclusive work environments, suggesting 
that the benefit of gender diversity would be more effective in environments 
where this resource is relatively scarce.  Similar to the above result, Adams & 
Ferreira (2008) posit gender diversity and firms’ financial performance has a 
significant positive relationship when measured as Tobin’s Q and ROA.  
However, they find gender diversity on a board of directors has a positive effect 
only when firms have a weak governance structure.  Most of the non-US studies 
failed to find any significant relationship between the proportion of female board 
representation and company performance.   
Marinova et al. (2010) observed 102 Dutch and 84 Danish firms and found a non 
significant relationship between firm financial performance and female board 
representation. This sample consisted of at least 40% of female directors in the 
boardroom.  Their finding is in line with Rose (2007) who employed Danish listed 
firms and found female board directors had no impact on firm performance.  
Further, Smith et al. (2006) employed a large Danish data set and failed to find 
any significant relationship between female board directors and company 
accounting performance measures.  In cross country analysis, Randoy et al. 
(2006) find no significant effect of gender diversity on stock market performance 
or on return on assets in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.  Similar results were 
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found by Du-Rietz & Henrekson (2000) who posit no significant relationship 
between women board directors and Swedish listed firm performance.  
While bringing benefits, female board members may also bring costs to a 
company.  Jude (2003) suggests that companies with female directors tend to 
perform less well than companies with all male boards.  Using an index compiled 
by the Cranfield School of Management, she reports that after female board 
directors were recruited, of the top ten companies in the index, six 
underperformed.  But rather than the appointment of female board directors being 
responsible for the drop in company financial performance, it is equally possible 
that the company’s poor performance could be reason for appointing women to 
the board.   Therefore it is important to consider circumstances surrounding 
female directors’ appointments and not to focus solely on female board directors’ 
company performance.  In addition, Adams & Meharn (2005) argue that when 
firms operate in a riskier environment, homogenous boards perform better than 
heterogeneous firms. 
2.2.5 Minority directors 
The competitive global market provides a compelling business argument for more 
diverse boards.  The one main reason for a minority to have larger representation 
is because the homogeneity of corporate boards can raise significant ethical, 
economic and social issues.  Board internationalisation is another reason for 
adding more non-national directors (minority directors). Due to globalisation, in 
2009 European boards averaged 23% non-national directors, an increase of 11% 
since 2008 ("Corporate Governance Report 2009: Boards in Turbulent Times", 
2009). Minority directors promote more effective global relationships.  According 
to the Wang & Clift (2009), ethno-cultural diversity makes corporate leaders more 
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sensitive to other cultures especially in business internationalisation.  Cultural 
differences, ethnicity and demography differences affect business practices, 
organisational structure, account disclosure and audit practices (Che-Ahmad & 
Houghton, 2001; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Yatim et al., 2006).  As an example, 
Johnson & Mitton (2003) and Gomez & Jomo (1997) explain Malaysian ethnic- 
favoured firms have poor corporate governance practices and higher agency costs.  
Carter et al. (2003) studied Fortune 1000 companies and found companies with 
two or more minority board directors perform better than companies with no 
minority directors.   Crano & Chen (1998) posit ethnic diversity of board directors 
increases the decision-making quality of the company and strategic analysis.   
Further, they explain that the resource–based theory of competitive advantage and 
strategic analysis is another benefit for introducing ethnic diversity to a corporate 
board.  Ethnic diversity increases board independence, because people with 
different cultural backgrounds raise more questions that would not come from 
homogenous group directors (Carter et al., 2003; Laughlin, 1992). Using 
Malaysian top 100 non-financial companies listed on stock exchange over a six 
years, Marimuthu (2008) explains that ethnic diversity enhances firm financial 
performance of companies.   Furthermore, Nemeth (1992) finds that minority 
viewpoints improve the quality of thought, performance and decision making.  
Moreover, Cox (1994) posits culturally diverse groups make better decisions than 
their homogenous counterparts.  Richard (2000) found ethnic diversity affects 
three different ways for determining firm performance, namely increased firm 
productivity, return on equity and market performance.  Further, Cox (1994) 
posits women and racio-ethnic minorities bring insights and cultural sensitivity 
that assists in reaching different market segments as companies enter new 
markets.   
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2.2.6. CEO duality 
Since 2000, hundreds of companies converted to a non-CEO duality structure, 
while few companies converted to CEO duality (Chen et al., 2008).  With the 
outbreak of large US corporate scandals, CEO duality received more attention, 
due to powerful CEOs abusing their terrific power by expropriating from the 
company assets and shareholders.   Most of the corporations increased pressure on 
regulators to separate CEO and chairman roles.  According to the Faleye (2007), 
the number of US shareholders calling for non-duality roles increased 
continuously from 3 in 2001 to 32 in 2004.  Faleye (2007) also finds the 
proportion of firms switching from non-duality increased from 55% in 1999 to 
approximately 70% in 2003.  Overall, 84% of European companies separated 
CEO and chairman roles.  In Australia, Germany, Netherland, Sweden and the 
UK, the role was always distinguished ("Corporate Governance Report 2009: 
Boards in Turbulent Times", 2009).   The Sri Lankan mandatory code of best 
practice, second principle, emphasises the importance of balance of power and 
authority in a company, so that no individual has unfettered powers of decision.   
Further, that code mentions that if there is CEO duality in a company, non-
executive directors should comprise the majority of the board to provide better 
board balance.   
There are two different theories on board leadership structure.  Based on the 
agency theory, Fama & Jensen (1983) suggest that CEO duality hinders a board’s 
ability to monitor management and therefore increase the agency problem. As a 
result, CEO duality increases management entrenchment and reduces board 
independence (Finkelstein & D'Alene, 1994; Rhoades et al., 2001). Conversely, 
stewardship theory argues that managers are inherently good stewards of company 
resources (Donaldson & Davis, 1991a; Donaldson & Davis, 1994).  They explain 
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that CEO duality creates strong leadership and a clear sense of strategic decision.  
Splitting roles may create high communication costs and decision making 
processes can be less effective and less efficient when there are two leaders.   
Evidence about the relationship between CEO duality and company financial 
performance is mixed and inconclusive. The empirical evidence shows there is no 
optimal board leadership structure, and company models depend on their own 
organisational characteristics and business environment (Finkelstein & D'Alene, 
1994; Rhoades et al., 2001).   Further, Finkelstein & D'Alene (1994) explain that 
when the company shows low performance and CEO power is informal then CEO 
duality is ideal.  Recent studies such as Aguilera et al. (2008) explain CEO duality 
and firm financial performance is related to institutional environments.  Elsayed 
(2007) explains firm financial performance is related to the industry as well. On 
the other hand, board vigilance is negatively associated when CEO power is 
informal and company performance is high.  Boyd (1995) explains CEO duality 
creates more advantages when a company operates in a complex and dynamic 
environment with resource scarcity.   Further, Faleye (2004) explains that when 
companies operate in a complex environment, strong CEO reputation, higher 
managerial ownership and small board size are more likely to have a dual role 
CEO.   In the Australian context, Kiel & Nicholson (2003) posit non-CEO duality 
is common in larger firms with larger boards and CEO duality exists in smaller 
companies.  Therefore company size and environment has a huge impact on CEO 
duality structure.  
2.2.7 Institutional Ownership  
Traditionally, institutional investors are not directly involved in corporate 
governance; they exercise their power in terms of buying and selling in the 
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marketplace (Bathala et al., 1994). In recent years, the role of institutional 
investors has changed significantly from inactive investors to effective monitors 
with collective capacity in the delivery of corporate governance (Tasi & Gu, 
2007).  Higher institutional ownership is always associated with higher board 
remuneration and incentive-related executive compensation, and it reduces the 
likelihood of CEO duality on the board (Henry, 2010).  Unlike boards of directors, 
institutional investors have increasingly used their power to pressure managers to 
come into line the shareholders’ interests (Cornett et al., 2007).  Also, Cornett et 
al. (2007) explain institutional shareholders have more opportunity, resources and 
ability to monitor and influence managers.  Furthermore, in recent decades 
institutional ownership role has expanded in monitoring, disciplining and 
influencing managers from passive investors. The dramatic increase in 
institutional ownership and its influence on corporate governance can be observed 
by the growing volume of equity controlled by institutions.  Hayashi (2003) 
shows that in 2003 US estimated institutional ownership was responsible for 60% 
of all outstanding equity in the country, compared to 8% in 1950.   
Shleifer & Vishny (1997) provide an “efficient monitoring” hypothesis on the 
relationship between institutional ownership and company value.  As shareholders 
of the company, the institutional owners’ primary objective is profit 
maximisation.  In contrast with family or individual owners, institutional owners 
are multiple owners and can themselves provide clear examples of good or bad 
corporate governance (Belev, 2003).  Navissi & Naiker (2006) find institutional 
owners have greater incentive to monitor management in a New Zealand context.  
Using 1,914 US companies, Clay (2001) finds significant positive relationship 
with company performance and institutional ownership percentage, where a 1% 
increase in institutional ownership leads to 0.75% increase in company financial 
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performance. Similar results were found by Lin (2010) who posits that when the 
institutional ownership is higher than 81.2% in Taiwanese companies, firm values 
start to increase.  Hartzell & Starks (2003) find that institutional ownership 
mitigates agency costs between shareholders and managers, because it increases 
the monitoring.   In line with the above findings, Tasi & Gu (2007) posit a 
negative agency costs relationship between institutional ownership and agency 
costs in the North American casino industry.  Similar to that Henry (2010) 
employed Australian listed companies’ data and found significant negative 
relationship with agency costs and institutional ownership.   
Conversely, Chaganti & Damanpour (1991) and Lowenstein (1991) find little 
evidence of positive institutional ownership and firm performance.  In line with 
above findings, Seifert et al. (2005) fail to find significant relationship with 
institutional ownership and firm performance in a cross country study.  Pound 
(1988) explains institutional ownership increases the conflict of interest in 
shareholders and managers.  From an agency perspective, McKnight & Weir 
(2009) employed UK listed companies’ data and suggest institutional ownership 
does not mitigate the agency problem in UK companies and is not effective in 
monitoring board actions.  This finding is in line with Doukas & Pantzalis (2001) 
who find a negative relationship with institutional ownership percentage and the 
financial performance of the company.  This may be when institutional investor 
shareholdings are high; shares are less liquid and therefore need to be held for 
long periods.   
2.2.8 Foreign Managers 
The growth of MNCs, particularly from 2006, has resulted in an increased 
awareness of the use of foreign managers in their foreign subsidiaries.  According 
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to the latest research by Spencer Stuart, the percentage of foreign board members 
at the UK’s largest companies has risen by one third in the 2010.  Further, he 
shows that “foreign directors now make up 32% of boards in UK’s 150 largest 
quoted groups, compared with 24% in 2010” (Smith, 2011).  The most difficult 
situation is appointing foreign managers in developing countries because cross–
cultural adjustment problems are likely to increase where there are high levels of 
cultural difference.  Boyacigiller (1990) analysed the US nationals in overseas 
professional positions in a major US bank with 84 branches in 43 countries and 
posits the informal roles played by foreign managers in mechanism of control.  
Further, he suggests foreign success is determined by the cultural distances 
between home and host country, political risk and the uncertainty level of the 
home country.  To reduce the foreign failure rates, it is required to plan effective 
selection criteria for foreign managers.  This because, some foreign directors 
worked in UK companies are appointed solely, they represent investors.  The 
second challenge is to provide professional counselling to foreign managers and 
their families, which should also address compensation and benefits issues, 
reassignment issues, legal issues, health, safety, and security issues.   
2.3 Debt, corporate governance and firm financial performance 
The literature recognises that debt plays a vital role in corporate governance and 
finance for mitigating agency conflict.  Debt is considered one of the most 
effective governance mechanisms for a corporation because debt can be use for 
monitoring and evaluating managerial performance (Agrawal & Gort, 1996).  
According to the prior literature, debt can play two different roles in the 
governance of corporations.  In one aspect, debt can be used to reduce agency 
costs by aligning the interests of shareholders and managers.  This is known by 
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Jensen (1986) as “control hypothesis” for debt creation.   The other aspect is 
called “expropriation hypothesis” (Bertrand et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 2000).   A 
company’s expropriation ability is increased with the increase in inside 
shareholders’ voting rights, which increase through the proportion of debt relative 
to the equity in capital structure (Stulz, 1990).  However, higher debt is always 
related to the increased threat of bankruptcy.  However, Graham & Harvey (2001) 
and Bancel & Mittoo (2004), based on US and Europe data, posit the optimal mix 
of debt and equity financing is crucial to company success.   
Previous empirical studies have mostly confirmed that the role of debt in 
corporate governance reduces agency costs in a company.  Debt reduces the “over 
investment” problem in companies, which in turn reduces the market value of the 
company and negatively affects shareholders’ value.  Debt in a capital structure 
reduces managerial discretion over free cash flow, because a large part of the 
company cash flow is needed to pay back debt holders.  Therefore debt tends to 
reduce the take up of projects with negative net present value (NPV) and reduces 
discretionary power of managers.   Furthermore, debt is used as a self control 
mechanism by managers to create an in-built discipline mechanism to protect 
company reputation and tenure.  Sarkar & Sarkar (2005) explain that debt acts as 
an indicator to the market that management is committed to profit maximisation 
which leads to higher market valuation of the firm.  This creates further benefits 
for management by decreasing the profitability of takeover and reducing the costs 
of capital.  Berger et al. (1997) posit management entrenchment and capital 
structure have a significant relationship.  Further, they find higher levels of debt in 
companies where CEO entrenchment is low, have had short tenure, and 
companies’ plans are tightly linked with company financial performance.  
However, some studies show negative aspects of debt as a corporate governance 
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mechanism in a company.   Faccio et al. (2001) explain that higher debt is 
associated with higher bankruptcy costs for a company.   Novaes & Zingales 
(1995) suggest the possibility of debt and higher agency costs.  They further 
explain that conflict can arise between managers and shareholders because the 
choice of preferred debt differs between managers and shareholders.  The next 
conflict arises when managers increase debt beyond the “optimal capital 
structure” to increase voting power which reduces the likelihood of takeovers 
(Stulz, 1990).  Further, Myers (1977) explains that high levels of debt in the 
capital structure will prevent managers from taking up positive NPV projects in 
future and create underinvestment problems.  However, Agrawal & Knoeber 
(1996) didn’t find any significant relationship with debt and company financial 
performance in US context. Consistently, De-Jong (2002) finds similar results in 
Dutch corporations and Tian (2005) finds no evidence in Chinese corporations.   
The effectiveness of debt as a disciplinary mechanism, or for mitigating the 
expropriating power of debt is dependent on the existence of a well developed 
capital market, financial intermediates and the legal protection offered by the 
country.   In line with above statement, Day & Peter (2004) argue that the 
effectiveness of debt through governance depends on the costs and equity of 
enforcement debt contracts, the legal environment and an unbiased judiciary 
system.  
2.4 Parent location, corporate governance and firm financial 
performance 
Multinational corporations use a range of corporate strategies to manage 
international operations.  These strategies include host country corporate 
governance mechanisms, cultural and general norms and the capabilities and 
knowledge of the subsidiary environment.  According to Bartlett & Ghoshal 
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(1995), there are four types of international strategies MNCs can follow.  These 
strategies may vary depending on where a MNC’s headquarters are located. Using 
283 subsidiaries, Ambos & Birkinshaw (2010) investigate the headquarters’ 
influence in subsidiary performance.  They suggest subsidiary performance is 
significantly related to the quality of strategic decision making ability of each 
MNC, and the attention it devotes to the subsidiary.  They explain that 
performance and sub-unit independence have a positive relationship.  MNC 
headquarters provide different degrees of freedom for fund allocation and decision 
making rights to their subsidiaries.  Ciabuschi et al. (2010), using 141 companies, 
study knowledge transfer performance.  They find a positive impact on 
performance and allocating decision making rights and funds to subsidiaries.  In 
recent studies, Zeitun & Gary (2007) explain social, economic and cultural factors 
are reshaping the country corporate ownership and this unique structure will 
determine corporate governance mechanisms and corporate performance. 
Regardless of the home country environment, most MNC subsidiaries from 
market centric economies more or less follow the headquarters’ corporate 
governance mechanism.  However, this model leads to higher agency costs, 
because managers’ interests are not in line with shareholders’.  
If an MNC has cultural knowledge of the country where the subsidiary operates 
then the subsidiary is likely to be more effective. Li et al. (2001) employed 898 
firms in China, including joint ventures established by overseas Chinese and firms 
from Western cultures, and found culture plays an important role in subsidiary 
performance.   Further, they find differences between joint ventures from East 
Asian countries and Western countries.  First, they explain East Asian 
collaborated Chinese firms are most likely to take first mover advantages than 
Western cultures collaborating with Chinese firms.  Secondly, Western firms 
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invest more in technology equipment than East Asian firms. Therefore MNC 
subsidiaries form Western countries enjoy the advantage of pioneering technology 
adaptation more than Asian MNC subsidiaries.  Thirdly, subsidiaries from East 
Asian countries have relatively higher debt to assets ratios than Western 
subsidiaries.   
2.5 Firm size, corporate governance and firm financial 
performance               
Based on the PA theory, larger firms have high agency costs because it is harder 
to align manager and shareholder interests. Henry (2010), using Australian 
company from 1992 to 2002, finds a positive relationship between free cash flow 
and firm size.   This increases the PA agency costs in larger firms. Therefore, 
larger firms select stricter governance rules to avoid agency problems.  Company 
resources and ability are other factors that influence the adoption of quality 
corporate governance mechanisms.  Guillen (2000) suggests that in Korea, larger 
firms have more human resources and the financial capability to adopt advanced 
governance mechanisms and he also suggests firm size has a stronger positive 
effect on the corporate governance index. The effect of firm size on corporate 
governance is ambiguous (Klapper & Love, 2003).  Based on emerging markets, 
Cho & Kim (2003) find a positive relationship between board independency and 
firm size.  Additionally, they explain firm size and the percentage of outside 
directors on a board have a positive relationship in Korean companies.  Using 
3SLS regression, Beiner et al. (2004) show a positive relationship with firm size 
and corporate governance index value.   Using the Standard & Poor’s rating, 
Dunerv & Kim (2002) posit a positive relationship with firm size and S & P 
ratings.  They also explain larger firms tend to attract more attention by 
governments and greater scrutiny by the public.  Consistently, Black et al. (2003) 
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explain a positive relationship between corporate governance index and firm size. 
Malaysian evidence shows a significant positive relationship between corporate 
governance ratings and firm size, which indicates that larger firms have more 
apparent corporate governance mechanisms (Ariff et al., 2007).  They further 
explain that high resources and reputation in larger firms leads to adopting better 
governance mechanisms than smaller firms.  This is in line with Guriev et al. 
(2003) who find a significant positive relationship between governance index and 
firm size, due to the existence of fixed costs and resources in implementing 
corporate governance mechanisms.   Ettredge et al. (2010) study the effect of firm 
size and corporate governance quality and suggest smaller listed firms lack the 
accounting skills, resources and qualified personnel to deal with some disclosure 
requirements compared to their larger listed counterparts.   This finding is in line 
with the final report of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (2006).  Ho 
et al. (2006) study the relationship between firm research and development (R & 
D) investment and firm size.  They find strong evidence that larger firms have 
comparatively high investments for R & D.   
Conversely, Gompers et al. (2003) used 1500 firms to construct a governance 
index as proxy for shareholders’ rights and argue larger firms have fewer 
shareholders’ rights, higher capital expenditure, larger corporate acquisition and 
poor governance status.  This study is in line with Brown & Caylor (2004) who 
find a negative relationship with firm size and corporate governance mechanisms.  
Acs et al. (1994) explain smaller firms’ ability to benefit from R & D is relatively 
higher and more innovative than larger firms.   
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2.6 Firm age, corporate governance and firm financial 
performance and agency costs 
Corporate governance is ultimately concerned with the decision making process, 
procedures, and attitudes that assist a business in achieving its objectives.  
Consequently, as the firm seeks to improve the professionalism and sustainability 
of its activities, it needs to give greater thought to issues of governance.  Agrawal 
& Gort (1996, 2002) explain mature firms have more knowledge, more abilities 
and more skills.  Mature firms acquire more knowledge and skills through their 
day to day activities and hire and train human capital.   The maturity of businesses 
is negatively correlated with PP costs (Hewa-Wellalage & Locke, 2011).  This 
suggests that longer-life businesses are not only profitable in a sustainability sense 
but also, exploitation by senior owner(s) is not so apparent.   
However, maturity can have adverse effects on firm financial performance.  The 
main disadvantages are the organisational rigidities and inertia that maturity can 
bring (Loderer & Waelchli, 2010). Tripasa & Gavetti (2000) posit mature firms 
will reduce flexibility of management adaptations and are reluctant to change.   
The behavioural aspects, such as seniority rules, rules of conduct and rigid 
hierarchy, also lessen performance in mature firms.  According to Loderer & 
Waelchli (2010), one of the more prominent aging effects in high-tech firms is 
that they are more exposed to competitive threats.  Old machinery and equipment 
and declining market share and market growth all lead to a decrease in productive 
efficiency and profitability compared with younger firms in a similar industry.  
Rent seeking behaviour is persistent in older firms because corporate governance 
allows it (Loderer & Waelchli, 2010).  Yermack (1996) shows mature firms have 
larger boards which favour rent seeking behaviour or quasi-rents.   In older firms, 
the manager-worker relationship is stronger and is maintained over a longer time 
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than in younger firms, therefore in mature firms labour growth is slower than in 
young firms (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003).  All the above mentioned factors 
lead to reduced performance by mature firms.   The relationship between PA 
agency costs and maturity of a firm is positively significant, indicating that agency 
costs increase with firm age (Hewa-Wellalage & Locke, 2010).  However, recent 
studies by Ariff et al. (2007) find a non significant relationship between firm age 
and corporate governance ratings in Malaysia.  This is in line with Ang et al., 
(2000), who find a non significant relationship with firm PA costs and firm 
maturity.  
2.7 Firm operating industry and financial performance and 
agency costs  
Firm financial performance can be evaluated by many parameters.  However, firm 
financial performance is highly dependent on the nature of the market in which a 
firm competes.  How the industrial structure impacts on firm financial 
performance has been extensively  studied in prior literature (Froeb & Geweke, 
1987).   In early years, Bain (1951)  explained that industry structure impacted on 
firm profitability and firm financial performance.  Firms in high concentrated 
industries with high entry barriers have high profit, because restricting output 
increase prices and concentrated firms reduce coordination costs.  Consistent with 
the theoretical argument of industry structure conduct performance Porter (1990) 
argues that a firm’s competitive advantage is derived from the industry in which 
the firm operates and its position in the industry.  Moreover, Schmalensee (1985) 
examined accounting profit of American manufacturing firms and found that the 
industry effect accounted for about 20% of variations in business-unit profits. 
Hence, he concludes, industry plays a significant role in determining firm 
profitability.  Furthermore, Gibbs (1993) finds that industry conditions affect a 
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firm’s investment opportunities and excessive returns are influenced by a firm’s 
competitive advantage.  Hence, firm financial performance can be determined by 
the firm’s operating industry.   
2.8 MNCs and rising importance 
The role and importance of MNCs is now established as part of the global 
economy.  MNCs are companies that operate through subsidiaries or have 
investments in more than two countries.  This form of business has become more 
commonplace with the practice of globalisation and the global economy.  As the 
number of MNCs increases, the connection of various practices among the 
companies and countries to include the functional integration of cross-border 
economic and financial activities has altered to accommodate the role of corporate 
cross-national connectedness. According to the various economic indicators, 
MNCs started to become an important economic power in the world during the 
early 1970s.  At that time MNCs were graded as “new actors” in the world 
economy, and they have steadily become more significant (Keohane & Nye, 
1975).  As a result, many of the barriers to international movement of goods, 
services, capital and technology have been removed, particularly after the end of 
the cold war in 1990, and MNCs have become the most powerful institute in the 
world through booming growth and expansion.  While MNC headquarters are 
mainly based in developed countries like the USA, UK, Canada and Australia, 
their resources, key markets and productive facilities are often domiciled in 
emerging markets.  According to the International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
inflows of FDI to the emerging markets grew by an average of 23% a year 
between 1990 and 2000. As a result of increasing the number of multinational 
companies and their subsidiary activities, the parent-agent relationship is also 
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critical to firm success and minimizing the agency cost handling the firm 
operations is vital.   
2.9 Corporate Governance in MNCs 
The main inspiration behind the modern economy is MNCs, which account for a 
considerable amount of world GDP and trade.  However, early this decade 
numerous company scandals appeared.   MNCs collapsed due to poor governance.  
Therefore, re-established trust and confidence is needed to improve corporate 
governance and corporate law standards.  This is vital for MNCs because they are 
no longer only bound to legal, ethical, cultural and economic regulations in their 
origin country. Similar to the shareholders and managers’ corporate governance 
relationship, parent- subsidiary corporate governance relationships also occur with 
the separation of ownership and control of the parent company and their 
subsidiaries.  When a parent company incorporates its wholly-owned subsidiaries, 
it needs to name its board of directors and officers, interfere in the subsidiary’s 
business activities and decisions, adopt by-law provisions and preserve the 
parent's control of its subsidiary, etc.  However, recent studies indicate that 
internationalisation creates high information asymmetry and moral hazards, 
especially when subsidiaries operate in emerging markets with weakly developed 
legal and business environments (Carpenter & Fedrickson, 2001; Hoskisson et al., 
2002).  Corporate governance issues become increasingly important for 
investment decision in foreign investors.  "Global Investor Opinion Survey: Key 
Findings” (2002) finds that long-term investors are willing to pay up to 25% of 
extra premium for good corporate governance practices.  Therefore, compliance 
of international corporate governance standards is important for MNCs.  
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 According to the OECD guidelines for multinational companies (2010), large 
scale corporations with high demand for capital need to be highly committed to 
international standards of good corporate governance.  The guidelines also 
recommend following established policies of the home country, consider the 
stakeholders’ view and provide reliable and timely disclosure of financial 
performance and taxation.  These OECD guidelines for MNCs provide voluntary 
codes and principles for sustainable and responsible business behaviour in any 
location in the world, consistent with applicable domestic laws.  These guidelines 
are approved by the 30 OECD member countries and non-member countries, such 
as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.  They ensure the basis of mutual understanding 
between business and societies in which they operate and help to improve the 
foreign investment culture and enhance the sustainability of MNCs.  These OECD 
guidelines are set of rules and procedures for responsible business and cover 
several areas, including human resources, environment, taxation, industrial 
relations, science and technology and information disclosures, etc.   These new 
guidelines are inherited from the OECD declaration on international investment 
and multilateral enterprises board political commitment adopted by OECD 
governments in 1976.  Finally, the statement by the UK national contact point for 
the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises (2008) report explains that 
since 2000, OECD guidelines for MNC represent several efforts to create a soft 
law framework for developing cultural and customary appropriate corporate 
behaviour.  According to the Costello & Costello (2002), parent-subsidiary 
corporate governance mechanism depends on the international strategy of the 
parent company, subsidiary importance for the MNC, subsidiary dependency on 
the host country, subsidiary environment uncertainty level, the subsidiary product 
market competition level, and the size and age of the subsidiary.  Moerke & 
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Dolles (2003) suggest the parent-subsidiary corporate governance bundle is 
dependent on the corporate governance system and legal framework of the host 
country, the demands and expectations of the parent company, market forces, new 
regulations and competitive advantage of the MNC.  The different MNCs from 
different geographical locations follow different corporate governance models.  
These models are differentiated each other by the capitalism in which they are 
embedded.  The most common and widely used MNC corporate governance 
model is the Anglo-American model (market-centric model) which is practised by 
MNCs from high investor protection countries like the US and UK. MNCs from 
Japan and European countries follow a relationship-based model (coordinated 
model) of corporate governance mechanisms.  MNCs from emerging economies 
follow a model of corporate governance different from the market-centric model 
and relationship-based models.  Due to weak legal protection and highly 
concentrated ownership, CEO duality and small boards are unique characteristics 
of the corporate governance model in MNCs in emerging economies.  
2.10 Corporate governance in Sri Lanka 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, most of the large Sri Lankan companies 
collapsed.  Many reasons were attributed to the crashes; many investors lost faith.  
Good corporate governance among listed companies is important to the country, 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka, Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Sri Lanka and the Colombo Stock Exchange jointly formulated a 
standard of corporate governance.  After publishing the voluntary Code of Best 
Practices on Corporate Governance in 1997, updates continue to ensure the 
standard of corporate governance in Sri Lanka continues to improve.  
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Until the mid 1990s corporate governance was popularly known in Sri Lanka as 
the systems used to control and direct other companies.  The real effort to codify 
the principle of corporate governance in a structured manner in Sri Lanka was 
made in 1996 by the Institute of Chartered Accountants.  It involved regulatory 
and semi regulatory organisations in Sri Lanka to set out the Code of Best 
Practices in order to help healthy evaluation of corporate governance principles 
and practices in Sri Lanka. In the financial year commencing April 2008, Sri 
Lankan listed firms have been subject to mandated rules on corporate governance 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka.  The main purpose of 
this new mandatory corporate governance rule is promoting accountability, 
transparency and overall efficiency in corporate governance best practice.   The 
most significant legislation enacted in Sri Lanka corporate governance was the 
Companies Act 7 of 2007, effective as of March 3, 2007.  This replaced the 25-
year-old Companies Act 17 of 1982 and introduced a solvency test and far-
reaching changes to the company law regime prevalent in Sri Lanka. Actively 
trading companies were identified and clustered based on ownership, corporate 
culture and management.  The results indicate that significant improvement 
should be made to corporate governance issues in Sri Lanka.  According to the 
corporate governance survey in Sri Lanka (2007), over 80% of participants 
considered corporate governance contributed to the organisation’s performance 
and shareholders’ value.  Furthermore, findings clearly explained several 
companies followed good corporate governance practices, displayed a higher 
price earnings ratio than their counterparts whose stated corporate governance 
practices ranked lower.  Improved corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka are 
likely to give Sri Lanka’s capital markets relatively more competitive advantages 
over other markets in the region.  
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The ownership structure and capital market structure create a unique environment 
for corporate governance practices in Sri Lankan.  The ownership structure of Sri 
Lankan listed companies is characterised by extensive family ownership 
(Balasooriya et al., 2008), pyramid structure and concentrated ownership 
(Senaratne & Gunarathne, 2007).  Therefore, corporate control ends up with a few 
individuals or families.  As a result of concentrated ownership most of the Sri 
Lankan listed companies prevent from PA agency costs.  However, PP agency 
cost highly exists.  Weak legal protection is one of the reasons for higher insider 
ownership in Sri Lanka.  The banking sector is the major external finance provider 
in Sri Lanka.  This is confirmed by Colombage (2007) who shows that, based on 
pecking order theory, Sri Lankan company managers’ first choice for long-term 
financing is bank debt then equity.  Moreover, Samarakoon (1999) examines 
listed companies in CSE and finds the use of debt finance by Sri Lankan listed 
firms is significantly low, especially in long-term debt.  One major reason is the 
large number of family businesses listed on the CSE; they prefer quasi-equity than 
bank debts.  
Additionally, this study discusses board effects, ownership effects, cultural effect, 
size and maturity effects on corporate governance practices on MNCs and LPCs’ 
financial performance and agency costs.   Sri Lanka’s long civil war has ended, 
and FDI has started to increase dramatically while the recent global crisis that 
started in the US and spread across the world has shown good corporate 
governance practices are important to all economies. During the last few years the 
issue of corporate governance has received increasing attention in academic 
literature and in the popular press.  The prior research findings relating to the 
corporate governance mechanisms and company financial performance are mixed.  
Also most of the research is based on developed countries and only a few studies 
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addressed emerging markets’ issues.  However, none of the research broadly 
discusses corporate governance for both local and foreign subsidiaries in a Sri 
Lankan context.   This research aims to extend existing corporate governance 
literature by focusing on the effect good corporate governance practices 
recommend by Sri Lanka have had on LPCs and MNCs’ financial performance in 
Sri Lanka.   Furthermore, this study aims to extend the methodology that accounts 
for unobservable variables, endogeneity and robustness.   This study also explores 
the effectiveness of the new rules and regulations for the corporate governance 
system in Sri Lanka.  
2.11 Conclusion 
This chapter examined existing literature pertaining to the relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate financial performance and also identified the 
contribution to be made in this research.  This review critically evaluates, MNCs 
corporate governance mechanisms and LPCs’ corporate governance mechanisms 
and their effect on agency costs and company financial performance. Institutional, 
financial and cultural factors are also presented with a concluding discussion on 
corporate governance developments and research relating to Sri Lanka and other 
emerging markets.  Chapter 3 provides an overview of the corporate governance 
environment in Sri Lanka with discussion about corporate governance changers 
over time and development of rules and regulations that have enhanced corporate 
governance practices in Sri Lanka.  It will also discuss country customary laws 
and their effect on the best practice of governance, and the roles of various 
organisations that influence the standard of corporate governance practices in Sri 
Lanka.  
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Chapter 3 
Corporate governance in the Sri Lankan context 
3.0 Introduction  
This chapter provides background about corporate governance practices, company 
law and corporate governance codes, rules and regulations in Sri Lanka. It also 
includes discussion of corporate governance systems and practices adopted by 
MNCs in Sri Lanka. The aim of this review is to clarify the potential for the 
research in this thesis to contribute to understandings of corporate governance in 
Sri Lanka.   
Prior research has shown that in the development of corporate governance 
systems, economic and political pressure, legal and regulatory systems, along with 
other environmental factors, have had substantial influence on the models of 
corporate governance that have evolved.  Aside from the political and legal 
framework, the primary influence on a country’s specific corporate governance 
system is culture.  The level of accountability, the distribution of power, the 
protection of property rights and equity is not necessarily the same as all cultures. 
(Sison, 2000).  The historical development of corporate governance practices in 
Sri Lanka is highly correlated with the history of corporation formulation and 
adaptation of commercial law. Prior to colonisation, a tribal governance structure 
existed in Sri Lanka, where each tribe was responsible for a kingdom.  Although 
the Singhalese administration was strong in 1855, the country was taken over by 
the English.  Despite gaining liberation from Britain in 1948, Sri Lanka still seeks 
jurisprudence from England and other regional countries like India and Malaysia.  
The best example is a new code of best practices (2008) for corporate governance 
in Sri Lanka.  It is based on the UK combined code, the best practices 
recommendations of the Australia Stock Exchange and the Malaysian code on 
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corporate governance, and the corporate governance report of the Securities and 
Exchange Board of India (Code of Best Practices on Corporate Governance, 
2008). The development of the institutional setting of any country is the first sign 
of sound corporate governance practices.  Economic reforms, corporate reforms, 
financial sector reforms and capital market development have all positively 
affected Sri Lankan corporate governance practices in recent decades.  Sri Lankan 
corporate governance initiatives commenced for the first time in 1997 with the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Sri Lanka publishing a voluntary code of 
best practices, whilst the Companies Act No 17 of 1982 deals with the regulations 
for companies.  In keeping with the growing shift towards adopting corporate 
governance through regulation in terms of a circular issued by the CSE, it is now 
mandatory for companies to comply with the corporate governance rules that 
formed part of the listing rules of the CSE, with effect from the financial year 
commencing April 1 2008.  Another significant piece of legislation established in 
Sri Lanka in 2007 was the Companies Act No 7 of 2007, effective as of March 
2007.  The Act, which replaced the 25 years old Companies Act 17 of 1982, is 
based on the New Zealand Companies Act of 1993 and introduced far-reaching 
changes to the company law regime which up until 2007 had been prevalent in Sri 
Lanka.   
3.1 Institutional setting in Sri Lanka 
3.1.1 Economic Reforms 
Sri Lanka is a lower-middle income developing country with Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) at about USD 43 billion (Wikipidea, 2011).  Sri Lanka is recorded 
8% GDP growth in 2011 in the conflict-free stable environment ("2012: Growth 
to slowdown, rupee to depreciate", 2011).  This strong growth rate is ahead of its 
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other core south Asian peers including India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Prior to 
economic liberalisation, Sri Lanka had followed inward economic policies, which 
had certain limitations for FDI during the period 1955-1977. In 1978, Sri Lanka 
shifted away from a socialist orientation and opened its economy to foreign 
investment.  However, before the brutal civil war in 1983, economic growth 
averaged around 4.5%. From the early 1990s government progress its 
privatisation reform and export orientated growth taking GDP growth to 7% in 
1993 and it maintained overall GDP growth of 5.2% per annum between 1990 and 
2000. 
However, in 2001 GDP growth was negative (-1.4%); the only contraction since 
independence is 1948.  This lead Sri Lanka into bankruptcy with debt levels 
reaching 101% of GDP.  This may have been due to global and local economic 
problems and severe terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka.  These failures increased 
awareness of transparency and accountability of financial transactions and lead to 
policy changes. Following the 2002 ceasefire, economic and social sector reforms, 
deregulation, and private sector development, the economy grew rapidly.  
Recently Sri Lanka’s economy has been affected by natural disasters, such as the 
December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami which caused an estimated US 1 billion 
damage, though the economy still grew by 6% in 2005. Similar to other emerging 
economies, foreign remittances are an important source of external financing for 
Sri Lanka. In 2007, foreign remittance figure was much larger than the country’s 
earning from exports, foreign aid, tourism and other capital inflows ("Impact of 
remittance's in Sri Lanka's Economical Development ", 2008).   
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3.1.2 Corporate Reforms 
Almost all enterprises in Sri Lanka were state-owned in the early 1970s.  The 
corporate reform process has brought about a shift from state-owned enterprises 
(SOE) and central planning to a market orientated economy.  During this time, 
state activities were further expanded through employment training and regional 
development.  As a result of an open economy policy introduced by 1977, Sri 
Lanka adopted privatisation and SOEs began to restructure. As a result of this 
liberalisation activity, public enterprise ownership switched to private ownership, 
though ultimately this private ownership ended up with ownership concentrated in 
a few families and political leaders.   Sri Lanka corporate reforms can be 
explained in three phases. First, characterised as a random attempt, the 
government, in the early 1980s, commenced an unplanned project to privatise 
SOEs in order to attend foreign aid.  Moreover, ownership changes and partial 
divestiture, liquidisation, management contracts and franchising methods were 
also adopted in Sri Lanka.   Second, a systematic approach; that started in the late 
1980s. Government privatised SOEs, using the concept of “peoplisation”.  Forty-
three SOEs were either totally or partially privatised (Knight-John & Jayasinghe, 
2004).  Third, a structural approach. In 1996, the Sri Lankan government 
implemented an entire public sector reform programme with the establishment of 
the Public Enterprise Reform Commission (PERC). This commission was 
implemented to ensure more transparency and to give the privatisation process 
more structure. During this era, the majority of SOE shares were sold to the 
private sector through open tenders and competitive bidding. 
3.1.2.1 Ownership structure in Sri Lankan companies 
In spite of economic and legal differences, all most all Asian companies have 
concentrated stock ownership and predominantly family ownership (Chakrabarati, 
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2002).  The literature indicates that highly concentrated ownership is more 
widespread in developing economies and developed countries outside Anglo-
American countries (La-Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  In Sri 
Lanka dominant family holdings are present in many listed companies and 
research confirms this.  Manawaduge et al. (2008) employed Sri Lankan stock 
exchange data and found that in Sri Lankan listed companies’ ownership is highly 
concentrated. This finding is in line with Balasooriya (2004) who argues Sri 
Lankan private companies are mainly held by a single owner or families. Using 
226 companies, he also found that at least 48 companies in the sample had a 
single shareholder with a majority holding.  
According to Zeitun & Gary (2007), corporate ownership structure depends on a 
country’s social, political, economical and cultural factors.  Emerging market 
political, social and economical factors are likely to be entirely different to those 
of developed countries, which may limit the application of empirical models 
tested in mature markets.  However, the ownership structure of Sri Lankan 
companies is characterised by peculiar features namely the controlling shareholder 
is usually from another corporate entity, with wide speed existence of family 
ownership, pyramid ownership structures and crossholdings (Senaratne & 
Gunarathne, 2007).  Masulis et al. (2009) studied 45 countries and report that 
family business groups are dominant in emerging economies.  Among that 
sample, Sri Lanka had the largest family ownership in listed companies at 64%. 
Weak-legal protection of investors is one of the main reasons for the prevalence of 
family-ownership in developing countries including Sri Lanka (La-Porta et al., 
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000).  Further, the underdeveloped financial markets restrict 
access to external financing and result in family dominant, highly concentrated 
ownership (La-Porta et al., 1997, 1998).  Moreover, consistent with the view of 
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Omran et al. (2008) the weak legal environment in Sri Lanka has resulted in 
companies moving to a high level of insider ownership which impacts the 
corporate governance mechanism.  From a PA perspective, concentrated 
ownership may reduce the agency conflict (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  In 
contrast, the main agency problem related with this concentrated ownership is risk 
of expropriation by large shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders.  
Javid & Iqbal (2008) explain this PP agency problem is often the result of a 
complex pyramid structure, interlocking directorships and cross shareholdings in 
highly concentrated ownership firms.  Implementation of a more developed stock 
market and ensuring investors’ protection is one to this problem of the main 
solutions for concentrated ownership in Sri Lanka.  
Institutional ownership is predominant in the Sri Lankan stock market.  
Manawaduge et al. (2008) suggest that a very high percentage of shares on the Sri 
Lankan stock market are owned by institutional investors.  Lee (2010) explains 
that due to the undeveloped equity market and weak investor protection, domestic 
investors are reluctant to invest in emerging markets with low levels of corporate 
governance reform. This may be one reason why foreign institutional ownership is 
dominant in Sri Lanka.  An, increase in institutional investor activities in the Sri 
Lankan share market is positively influenced through sound governance practices. 
3.1.3 Financial sector reforms 
The financial sector in Sri Lanka has been changing since the late 1980s, through   
deregulation and improved private sector involvement. Advice by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank saw Sri Lanka remove 
restrictions on interest rates, loans and exchange rate relations which encouraged 
foreign and domestic competitors to invest in financial markets in Sri Lanka and 
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reduce government interference in the market.   Edirisuriya (2007) says lack of 
financial literacy among Sri Lankan customers, state banks domination in the 
financial sector and the government’s lack of a clear goal for the financial market 
has limited the benefits from financial sector reforms.  The banking sector is the 
most important and dominant sector in the Sri Lanka financial system.  As at 
2008, the banking sector accounted for 94% of total deposits and more than 58% 
of total assets of the financial sector.  Non-financial institutes hold only 6% of 
financial sector assets (Siriwardhana, 2008).  Sri Lankan financial sector reform 
started with the banking industry.  Later it extended to equity markets, capital 
markets, electronic finance and rural micro finance sectors.  In Sri Lanka, 
financial sector reforms were mainly reflected by relaxing regulations and 
reducing state involvement of the financial sector (Edirisuriya, 2007). The 
regulations relaxed included interest rate deregulation, the introduction of market 
based credit policies, opportunities for foreign or private bank entries to invest in 
the financial sector and improved rules and regulations to enhance the security of 
the sector.   This deregulation lead to significant changes in the financial sector in 
Sri Lanka, including wide spread implementation and use of ATM facilities, 
internet banking, telephone banking, and EFTPOS, etc.  Moreover, due to the 
relaxation of financial market rules and regulations in 2007, there were 14 
financial institutes doing commercial banking activities in Sri Lanka.  In 2010, Sri 
Lanka has six banks among the 500 largest banks in Asia ("Country and 
Performance Topnotchers", 2010).  However, state owned banks still dominate Sri 
Lanka’s banking sector.    
Another significant outcome of financial sector reform is the establishment of the 
Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) in 1984.  As at November 2011, 272 companies 
were listed on the CSE with more than US$20 billion market capitalisation (CSE, 
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2011).  Another significant outcome is the level of liquidity in Sri Lankan 
commercial banks in line with international levels (Edirisuriya, 2007).   However, 
further financial deregulation and monitory policy changes are required to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Sri Lanka’s financial sector.   
3.1.4. Capital market in Sri Lanka 
Based on the Central Bank of Sri Lanka disclosure , Sri Lanka achieved economic 
growth of well above 6 % for four consecutive years (2005-2008), and in 2008, 
for the first time in history, per-capita income exceeded US $ 2000 ("Central Bank 
of Sri Lanka Annual Report”,2009).  This raised the current status of the country 
from a lower-income to lower-middle income country.  The Sri Lankan share 
market and corporate governance best practices played a leading role in achieving 
these extraordinary results.  
Colombage (2007) explains that existing microeconomic policies impose 
constraints and discourage levered finance in the firm’s capital structure.  Only 
10%  of total corporate debt in Sri Lanka is provided by listed and unlisted debt 
and debt instruments; the remaining 90% is provided by banks (Colombage 
(2007). 
To ensure a successful capital market, Abeysuria (2001) suggests both inside 
market development and around market development need to be considered.  
Inside market development includes increased market participants, and composed 
of local and foreign institutional investors, including pension funds, providence 
funds, insurance companies and financial institutions. Further intermediaries need 
to bring investors and issuers together to ensure fast and large financial market 
growth.  Inside market development also includes government commitment to 
enhance and established capital market in the country.  Considering market 
  
64 
 
development, capital market requires stabilised micro and political environments 
to retain and increase investors.  Many markets in the South Asia region suffer 
political instability and high volatility of inflation and interest rates.   These 
factors negatively affect capital market development in the South Asia region.   
Similar to other regional countries, Sri Lanka’s taxation has hindered the 
performance of the capital market.   Transaction taxes, stamp duties, and income 
taxes on the cost of issuing investment returns and intermediate profits hinder 
development. 
3.1.4.1 Stock market in Sri Lanka 
Share trading in Sri Lanka started in the 19th century, when British planters need 
to raise capital to establish tea plantations in Sri Lanka, which lead to the 
establishment of the Colombo Share Market in 1896.  This share market 
maintained high levels of activity before independence, when shares of 
companies’ registered in London, Bombay and Singapore were freely traded in 
the Colombo market, along with the local companies.  However, nationalisation of 
public entities in 1958 had a negative effect on the stock market and the open 
economic policies of 1977 lead to a reversal of the situation pertaining to the stock 
market in Sri Lanka.  After that, market showed volatility due to the highly 
uncertain political environment, a change of governments, and the breakdown of 
peace talks, highly volatile interest rates and decline in economic growth.  Since 
2008, the CSE has been Sri Lanka’s only stock exchange and is one of the best 
performing in Asia.   During recent years the CSE All Share Price Index (ASPI) 
has performed better than the Bombay Stock Exchange and the Karachi Stock 
Exchange.  
The CSE reports of two major price indices; the All Share Price Index (ASPI) and 
Milanka Price index (MPI).  The CSE introduced MPI on 4 January 1999. This 
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index consists of 25 selected companies (most liquid stocks weighted on market 
capitalisation) over the previous four quarters.   
The CSE provides opportunities to foreign investors and individuals to trade 
shares in listed companies of up to 100% of the issued capital except for a few 
companies.  As at 30 November 2011, the official list of companies on the CSE 
contained 272 companies representing 20 different sectors according to the core 
business activities of the companies.  Due to the global financial crisis in 2008, 
the CSE ASPI index fell by 40.9%.  However, according to a CSE media release 
(2010), during 2009, the performance of the CSE made it the second best 
performing stock market in the world.  Therefore more and more companies tried 
to take advantage of the “bull” trend of the CSE.   The performance of the equity 
market is highly correlated with the country’s political and peace environment. 
Additionally, equity market performance depends highly on the profitability of 
key market institutions and the sound economic situation of the country.  
3.1.4.2 The Bond market in Sri Lanka 
In Sri Lanka, the bond market commenced activities in the 1990s with the issuing 
of medium-and long-term bonds from the government and corporate sector.  
Long-term tradable government bonds (treasury bills) began in 1997, to meet the 
government budgetary requirements.  As a result of financial sector reforms and 
re-structuring, there was increased attention paid to the Sri Lanka bond market. 
The debt management policy restructure was done by shifting from issuing non-
marketable instruments (Rupee loans) and short-term marketable instruments 
(Treasury bills) to medium- and long-term marketable instruments.  Strengthening 
the legal and institutional framework, market infrastructure development and 
micro-economic policy changes positively affected the bond market and market-
based debt management in Sri Lanka (Siriwardhana, 2008).  
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Bond market development brings significant advantages to a country.  The first 
advantage is it strengthens the financial system of the country.  The second 
advantage is that it reduces the instability problem due to foreign currency 
mismatches.  Thirdly, it lessens the development of assets pricing bubbles.  
Fourthly, it expands opportunities for financial institutions to raise debt capital 
and finally, the development of the bond market helps the government to better 
structure and manages it best.  
However, compared to other developed and developing countries, Sri Lankan 
corporate bonds represent a low 0.26% of GDP.  According to the CSE (2000), 
corporate investments were mainly (70.7%) financed by retaining earnings, 23.7% 
by banks and development financial institutions via short term lending, 4.3% for 
FDI and only 1.2% by capital market finance. This is because in developing 
countries investors are more likely to rely on banks for external financing.    
However, the CSE reports in 2008 that corporate debentures recorded an increase 
in turnover on the previous year.  Colombage (2007) explains firm size is a 
significant factor for leverage accessibility in Sri Lanka, indicating larger firms 
tend to utilise higher leverage levels in their capital structure than their smaller 
counter parts.    
Corporate debt in Sri Lanka is mainly supplied by the banking sector.  Given 
evidence of the global financial crisis relating to curtailment of bank credit, the 
need to enhance fund diversification and develop the debt market is important to 
Sri Lanka.   The government understands the importance of funds diversity after 
the collapse of major banks and the Asian financial crisis.   As a result, in 2007 
the Sri Lankan budget indicated that the government had formulated a ten-year 
plan to increase the awareness of capital markets and other financial entities to 
create more capital for investment.  The Central Bank of Sri Lanka (2007) 
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indicated the importance of the bond market to the country.  The CSE and SEC in 
Sri Lanka also identified the importance of the country’s bond market.  However, 
the success of the corporate bond market depends largely on the micro economic 
environment stability of the country.   
3.2 Corporate governance in Sri Lanka 
The evolution of corporate governance mechanisms depends on the political, 
cultural and historical characteristics of a country (Prowse, 1999).  Pre-colonial 
Sri Lanka was a centralised kingship state.  Rules of governance were centralised 
and despotic.  Exchange, production and service providing was governance by 
various religious and social customs (Senevirathne, 1978).  After the kingship 
regime, Sri Lanka was subjected to centuries of Portuguese, Dutch and British 
domination.  From the time of independence in 1948, the legal system of Sri 
Lanka has developed into a complex mixture of English common law and Roman-
Dutch, Sinhalese, Muslim, and customary law.  In 1982, the Companies Act and 
later other corporate governance laws were passed regarding the functioning of 
joint-stock companies and protecting the investors’ rights.  
The legal system of a country plays an important role in shaping effective 
corporate governance while protecting shareholders and creditors.  Corporate 
governance necessities may differ from corporation to corporation, but the 
protection offered in the law (de jure protection) and to what extent the laws are 
enforced in real life (de facto protection) affects all businesses within the country 
in a similar way.    The legal system in Sri Lanka is built on the English common 
law system.  Among 18 English-origin law countries, the Sri Lankan shareholders 
right index score to 3, which is the second lowest value of the 18. The other 
countries in this category are Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Kenya (La-Porta et al., 
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2002). However, after introduced mandatory corporate governance rules for CSE 
listed companies from 1 April 2008, the World Bank rated investor protection in 
Sri Lanka as being slightly above the region, but still lower than the OECD 
averages.  Corporate governance practice is particularly important for developing 
countries since corporate governance issues are central to financial and economic 
development.  
As with several other South Asian regional countries, the Sri Lankan corporate 
governance system has features consistent with the Anglo-American model. 
However, from an ownership perspective and a banking relationship perspective, 
Sri Lanka’s corporate governance system is very different from the Anglo- 
American system.  From an agency perspective, Asian countries with 
concentrated ownership suffer more from PP agency costs, than PA agency costs 
(Lee, 2007).  Most of the Anglo- American countries with scattered ownership 
suffer high PA agency costs.  Another characteristic of Sri Lankan corporate 
structure is a financial sector dominated by banks (Lee, 2007).  Banks are the 
primary financial supporter of companies and the two often have complex and 
long relationships. Due to a weak legal structure and undeveloped micro-
economic environment, Sri Lankan companies highly depend on banks for capital 
funding.  Sri Lanka’s corporate debt level is significantly less than developed 
countries. Sri Lankan corporate leverage is 44% of book value and 39% of market 
value (Colombage, 2007).  However, G-7 countries’ corporate leverage ratio 
range between 54% and 73% for book value and 40% to 70 % for market value 
(Rajan & Zingales, 1995a).  Furthermore, complex tax charges imposed by the Sri 
Lankan government drastically reduced the secondary market trading in debt 
securities ("Nuisance Tax ", 2009).  Another distinguishing characteristic of Sri 
Lankan corporate governance is state intervention, which is relatively higher than 
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in Anglo-Saxon model countries.  As an example, according to the “Investment 
Climate Report” (2009), state sector banks are dominant in the banking sector and 
comprise 40% of total banking sector assets.  These characteristics of ownership - 
the bank-company relationship, debt, and government interventions all work to 
create a different structure of the micro economic environment.  Therefore, the Sri 
Lankan model of corporate governance mechanism is distinguished from the 
Anglo- American model and creates a unique corporate governance environment.  
The key finding of Corporate Governance Survey in Sri Lankan (2007) is 
indicated that senior executives have high awareness of good corporate 
governance practices and benefits.  More than 80% of senior executives believe 
good corporate governance enhances organisational performance and 
shareholders’ value.  Ninety-six percent of senior executives believe the audit 
committee is the most important principal to ensure good corporate governance in 
Sri Lanka.  Most Sri Lankan companies (more than 87%) maintain a sufficient 
number of non-executive directors.  Further, many listed companies have unitary 
boards with mixed non-executive and executive directors (Waring & Pierce, 
2005).   Further, the above survey confirmed board involvement in strategy and 
goal setting in Sri Lankan companies is high, separation of ownership and control 
is an increasing trend and the survey confirmed as at 2002 only 38% of the 
companies had CEO duality (Waring & Pierce, 2005).  However, the Institute of 
Policy Studies (IPS) (2009) finds that even though corporate governance rules and 
laws changed, corporate governance and risk management issues have still not 
received enough attention by the Sri Lankan government.  Further, the IPS 
explains that to face the global financial scandals and control intra-country 
financial collapses, Sri Lanka needs to reduce financial market regulations.   The 
report goes on to say that Sri Lanka’s financial company collapses and internal 
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financial problems arise mainly due to ‘pyramid structure’ of companies rather 
than global financial disgraces. 
3.3 Recent development in CG practice in Sri Lanka  
The legal framework for corporate governance in Sri Lanka is primarily contained 
in the Companies Act, No. 17 of 1982.   Sri Lankan public companies which were 
established under the Companies Act No.17 or any other statutory corporation, 
incorporated or established under the laws of Sri Lanka may apply to the 
exchange for admission to the official list.  This Act, as amended by Act No. 13 of 
1991, provides the main legal principles for Sri Lankan companies.  However, the 
Companies Act, No.17 and Act No. 13 are not very effective in ensuring best 
corporate governance practices (Wickramasinghe, 2006). Recently, the 
Companies Act, No 7 of 2007 addressed shortfalls of old company Acts in an 
effort to ensure best practices in corporate governance in Sri Lanka.  
3.3.1 Companies Act 7 – 2007 
The most significant legislation enacted in Sri Lanka in 2007 was the Companies 
Act 7 of 2007.  This became effective on 3 March 2007 and replaced the 25-year-
old Companies Act 17 of 1982.   This new company law significantly changed the 
old company law (1982) by moving away from its traditional affiliation to the 
company law in England and aligned itself to a legal system based on the New 
Zealand Companies Act of 1993. The following six significant developments and 
changes were introduced by the Sri Lanka new Companies Act 7 of 2007 i.e., 
stakeholders rights move from ‘contract to’ statute’; long existing concepts are 
eliminated; new concepts of company law, reduced restrictions and provisions for 
greater flexibility, new concepts introduced related to capital, distributions and 
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duties of directors, strengthened stakeholders rights and the provision of 
alternative dispute resolution procedures are introduced. 
The Companies Act No. 7 of 2007 is a significant development in company law in 
Sri Lankan, but it still has the following shortfalls.  First, it fails to recognise 
essential practices adopted by a company. E.g: the treatment of issuing bonus 
shares.  Secondly, the new Act includes some compulsory responsibilities for 
directors that appear burdensome in the context of Sri Lanka’s economic climate. 
Finally, the Sinhala version of the Act, which takes superiority, has 
inconsistencies with the English version.  
Actual corporate governance reform started in Sri Lanka in 1997 with the 
publication of the “Voluntary Code of Corporate Governance” by the Chartered 
Accountants of Sri Lanka (ICASL).  This fundamentally addressed the issues 
relating to financial aspects of corporate governance.  This voluntary code was 
followed by the “Code of Best Practices on Audit Committee” issued by ICASL 
in 2002.  Thereafter ICASL jointly with the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) of Sri Lanka issued “Code of Best Practices on Corporate Governance” in 
2003.  However, Cabraal (2003) reports most of the companies in Sri Lanka do 
not actually follow this voluntary code.  This is confirmed by Mudalige (2006) 
who posits more than half of the listed companies in Sri Lanka do not comply 
with the voluntary code, despite it being in existence for several years.  
The corporate governance code (2003) was revised in 2005 jointly by ICASL and 
SEC. The draft standards were formulated based on a combination of codes from 
the UK, the New York Stock Exchange, the code of corporate governance of 
Singapore and principles for good governance and best practice recommendations 
from the Australian Stock Exchange, the Malaysian code of corporate governance 
and the corporate governance report of the securities and exchange board of India, 
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all with the view to formulate rules with practical application in Sri Lanka.  This 
draft code expects openness, integrity and accountability of listed firms in Sri 
Lanka (Wickramasinghe, 2006).  It focuses on the following factors; the board of 
directors, audit committee and remuneration committee.  
Subsequently, in early January 2007, the Sri Lankan securities regulator 
introduced a revised corporate governance code for listed companies, and made it 
mandatory from 1 April 2008.  This mandatory rule was implemented in two 
stages.   The first phase, which started in the 2007 financial year, gave listed firms 
time to fall into line and created awareness in the business community of the need 
for best practices in corporate governance.  Moreover, listed firms had to publish 
details of how far they complied with or deviated from the new mandatory 
corporate governance code.  The second phase started on 1 April 2008. Listed 
firms have to include an “affirmative statement” and disclose they fully comply 
with corporate governance standards introduced by SEC, ICASL and CSE.   This 
new mandatory corporate governance code precisely addressed the minimum 
number of non-executive directors and independent directors in the corporate 
board, the criteria for determining the ‘independence’, confessions required to be 
made by listed companies in respect of its directorate, audit committee and 
remuneration committee minimal requirements (De-Silva, 2007).  
3.3.2 Code of best practice on corporate governance- 2008 
 A new corporate governance code was introduced in 2007 and made compulsory 
by 1 April 2008 for all listed companies in Sri Lanka.  According to the president 
of ICASL in Sri Lanka the new corporate governance code key aspects of the new 
code are:  
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Ensure success of the company through a collectively responsible board - This is 
the main rule of the corporate governance mandatory code 2008.  Every public 
company needs to be directed or controlled by a board of directors.  The board 
should be responsible for implementing business strategies of the company, 
internal control of the company and risk management.  
Ensure balance of the board - Board balance is mainly ensured through the 
following activities.  First, there needs to be a clear division between chairman 
and CEO responsibilities to ensure balance of power and authority of the 
company.   To avoid expropriation of company benefits and disperse corporate 
control among many individuals the company board should consist of at least two 
non-executive directors or the equivalent to one third of total number of directors, 
whichever is the higher.   To ensure board balance, the company is required to 
establish an independent audit committee and a remuneration committee.   
Ensure directors interest in the company - All the directors need to disclose their 
interest in the company.  This ensures unbiased transaction by the company and 
transparency with regards financial decisions.  Directors need to declare all their 
materials interests in contracts involving the company.  Furthermore, they need to 
disclose other board related activities; whether they are on the boards of other 
companies and their roles on committees.  
Enhance transparency of appointments and remunerations - Every company 
annual report should contain a statement of remuneration policy and detail 
remuneration. This should include remuneration committee details and aggregate 
remuneration for executive and non-executive directors.  Appointment of directors 
should disclose, including a brief resume of each director, names of directorships 
and membership of board committees.  
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Enhance rights of the shareholders - The corporate governance new mandatory 
code states that a listed company should conduct regular communication with 
institutional shareholders to increase awareness of company activities.  It also 
mentions that individual shareholders should be encouraged to participate in 
general meetings and present their views.  
3.4 Corporate governance monitoring agencies in Sri Lanka 
To obtain high investor protection and maximize the shareholder wealth the Sri 
Lankan government introduced improved corporate governance practices.  Over 
the past two decades corporate governance has been continuously and constantly 
developing, responding, reacting and pro-acting.  Some reactions and changes can 
be described as response to world financial climate changes, some initiatives can 
be categorised as proactive treatment to achieve the desired goal of an emerging 
country.   This rapid change enhanced the decision making and investor protection 
of the country and strengthened financial markets and the micro-economic 
environment of the country.  It involved regulatory and semi-regulatory 
organisations and authorities, such as Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE), Securities 
and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka (SEC), Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Sri Lanka (ICASL), and the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce 
(CCC).  All were involved to ensure the corporate governance practices were 
introduced and implemented by Sri Lankan companies.  
3.4.1 Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka (ICASL) 
The ICASL of Sri Lanka is the main professional accounting body of Sri Lanka.  
The ICASL is a member of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), 
The Confederation of Asian and Pacific Accountants (CAPA) and a founder 
member of the South Asian Federation of Accountants (SAFA).  ICASL is the 
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pioneer institute which first introduced codifying corporate governance principles 
to the country.  First, ICASL introduced the ‘Code of Best Practice on matters 
related to financial aspects of corporate governance” in 1996 and updated it in 
2003. 
3.4.2 Securities Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka (SEC) 
The SEC was established in 1987 in Sri Lanka, to obtain financial sector and 
capital market development in country.  This was one of the first SECs set-ups in 
the South Asia region.  It became more active in early 1990s after the collapse of 
many companies, especially financial institutions in Sri Lanka.  This SEC plays a 
highly significant role developing Sri Lanka’s capital market and works to 
improve corporate governance practices. This commission initiated a central 
depositary system, laws relating to insider trading and formulation of mergers and 
takeover codes, etc.   Furthermore, the SEC is engaged to monitor and supervise 
the CSE, granting licence to the stock exchange, protecting the interest of 
investors, regulating the securities market and ensuring the professional standards 
of such markets.  The SEC of Sri Lanka was actively involved in the 2002 edition 
of the corporate governance code for improving and promoting the use of capital 
market advantages via good corporate governance practices.  
3.4.3 Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) 
The CSE was incorporated 2 December 1985.  The CSE’s primary objective is 
strengthening the security market by improving the infrastructure and regulatory 
framework.  At the moment, the CSE focuses on market development and 
diversification (CSE, 2008).  Additionally, at present the CSE provide facilities 
for the secondary trading of equity and debt instruments via the debt security 
trading system (DEX) which was implemented in 2003.  The CSE operates as a 
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self-regulatory organisation under the supervision of the SEC.  Presently, the CSE 
consists of 272 listed companies representing 20 business sectors.  In terms of the 
contribution of sectors to the total market capitalization for the year 2008, the 
telecommunications sector was the largest contributor with 21.44%, followed by 
the banking, finance and insurance sector which contributed 16.97%.  The CSE 
exchange has two main price indexes, the All Share Price Index (ASPI) and 
Milanka Price Index (MPI).  Except for a few companies, foreign investors have 
no restrictions if they choose to participate in CSE activity.  
3.4.4 Central bank of Sri Lanka (CBS) 
In addition to the general and traditional function of the Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka, the bank provides regulatory functions.  This is the supervisory bank to 
help improve corporate governance practices and credit delivery systems in other 
banks and financial institutes in Sri Lanka. To maintain the financial health of 
finance companies in Sri Lanka, the CBS introduced a draft mandatory rule on 
corporate governance for registered finance companies (2007). This document’s 
preliminary focus is on the auditing and risk management of financial institutes. 
Secondly, it deals with information technology matters related to corporate 
governance.  Thirdly, it has guidelines related to the financial institute or bank 
boards’ responsibilities, CEO, chairman and other directors, committees and 
rights of minority shareholders, etc.  
3.4.5 Ceylon Chamber of Commerce (CCC) 
The Ceylon Chamber of Commerce was established on 25 March 1839, under 
British rule.  In 2001/2002, the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce issued a “corporate 
governance” booklet with the key corporate governance principles desirable to Sri 
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Lanka. Moreover, the CCC promotes best practices on corporate governance 
among its members and affiliated institutes.  
3.4.6 The Sri Lanka Institute of Directors (SLID) 
This has brought together large number of company directors who are actively 
involved in administration and corporate governance issues in their companies.  
SLID holds regular meetings to discuss the corporate governance issues of the 
companies and to develop improvements to corporate governance practices. The 
CCC has launched several programmes to educate directors about corporate 
governance practices in the board room and in the company.    
3.5 The limitations of existing corporate governance practices in 
Sri Lanka 
Gunarathne & Saram (2009) argue that though the Companies Act No. 7 of 2007 
addresses the shortfalls of treatment of capital, directors’ duties and stakeholders’ 
rights, listing rules have not been addressed.  According to the Waduge (2010) 
one reason for weak company accountability is because of the requirement for a 
board to have one third independent directors.  The second problem is limited 
transparency.  Financial and annual reports require only limited basic information 
from the company accounts.  This creates potential for information asymmetry 
problems.  The third limitation of the new code of corporate governance relates to 
shareholders’ rights and firm efficiency.  Firm performance and accountability 
measures are missing from the rules.  Moreover, the new code emphasises the 
promotion of board directors’ independence rather than stakeholder rights and 
firm efficiency through the objectives of directors.  
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3.6 An overview of FDI in Sri Lanka 
The Foreign Investment Act 1987 opens up investment in Sri Lanka to attract 
foreign investment.  Investment has been actively canvassed and the BOI report 
(2002) indicates there were over 1000 companies from 55 countries operating in 
Sri Lanka (Athukorala, 2003).  Privatisation and deregulation of policies helped to 
attract FDI to the country.    Agrawal & Gort (2002) investigated the economic 
impact of FDI in south Asian countries i.e, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka 
and Nepal and found linkage effects between foreign and national investments.  
Moreover, they argue FDI inflows on GDP growth rate were negative before 
1980, and then the early 1980s began to show a positive effect which became even 
stronger during the late ‘80s and early ’90s.   
Various exemptions, including tax holidays, duty free imports, and 100% foreign 
equity ownership are the major reasons that Sri Lanka attracted global giants and 
FDI in recent decades.   According to the “FDI in Sri Lanka” (2010) Sri Lankan 
FDI inflows decreased after 2000, due to the downturn in world economic 
activities.  Furthermore, the civil war and political uncertainty and the stagnation 
of the Japanese economy and Middle-east uncertainty adversely affected the FDI 
inflows in Sri Lanka in recent years. 
 After the end of the its civil war, Sri Lanka’s FDI inflows in the first six months 
of 2010 reached US$425 million.  The top five investing countries in 2010 were 
India, Malaysia, Britain, China and Mauritius.  Multinational corporations play a 
significant role in FDI flows in Sri Lanka.  As the number of MNCs increases and 
they continue to be more relevant and important, their corporate governance 
activities become essential in aligning the subsidiaries’ and parent interests.  
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3.6.1 Free Trade Zones (FTZ) in Sri Lanka 
FTZs are a key aspect of liberalisation and industrialisation in developing country 
economies.  To attract new business and especially foreign inflows, the Sri 
Lankan government started free trade zones in the late1970s.  Foreign ownership 
gradually increased from the early 1980s. Like other countries FTZs, Sri Lanka 
provides several incentives to the foreign investors.  Comparing the South Asia 
region, the Sri Lanka offered more benefits than India to attract foreign investors. 
This included 100% foreign ownership, and the elimination of tariff and quotas. In 
addition, in the late 1990s the Sri Lankan government provided interest free loans 
of up to 20 million Sri Lankan rupees to start-up businesses in the rural free trade 
zone. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed of the overall corporate governance reforms in Sri 
Lanka from 1997 to 2010.  Sri Lanka’s institutional reforms process has brought 
about a shift away from state-owned companies and central planning to greater 
market orientation which started in the late 1970s. Since the commencement of 
the reform process and FDI inflows, Sri Lanka has achieved strong economic 
growth.  Foreign investment has been actively promoted in Sri Lanka and there 
are now more than 1000 companies from 55 countries operating in Sri Lanka. An 
investor-friendly environment, including a tax holidays, duty free imports and 
100% foreign equity ownership  are the major  factors that have attracting global 
investors to Sri Lanka.  Furthermore, the end of almost three decaded of civil war 
is another reason for the boost in business opportunities and FDI inflows in Sri 
Lanka after 2009.  
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A significant driving force of the reform agenda is the Companies Act No 17, 
which was introduced in 1982.   The recently introduced Companies Act No.7 of 
2007 it makes a significant development to company law in Sri Lanka, making 
important and wide ranging changes.  Meanwhile, the government took several 
steps to improve the operational and regulatory infrastructure to facilitate such 
development by encouraging the restructuring of the Colombo Stock Exchange, 
the founding of the Securities Exchange Commission and other complementary 
bodies such as the Sri Lankan Accounting and Auditing standards Board. 
In addition to the changes made to the securities laws to align with the trading 
partners, there have also been changes made to improve the standard of corporate 
governance practiced in Sri Lanka.  The actual corporate governance reforms 
started in 1997 with the publication of the “voluntary code of corporate 
governance”.  This fundamentally addresses the issues relating to financial aspects 
of corporate governance.  To assist Sri Lankan companies to access global 
portfolio equity, Sri Lanka introduced the “corporate governance best practice 
mandatory code on 1 April 2008, expecting to achieve accountability and 
transparency as well as environmental and social sustainability.    Since the new 
code was introduced, there are still problems of accountability, transparency and 
efficiency; therefore further opportunities for corporate governance reform 
remain.  
Chapter 4 will provide the theory, hypotheses and empirical model development 
for this study. 
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Chapter 4 
Hypotheses and Empirical Model Development 
4.0 Introduction 
Evidence concerning differences in the financial performance of MNCs and LPCs 
are mixed in the literature.   Though some studies have been carried out in 
European countries, these studies’ limitations suggest that corporate governance 
and firms’ financial performance and agency costs are not defined adequately in 
the light of important factors affecting the financial performances in MNCs and 
LPCs.  Furthermore, the process by which the value of the firm is affected by 
corporate governance factors differs between countries.  These differences are due 
to legal, economic and socio-cultural factors in the individual countries.  Within 
the prior literature, there is no study that examines issues in corporate governance 
and company (MNCs and LPCs) financial performance and agency costs in a Sri 
Lankan context.  This is an interesting topic because since 2006 the number of 
MNCs arriving in Sri Lanka has dramatically increased.  During the past few 
years, improving corporate governance has played a leading role in improving 
performance in Sri Lanka’s listed companies.  It is now compulsory for companies 
to comply with the corporate governance rules that form part of the listing rules of 
the CSE, effective from 1 April 2008.   
In this study, financial performance is considered from three perspectives - the 
marketing based financial performance proxy (Tobin’s Q), the accounting based 
financial performance proxy (ROA) and the shareholders value creation proxy 
(ROE).  Moreover, agency costs are considered from three perspectives; i.e., PA 
agency costs measured as assets utilisation ratio, Q- dummy free cash flow and PP 
agency costs measured as dividend payout ratio.  In terms of corporate governance 
attributes, the study uses corporate governance indicators like board 
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characteristics (board size, board composition and board leadership) and firm 
characteristics (firm size, firm age, leverage, etc.). 
This chapter is structured as follows.  Section 4.1 presents the research framework 
of this study.  Section 4.2 presents the conceptual framework.  Section 4.3 deals 
with the testable hypotheses development of the current study.  Section 4.4 
concludes the chapter.   
4.1 Research Framework 
Prior studies have focused only on specific features of corporate governance, 
which makes it difficult to understand the actual relationship between corporate 
governance and firm financial performance.  A vast body of literature evaluates 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance as measured 
by market-based performance measures and accounting-based performance 
measures. Most of the evidence confirms a positive relationship between good 
corporate governance variables and financial performance proxies.  However, 
Love (2010) explains that most of the corporate governance literature suffers 
endogeneity problems that are difficult to resolve.  
In recent studies, Hermalin & Weisback (2003); Denis & Kruse (2000) and 
Wintoki et al. (2007) explain the effect of unobservable firm-specific factors, 
which simultaneously determine firm financial performance and firm corporate 
governance.  They also explain the causal effect of corporate governance and firm 
financial performance.  Wintoki et al. (2007) find that corporate governance and 
firm financial performance relationship may suffer from three possible sources of 
endogeneity; namely unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic 
endogeneity.  Therefore results of studies ignoring possible endogeneity issues 
need to be interpreted with caution.  
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Most prior research is based on UK, US and other developed markets that have 
market centric economies with widely held ownership, high investor protection 
and highly liquid stock markets. That dispersed ownership structure gives more 
decision-making power to corporate managers and leads to higher PA agency 
cost.  The rest of the corporate governance research has focused on Europe and 
Japanese markets where the relationship mechanism operates and where there is 
more reliance on large investors and banks.   The research findings from market 
centric economies and relationship based economies may not be relevant to an 
emerging economy like Sri Lanka where there is predominantly concentrated 
ownership, low investor protection and a restricted capital market.  This is in line 
with Miguel et al. (2004) who studied the corporate governance structure of six 
countries and concluded that corporate governance and financial performance is 
significantly determined by the nature of the existing governance system of the 
country; its general rules and regulations, cultural and other ethical issues.   This 
unique structure creates an environment for a different corporate governance 
model.  Moreover, though the market centric and relationship based models are 
widely discussed in literature, they have not been extensively examined in 
emerging economies.  Furthermore, corporate governance mandatory principals 
(2008) and other rules and regulations are still new to the Sri Lanka. Therefore 
studies related to this field will help to enhance further development of corporate 
governance in Sri Lanka.  
This study examines whether LPCs and MNCs subsidiaries do have different 
governance structures and studies the effects of those governance mechanisms on 
financial performance and the agency costs of the companies.  This study makes a 
number of contributions to the literature.  First, it is adds to the empirical evidence 
on the relationships between corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial 
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performance and agency costs.  By studying a wide range of corporate governance 
variables, it enhances the understanding of how different corporate governance 
mechanisms collaborate with company financial performance and agency costs.  
Secondly, most existing studies use data from developed countries with western 
culture. Cultural, structural and legal differences influence individual behaviours, 
leadership and management activities.  This study provides evidence from Sri 
Lanka, which is a developing country with pyramid ownership and a weak 
regulatory system, similar to other emerging economies.  Thirdly, this research 
undertakes the first direct study of company financial performance, agency costs 
and corporate governance mechanisms in listed Sri Lankan companies (both MNC 
subsidiaries and LPCs) representing all industries except the financial sector. 
Fourthly, this study adopts a generalised method of moment dynamic panel 
technique to control the endogeneity effect of board characteristics and ownership 
structures and reverse causality on financial performance and agency costs.  Most 
of the previous studies did not explore the endogeneity effect of board 
characteristics and ownership structure and they explored 2SLS or 3SLS 
regression technique for selected variables only.   
4.2 Conceptual framework 
In order to understand corporate governance and financial performance and 
agency conflicts variables in relation to MNCs in Sri Lanka, it is necessary to 
know the major corporate governance pillars that contribute to the home country 
corporate governance system and the host country corporate governance system.  
In addition, firm-specific factors, strategic, environmental and cultural factors 
may potentially play a significant role.  For LPCs, corporate governance 
mechanisms are based on the Sri Lanka corporate governance system.   
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Corporate governance mechanisms of LPCs can be categorised as internal 
corporate governance mechanisms and external corporate governance 
mechanisms.    
MNCs’ corporate governance mechanisms are influenced by both host country 
and home country corporate governance systems.  Depending on legal and 
regulatory frameworks, MNCs’ corporate governance models can be categorised 
into three broad categories; the Anglo-US model, German model and Japanese 
model.  Therefore, this study considers MNCs’ parent company location to be an 
important variable to determine corporate governance mechanisms in subsidiaries. 
Another distinguishing variable in MNC subsidiaries is the foreign manager. 
However, a foreign manager’s contribution to a subsidiary’s financial 
performance has not been established yet. Therefore, this study includes foreign 
managers as an independent variable to check the effect of Sri Lankan firms’ 
performance.  Figure 4.1 depicts the conceptual framework below. 
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3.3 Hypothesis  
The research questions have been stated do hypotheses to facilitate statistical inferences regarding the questions raised.  
 
Hypothesis 1:  
 
H0: There is no significant difference between the governance mechanism of MNC subsidiaries and governance mechanism of LPCs 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Figure 4.1 Conceptual framework: Financial performance of LPCs and MNCs in Sri Lanka 
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4.3 Hypotheses development 
The hypotheses presented in this study will be tested in different firms in the 
context of social, economic and political factors important to the LPCs and MNCs 
in Sri Lanka.  
4.3.1 Description of hypotheses 
This section provides theoretical and empirical links between research questions 
and develops the research hypotheses.  The first hypotheses concern the board size 
and financial performances and agency costs of MNC subsidiaries and LPCs in 
Sri Lanka.  The hypotheses are as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: 
The issue of board size became more prominent in the 1990s when more emphasis 
was placed on governance mechanisms; however the impact of board size and 
firm financial performance is still inconclusive.  Optimal board size differs 
depending on country, firm and industry.  According to Ning et al.,(2010), 
optimal board size for US public listed companies ranges from 8 to 11 board 
members.  "Corporate Governance Report 2009: Boards in Turbulent Times" 
(2009) states European companies’ average board size is 11.8.  How board size is 
determined can be explained by two major theories; agency costs theory and 
resource dependency theory.   When a firm’s board size is smaller than the 
optimal, it is likely board size will be increased.  This is aligning with resource 
dependency theory.  On the other hand, when firms have larger boards, they are 
more likely to reduce board numbers.  This reduces the free-rider problem and 
conflict inheritance in larger boards and aligns with agency costs theory.  
Yermack (1996), using 797 small firms across eight years, provides empirical 
evidence of a negative relationship between board size and firm financial 
performance.   Further, Hermalin & Weisbach (2003a) argue that larger boards 
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increase agency costs and free-rider problems with directors.  They also explain 
that larger boards can often move into a more figurative role, rather than fulfilling 
the intended function as part of management.   Compared with larger boards, a 
smaller board may be less burdened with bureaucratic problems and may be more 
functional.   
In a meta-analysis of 131 studies drawn from an aggregate of 20,620 companies, 
Dalton et al. (1999) find larger boards are associated with better financial 
performance. They explain that larger boards have more relevant expertise and 
therefore in the case of earnings management, large boards consist of more 
independent directors with finance and corporate experience.  However, corporate 
board size is influenced by other environmental and firm specific factors.  
Generally, large and complicated firms require large boards with a lot of expertise 
and high accessibly to market resources.  This is in line with Coles et al. (2008) 
who argue that when firms switch from simple to complex, board size increases to 
the optimal board size to achieve higher financial performance.   
After controlling for a possible endogeneity effect, Drakos & Bekiris (2010) find a 
significant negative relationship with board size and company financial 
performance.  There is very little prior research addressing endogeneity of board 
size and company financial performance. Board size, is known to be correlated 
with observable and unobservable firm characteristics that are potentially 
correlated with firm financial performance (Bennedsen et al., 2007). Considering 
this endogenous effect Jong et al. (2000) and Black et al. (2003) find significant 
relationship of firm financial performance and board size in Dutch and Korean 
firms, respectively. This study will address possible endogeneity of board size 
collectively with other board structure variables.  
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Therefore, the following hypotheses are postulated regarding the board size and 
corporate governance relationship in MNCs and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
H1a1 : There is no significant association between firm board size and financial 
performance of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H1a2 : There is no significant association between firm board size and PA agency 
costs of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H1a3 : There is no significant association between firm board size and PP agency 
costs of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H1b1: There is no significant association between firm board size and financial 
performance of LPC in Sri Lanka.  
H1b2 : There is no significant association between firm board size and PA agency 
costs of LPC in Sri Lanka.  
H1b3 : There is no significant association between firm board size and PP agency 
costs of LPC in Sri Lanka.  
 
The next hypotheses concern the non-executive directors’ percentage and 
financial performances and agency costs of MNC subsidiaries and LPCs in Sri 
Lanka.  The hypotheses are as follows. 
Hypothesis 2: 
The code of best practice on corporate governance (2008) in Sri Lanka 
recommended that all publicly listed companies’ boards should include sufficient 
calibre of non-executive directors.  According to the corporate governance survey 
in Sri Lanka (2007), 87% of respondents consider that balance between non-
executive directors and executive directors are appropriate in Sri Lankan listed 
companies. The Cadbury Report (1992), Hampel report (1998) and Higgs report 
(2003) recommended more non-executive directors for UK boards.     
Findings about the relationship between the inclusion of independent non-
executive directors and the financial performance of a firm provide mixed 
evidence.  Schellenger et al. (1989) posit a positive relationship between the non-
executive proportion of the board and corporate financial performance.   Based on 
a series of semi structured interviews, Long et al. (2005) compare the role of non-
executive directors between listed and unlisted UK companies by studying 
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strategy involvement, financial monitoring, and overall board contribution 
perspectives.  They find that non-executive directors in listed firms create high 
levels of transparency, shareholder perception, information asymmetry, and the 
impact of corporate governance regulation.   
Many researchers have identified that non-executive directors may provide 
effective monitoring, but the following evidence suggests the opposite. First, the 
Higgs Report (2003) finds the recruitment process for non-executive directors’ is 
highly prejudiced.   The report says 95% of non-executive appointments are based 
on personal contacts and only 4% of non-executive directors had formal 
interviews.   Secondly, Jensen (1993) finds that non-executive directors are often 
lacking expertise in the field which is meant to be there are of expertise.  
Therefore monitoring effectiveness is reduced.  Moreover, Young (2000) explains 
that non-executive directors’ board monitoring can be irrelevant, costly and can be 
a threat to board unity.   Further, Harris & Raviv (2008) suggest that board 
structure depend on the firm’s characteristics and its contracting environment.  
Therefore the effects of non-executive directors percentage is remain an open 
question on which this study seeks to shed light.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Therefore the following hypotheses are formulated in regard to non-executive 
directors in Sri Lankan companies.  
H2a1 : There is no significant association between percentage  of non-executive 
directors and financial performance of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H2a2 : There is no significant association between percentage of non-executive 
directors and PA agency costs of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H2a3 : There is no significant association between percentage of non-executive 
directors and PP agency costs of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H2b1 : There is no significant association between percentage of non-executive 
directors and financial performance of LPCs  in Sri Lanka.  
H2b2 : There is no significant association between percentage of non-executive 
directors and PA agency costs of LPCs  in Sri Lanka.  
H2b3 : There is no significant association between percentage of non-executive 
directors and PP agency costs of LPCs  in Sri Lanka.  
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The next hypotheses concern insider ownership, financial performance and 
agency costs of MNC subsidiaries and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  The hypotheses are as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 3: 
In corporate finance, the relationship between insider ownership and firm 
financial performance is an important and contested area.   Morack et al. (1988) 
and McConnell & Servaes (1990) investigate the relationship between top 
management ownership, known as insider ownership, and company financial 
performance.  They find a significant non-linear relationship.   
Sheu & Yang (2005) analyse Taiwan’s electronic industry and posit stock 
ownership of top managers in high-tech companies positively affects company 
financial performance.  Chen et al. (2003) find similar results between insider 
ownership and firm performance if they control for fixed effects.   Their result is 
stable after the treatment of insider ownership and performance proxy (Tobin’s Q) 
as causality in a simultaneous equation system.  McKnight & Weir (2009) 
examine the impact of governance and managerial ownership variable on agency 
costs using UK quoted companies.  They find insider ownership and agency costs 
have a negative significant relationship, which indicates that increasing insider 
ownership positively affects overall firm performance. While previous research is 
predominantly derived from market-centric models and relationship-based 
models, there is also some emerging market model evidence.  Zeitun & Gary 
(2007) examine the Jordan Stock Exchange and find that there is a significant 
relationship between ownership concentration and ROA.  Abor & Nicholas (2007) 
examine Ghana SME’s and found insider ownership has significant positive 
impacts on profitability.  Manawaduge et al. (2008) find positive relationships 
between insider ownership and ROA in a Sri Lankan context.   
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Recently, Demsetz & Villalonga (2001) examined the insider ownership 
proportion and firm financial performance, while considering insider ownership as 
an endogeneity effect.  However, they cannot find any significant relationship 
between insider ownership percentage and corporate financial performance.  
Therefore, the following hypotheses are postulated regarding insider ownership, 
financial performance and corporate governance relationship in MNCs and LPCs 
in Sri Lanka.  
H3a1 : There is no significant association between percentage of insider ownership 
and financial performance of MNC subsidiaries in Sri Lanka.  
H3a2 : There is no significant association between percentage of insider ownership 
and PA agency costs of MNC subsidiaries in Sri Lanka.  
H3a3 : There is no significant association between percentage of insider ownership 
and PP agency costs of MNC subsidiaries in Sri Lanka.  
H3b1 : There is no significant association between percentage of insider ownership 
and financial performance of LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
H3b2 : There is no significant association between percentage of insider ownership 
and PA agency costs of LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
H3b3 : There is no significant association between percentage of insider ownership 
and PP agency costs of LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
 
The next hypothesis concerns the board diversity and financial performances and 
agency costs of MNC subsidiaries in Sri Lanka.  The hypothesis is as follows. 
Hypothesis 4: 
Board diversity has been a growing area of research in recent years. There are two 
major reasons why board diversity could lead to superior performance in a 
company.  The first reason is that board diversity is seen as part of good corporate 
governance practice, and prior research suggests a diversified board increases 
company financial performance (Carter et al., 2003).  The second reason is that a 
diversified board reduces agency conflict between managers and shareholders.  
Carter et al. (2003) argue that board diversity increases board independence, 
hence it reduces misalignment of manager and shareholder interests.  Barnhart et 
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al. (1994) explain that through discussion, the exchange of ideas on a diversified 
board improves board performance by providing new insights and perspectives.     
However, some studies find a negative relationship between board diversity and 
firm financial performance or a non-significant relationship.  Ancona & Caldwell 
(1992) explain that if diversity increases financial performance, the high costs of 
coordination and communication among a diverse top management team can 
ultimately increase company costs. Further, Hambrick et al. (1996) explain 
heterogeneous group decision making is less efficient than homogenous board 
decision making, and this affects a firm’s competitive behaviour. Consistent with 
that, Pelled et al. (1999), Amason (1996) and Carpenter (2002) suggest that a 
heterogeneity group can negatively affect communication in a top management 
team.  Moreover, from an agency perspective, Jensen (1993) explains that largely 
diversified boards are less effective in controlling management.  Hence, 
diversified boards have more agency problems than non-diversified boards.  
Finally, there are some studies who found no significant relationship between 
board diversity and firm financial performance/agency costs.  Farrell & Hersch 
(2005) founds that board gender diversity does not result in any value creation or 
deduction.  Rose (2007) found no significant relationship between board gender, 
nationality and educational diversity and firm financial performance in Danish 
firms.  Moreover, Walt et al. (2006) investigated the level of board diversity in 
board composition. They also fail to find any significant relationship between 
board diversity and firm financial performance in New Zealand context.  
Thus, the following hypotheses are formulated regarding board diversity and firm 
financial performance and agency costs in MNCs and LPCs in Sri Lanka. 
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H4a1 : There is no significant association between board diversity and financial 
performance of MNC subsidiaries in Sri Lanka.  
H4a2 : There is no significant association between board diversity and PA agency 
costs of MNC subsidiaries in Sri Lanka. 
H4a3 : There is no significant association between board diversity and PP agency 
costs of MNC subsidiaries in Sri Lanka. 
H4b1 : There is no significant association between board diversity and financial 
performance of LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
H4b2 : There is no significant association between board diversity and PA agency 
costs of LPCs in Sri Lanka. 
H4b3 : There is no significant association between board diversity and PP agency 
costs of LPCs in Sri Lanka. 
 
The next hypotheses concern female board director percentage on boards and 
financial performance of MNCs and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  The hypotheses are as 
follows. 
Hypothesis 5:  
Corporate boardrooms around the world are still not very diverse as far as gender 
is concerned.  The situation has started to change. The existing literature reveals a 
slow but steady rise in female presence on boards of directors in companies across 
the globe.  The German Institute for Economic Research pointed to legislation as 
being the key factor in attracting women to board membership.  For example, in 
Norway, federal legislation requires all boards to have at least 40 % female 
representation on the company board.  Before Norway’s law, only 7% of publicly 
listed Norwegian companies’ board members were female.  But by 2009, Norway 
had the highest proportion of women on corporate boards in the world with an 
average of 44.2%.  Similar laws have been passed in Spain and the Netherlands.  
The issue of women on corporate boards of directors has received considerable 
attention in past decades, thus the central question within this area is whether or 
not the presence of women on boards contributes to board performance and 
corporate performance.   Social identity theory explains that women with minority 
status may face specific social barriers in the context of corporate boards (Singh & 
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Vinnicombe, 2004).  On the other hand, the concept of “tokenism” has been used 
widely to explain the difficulties that women face when they enter traditionally 
male occupations (Kanter, 1987).  Recent empirical studies show positive 
relationships with gender diversity and firm financial performance (Campbell & 
Vera, 2010; Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003) while other studies show 
negative relationships or non significant relationships (Adams & Ferreira, 2008; 
Marinova et al., 2010).  Using a large panel of publicly-traded UK firms from 
1996-2003, Adams & Ferreira (2008) find gender diversity only has a positive 
effect on weak corporate governance firms in the UK.   
Marinova et al. (2010) observed 102 Dutch and 84 Danish firms, and found a non 
significant relationship with firm financial performance and female board 
representation. This sample consisted of at least 40% female directors in the 
boardroom.  Their finding is in line with  Rose (2007) who employed Danish 
listed firms and found female board directors had no impact on firm performance.  
Further, Smith et al. (2006) employed a large Danish data set and failed to find 
any significant relationship between female board directors and company 
accounting performance measures.  In cross country analysis Randoy et al.  
(2006) found no significant effect of gender diversity on stock market 
performance or return on assets in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.   
The objective of these hypotheses is to examine gender diversity impacts for both 
agency costs and financial performance in Sri Lankan MNCs and LPCs.  
H5a1 : There is no significant association between percentage of female board 
directors and financial performance in  MNCs in Sri Lanka. 
H5a2 : There is no significant association between percentage of female board 
directors and  PA agency cost  in  MNCs in Sri Lanka. 
H5a3 : There is no significant association between percentage of female board 
directors and  PP agency cost  in  MNCs in Sri Lanka. 
H5b1: There is no significant association between percentage of female board 
directors and financial performance in LPCs in Sri Lanka. 
  
96 
 
H5b2: There is no significant association between percentage of female board 
directors and PA agency cost in LPCs in Sri Lanka 
H5b3: There is no significant association between percentage of female board 
directors and PP agency cost in LPCs in Sri Lanka 
 
The next hypotheses concern the minority percentage representation on the board 
and financial performance of MNC subsidiaries and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  The 
hypotheses are as follows. 
Hypothesis 6:  
Discussion and representation of ethnic minorities on company boards rose 
rapidly in the 1990s and early 2000s, but considering US figures from the last four 
years, the number of companies that have at least one minority director has only 
slightly increased from 75% to 78% ("34th Annual Board Directors Study", 
2007). 
Hillman et al. (1998) employed S & P 500 companies and found that companies 
with more women and more minority directors had better stock returns and less 
risk of loss of shareholders.  Carter et al. (2003) explain there is a positive 
relationship with minority representation and firm financial performance using 
Fortune 1000 firms.  In an Asian context, Marimuthu (2008), using Malaysian 
listed firms, finds a significant positive relationship with ethnic diversity and firm 
financial performance using return on assets as a performance measure variable.    
On the other hand, ethnic diversity can decrease company financial performance. 
Although a mixed relationship between ethnic diversity in the boardroom and firm 
financial performance is often cited in the previous literature and popular press, 
most early studies are not robust in addressing the endogeneity of ethnic diversity.  
Therefore, the actual relationship between ethnic diversity and financial 
performance is still unsolved.  
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Therefore, the following hypotheses are postulated regarding the minority board 
directors’ percentage and corporate governance relationship in MNCs and LPCs 
in Sri Lanka.  
H6a1 : There is no significant association between the percentage of ethnic 
minority directors serving  on the board and the financial performance in MNCs in 
Sri Lanka. 
H6a2 : There is no significant association between the percentage of ethnic 
minority directors serving  on the board and the PA agency cost in MNCs in Sri 
Lanka. 
H6a3 : There is no significant association between the percentage of ethnic 
minority directors serving  on the board and the PP agency cost in MNCs in Sri 
Lanka. 
H6b1: There is no significant association between the percentage of ethnic minority 
directors serving on the board and the financial performance in LPCs in Sri 
Lanka. 
H6b2: There is no significant association between the percentage of ethnic minority 
directors serving on the board and the PA agency cost in LPCs in Sri Lanka. 
H6b3: There is no significant association between the percentage of ethnic minority 
directors serving on the board and the PP agency cost in LPCs in Sri Lanka. 
 
The next hypotheses concern the ownership type of the company and financial 
performance and agency costs of MNCs and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  The hypotheses 
are as follows 
Hypothesis 7:  
According to the “Board of Directors Study in Australia and New Zealand “, 
(2007), there is considerable discrepancy among geographic regions of the world 
with regard to CEO duality.  In the US, the CEO is most often also the chairman 
of the board, in Europe and the United Kingdom the CEO and chairman roles are 
separated and the chair is generally non-executive. In recent years corporations 
have been facing strong pressure from regulatory bodies and shareholders to 
separate CEO and chairman roles in organisations.  In the US, the fraction of 
firms converting to non-duality from duality increased by 55% in 1999 to 
approximately 70% in 2003 (Chen et al., 2008b).   
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In early literature, Fama & Jensen (1983), Westphal & Zajac (1995), Pi & Timme 
(1993) find CEO duality leads to more agency conflict and ultimately poor 
financial performance of a firm.   In contrast, Donaldson & Davis (1991b) 
explain, based on stewardship theory, that CEO duality creates a necessary and 
important unity of command at the top of an organisation.  Furthermore, 
Finkelstein & D'Alene (1994) explain CEO duality helps to avoid confusion 
among managers, employees and stakeholders, with timely decision making.  
Supporting the above discussion, Brickley et al. (1997) explain separation of CEO 
and chairman roles conflicts with top management, reduces decision making 
speed and effectiveness of the firm and leads to poor firm performance.  
Faleye (2004) posits that CEO duality is preferable in firms with small boards, 
ones with large insider ownership and highly complex operations.   To avoid one 
person having unfettered powers of decision making, the code of best practice on 
corporate governance in Sri Lanka (2008) includes their second principle, which 
states there should be a clear separation of responsibilities between chairman and 
CEO of the company to ensure balance of power and authority.  The board 
leadership structure is contingent on the ownership structure of the company.  
Consequently, OLS estimations are biased and inconsistent; most prior studies fail 
to control for such potential control biases.   
However, according to empirical evidence there is no universal optimal board 
leadership structure and companies need to adopt the best structure that fits with 
the institutional structure and business environment.   Palmon & Wald (2002) in 
line with above statement provide evidence that the optimal leadership structure 
depends on firm size.  
However, some studies do not detect any significant relationship between board 
leadership role and financial performance (Baliga et al., 1996; Dalton et al., 
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1998).  Consequently, most of the early studies used ordinary least square (OLS) 
estimations to evaluate the relationship between CEO duality and financial 
performance of a company.  OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent.  
Therefore, most of the early studies fail to control potential selection bias.  Chen 
et al., (2008) control this potential bias and use the Heckman two-step procedure 
and a fixed effect model to control for unobservable factors.  However, their study 
does not show any significant relationship between firm financial performance 
and CEO duality.   
Therefore the following hypotheses are formulated regarding corporate 
governance and CEO duality in Sri Lankan LPCs and MNC subsidiaries.  
H7a1 : There is no significant association for firms that practise separate leadership 
(CEO position) with  financial performance in MNCs on Sri Lanka. 
H7a2 : There is no significant association for firms that practise separate leadership 
(CEO position) with  PA agency costs in MNCs on Sri Lanka. 
H7a3 : There is no significant association for firms that practise separate leadership 
(CEO position) with  PP agency costs in MNCs on Sri Lanka. 
H7b1 : There is no significant association for firms that practise separate leadership 
(CEO position) with  financial performance  in LPCs in Sri Lanka. 
H7b2 : There is no significant association for firms that practise separate leadership 
(CEO position) with  PA agency costs in LPCs in Sri Lanka. 
H7b3 : There is no significant association for firms that practise separate leadership 
(CEO position) with  PP agency costs in LPCs in Sri Lanka. 
 
The next hypotheses concern the company ownership type and financial 
performance and agency costs of MNC subsidiaries and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  The 
hypotheses are as follows. 
Hypothesis 8:  
The effect on firm financial performance of the percentage of shares owned by 
institutional investors and the percentage of shares owned by individual or board 
members is tested out by this hypothesis.    Institutional ownership has increased 
and has also been highly debated in recent years.  The expectation is that 
institutional ownership positively and significantly affects shareholders value and 
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corporate governance in public companies (Hellman, 2005).  Furthermore, the 
institutional investor role has dramatically changed during the past few years as 
passive investors become active monitors.   Previous empirical studies find that 
the preferences, behaviours, and dividend pay-outs are different for individual 
investors and institutional investors (Griffin et al., 2003; Jain, 2007; Ng & Wu, 
2007).  Gillan & Starks (2003) explain foreign institutional ownership has a 
positive effect on quality corporate governance practices. Ferreira & Matos (2008) 
find a positive relationship with foreign institutional ownership and financial 
value of the companies.   Allen et al. (2000) suggest that institutional ownership 
companies have better information gathering, higher dividend payouts and better 
monitoring, which reduces the agency conflicts.    
Conversely, Henry (2010) finds institutional ownership creates greater potential 
for agency costs because independent monitoring is less effective in institutional 
ownership firms compared with individually owned firms.  He also explains that 
institutional ownership has a positive relationship with greater board 
independence, higher remuneration and reduced likelihood of CEO duality.   
The inclusive results of previous studies on the ownership type (institutional or 
individual/board) may stem from inconsistency in unobservable biases.   There are 
very few studies that consider endogeneity of the ownership type.  Considering 
endogeneity effect of ownership type, Clay (2001) finds a significant positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and Tobin’s Q.  This is confirmed by 
Tasi & Gu (2007) who find a positive significant relationship between Tobin’s Q 
and institutional ownership after controlling the endogeneity issue of ownership 
type.   
Nevertheless, Based on 300 Fortune 800 firms, Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) find a 
non significant relationship with institutional ownership and corporate financial 
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performance.  This is consistent with Craswell et al. (1997) who find non-
significant results after analysing an Australian sample of companies.  
Therefore the following hypotheses are formulated in regard to ownership type 
and company financial performance and agency costs in LPCs and MNCs in Sri 
Lanka.  
 
H8a1: There is no significant association of ownership type (individual/board or 
institution) and financial performance in MNCs in Sri Lanka. 
H8a2: There is no significant association of ownership type (individual/board or 
institution) and PA agency costs in MNCs in Sri Lanka. 
H8a3: There is no significant association of ownership type (individual/board or 
institution) and PP agency costs in MNCs in Sri Lanka. 
H8b1: There is no significant association of ownership type (individual/board or 
institution) and financial performance in LPCs in Sri Lanka. 
H8b2: There is no significant association of ownership type (individual/board or 
institution) and PA agency costs in LPCs in Sri Lanka. 
H8b3: There is no significant association of ownership type (individual/board or 
institution) and PP agency costs in LPCs in Sri Lanka. 
 
The next hypotheses concern the foreign manager presence and financial 
performance and agency costs of MNCs and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  The hypotheses 
are as follows. 
Hypothesis 9:  
Foreign managers can be defined as those “employees of business 
organisations...... who are sent overseas on a temporary basis to complete a time 
based task or accomplish an organisational goal” (Harrison et al., 2004).   In the 
early 1990s MNCs depended heavily on foreign managers (Meuse et al., 2010).  It 
was quite common for foreign subsidiaries in developing countries to be headed 
by foreign managers from the parent company country. International assignments 
were viewed as playing an important role in fostering global talent in the 
subsidiary organisation.  However, later, companies discovered that foreign 
managers were expensive and had significant failure rates. Therefore MNCs 
started to employ local managers who were knowledgeable about local culture and 
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local market trends.  But these local managers were often detached from the 
culture of corporate headquarters.  
Foreign managers are used to transfer technology skills, to provide international 
experience to local staff, to test high-potential managers in a general management 
position and provide staff with management development experience, etc. 
(Peterson et al., 1996).    Similar to the technology and other assets transferring 
through foreign managers, the parent company can use foreign managers to 
transfer company culture and organisational behaviour to the subsidiary company 
(Harrison, 1994).  Harvey & Moeller (2009) explain that a qualified foreign 
manager needs the following managerial competences;  cultural awareness, which 
includes communication and learning adoptability, cross cultural skills, emotional 
energy and physiological maturity.   In line with the above statement Culpan & 
Wright (2002) and Harvey & Novicevic (2002c) explain foreign managers need 
soft skills to develop effective local strategies in a subsidiary environment.  Soft 
skills embody in depth ideas about local government relations, cultural leadership, 
social networking, team work, a deep understanding of local consumers and 
competitors and high levels of local social knowledge.  
Not every foreign manager is successful.   According to Shay & Bruce (1997), 
70% of all US managers assigned as foreign managers in developing countries 
were unable to simply survive their assignment.  There are three main reasons 
why they were unsuccessful: The manager’s inability to adjust to the different 
physical and cultural environment; the inability of the manager’s spouse to adjust 
to a different physical or cultural environment; and other family related problems 
(Anderson, 2005; Tung, 1987).  "GMAC/SHRM Global Forum" (2006) found that 
65% of MNCs were expecting an increase in foreign managers in the next decade.   
Foreign companies invested in Sri Lanka need to consider the country’s 
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institutional and legal framework, social network and cultural factors when 
selecting and appointing foreign managers in Sri Lanka.  
Therefore, the following hypotheses are formulated in regard to foreign managers, 
corporate governance and MNC subsidiaries’ firm value.  
H9a1 : There is no significant association between foreign managers’ presence and 
financial performance of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H9a2 : There is no significant association between foreign managers’ presence and 
PA agency costs of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H9a3 : There is no significant association between foreign managers’ presence and 
PP agency costs of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
 
The next hypotheses concern firm size and financial performance of MNC 
subsidiaries and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  The hypotheses are as follows. 
Hypothesis 10: 
Firm size is considered to be one of the important variables in organisational 
studies.   Factors such as more expertise in the field, more layers of managers and 
greater bureaucracy lead to higher financial performance in larger firms but not in 
smaller firms.  
According to the early literature, firm size has a positive relationship with firm 
performance. Previous scholars explain that firm size may lead to an increase in 
net economies of scale, greater control over external stakeholders and resources, 
and attraction and retention of better employees (Gooding & Wagner, 1985; 
Stanford, 1980).  In recent research undertaking meta-analysis, Orlitzky (2001) 
proves a positive path between firm size and firm financial performance.  In 
contrast, Ibrahim et al.(2008), using Malaysian family and non-family businesses, 
find a negative relationship with firm size and firm financial performance.   
However, Wan & Bullard (2008) empirically investigated the US wood household 
furniture industry and found no significant impact on firm size and firm overall 
performance.    
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Therefore, the following hypotheses are postulated in regard to firm size and firm 
financial performance and agency costs in MNCs and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
H10a1 : There is no significant association between firm size and financial 
performance of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H10a2 : There is no significant association between firm size and PA agency costs 
of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H10a3 : There is no significant association between firm size and PP agency costs 
of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H10b1 : There is no significant association between firm size and financial 
performance of LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
H10b2 : There is no significant association between firm size and PA agency costs 
of LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
H10b3 : There is no significant association between firm size and PP agency costs 
of LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
 
The next hypotheses concern the firm age and financial performances and agency 
costs of MNCs and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  The hypotheses are as follows. 
Hypothesis 11: 
Storey (1994) posits younger firms have higher death rates and faster growth rate 
than mature firms. “For young firms, probably the most powerful influence on 
their survival is whether or not they grow within a short period after start-
up”(Storey, 1994).   However, it is still unclear whether maturity helps a company 
prosper or dooms it.  As the firm matures, technology adoption, degree of 
diversification and expertise in the management team gradually increases  (Campa 
& Kedia, 2002; Villalonga & Amit, 2004).  These factors may increase firm 
financial performance. Moreover, firms operating for several years with 
established systems and reputation should have better governance practices.  Age 
should help firms to become more efficient.  Due to the development of human-
capital, employee training and established social networks, mature firms can 
generate more profit than young firms.  This is in line with Hopenhayn (1992) 
who shows that individual productivity increases as firms mature; hence mature 
firms are profitable than young firms.  Agrawal & Gort (2002) explain a similar 
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idea and suggest old firms have more knowledge, abilities and skills than new 
firms. 
Thus, the following hypotheses are formulated regarding firm age and firm 
financial performance and agency costs in MNCs and LPCs in Sri Lanka. 
H11a1 : There is no significant association between firm maturity and financial 
performance of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H11a2 : There is no significant association between firm maturity and PA agency 
costs of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H11a3 : There is no significant association between firm maturity and PP agency 
costs of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H11b1 : There is no significant association between firm maturity and financial 
performance of LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
H11b2 : There is no significant association between firm maturity and PA agency 
costs of LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
H11b3 : There is no significant association between firm maturity  and PP agency 
costs of LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
 
The next hypotheses concern firm leverage and financial performance and agency 
costs of MNC subsidiaries and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  The hypotheses are as follows. 
Hypothesis 12:  
The decision regarding the optimal mix of debt and equity financing is critical to 
company success (Bancel & Mittoo, 2004; Graham & Harvey, 2001).  However, 
the literature seems to present a unanimous position on the role of debt.  Some 
scholars point to debt allocated to large creditors, such as banks, being a useful 
tool for reducing the agency problem.   Ang et al. (2000) and Florackis (2008) 
explain that debt can be used as an external monitoring variable to control the 
agency problem in a firm.  Diamond (1991) explains that the bank is an efficient 
method for monitoring.  Alternatively, direct monitoring is inefficient, because of 
its high cost.  Furthermore, Faccio et al. (2001) explain debt can work as a control 
for insiders, as a mechanism for expropriation of minority shareholders and other 
outside shareholders.  However, the effectiveness of debt, either as a monitoring 
mechanism or as an expropriation control mechanism depends on institutional and 
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capital market qualities.  Well developed capital market, exhibiting efficient 
banking systems, strong of bankruptcy laws, active take-over market and 
transparency and accountability of auditing  positively affect a firm’s debt level 
(Berglof, 1995; Day & Peter, 2004a). 
Colombage (2007) explains that due to under development of the bond market Sri 
Lankan companies rely heavily on bank debt when raising external capital.  
However, the Sri Lankan government and regulatory bodies have been striving to 
develop a solid capital market in recent years.  As an emerging economy, less 
security, higher interest rates and weak rules and regulations may be the reason 
for lower leverage ratios of companies.  As a country with a large proportion of 
small and medium size enterprises most of the owners depend on loans to the 
business from the owners, known in smaller business as quasi-debt, distort debt to 
equity and debt to assets ratios.   
Thus, the following hypotheses are formulated regarding firm leverage level and 
firm financial performance and agency costs in MNCs and LPCs in Sri Lanka. 
H12a1 : There is no significant association between firm leverage and financial 
performance of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H12a2 : There is no significant association between firm leverage and PA agency 
costs of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H12a3 : There is no significant association between firm leverage and PP agency 
costs of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H12b1 : There is no significant association between firm leverage and financial 
performance of LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
H12b2 : There is no significant association between firm leverage and PA agency 
costs of LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
H12b3 : There is no significant association between firm leverage and PP agency 
costs of LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
 
The next hypotheses concern MNC parent location and financial performances 
and agency costs of MNC subsidiaries and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  The hypotheses 
are as follows. 
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Hypothesis 13: 
Headquarters can affect MNC subsidiaries performance in several ways.  Ambos 
& Birkinshaw (2010) argue that the level of autonomy and sub-unit power of 
subsidiaries designated by headquarters positively affects subsidiary performance.  
The next influential factor is headquarters’ knowledge of the transfer process.  
Ciabuschi et al. (2010) examine the knowledge transfer process and find 
allocating decision-making rights and providing necessary funds positively affects 
subsidiaries’ performance.  The tasks include handling basic governance functions 
in the subsidiaries, fulfilling legal requirements (preparing annual reports, health 
and safety or environmental legislation) and undertaking the budgeting process. 
Asma (1996) explains many foreign subsidiary companies ‘values, technologies, 
systems and procedures derive from their parent companies.  Further, he explains 
US companies emphasise individual rewards rather than a group rewards system 
while Japanese based companies follow collectivism.   
According to Luo (2001), the distance between host country and home country, 
culture, rules and regulatory stringency, and industrial growth all affect the 
financial performance of MNC subsidiaries.   Subsidiaries’ agency costs can be 
determined by the MNC headquarters’ geographical location.  The main reason 
for that is a dividend payments difference.  Dividend policy is highly influenced 
by the host country’s tax scheme. MNCs from emerging economies like India, 
Malaysia, and MNCs from developed markets like UK and US may have different 
dividend payment policies for shareholders.   Due to the above reasons, it can be 
assumed that geographical location of MNC headquarters where different cultural 
values are practised can significantly affect subsidiaries’ financial performance 
and agency costs.    
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Therefore the following hypotheses are formulated in regard to MNC parent 
location, corporate governance and MNC subsidiaries’ firm value.  
H13a1 : There is no significant association between MNCs’ parent company 
location or region  and financial performance of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H13a2 : There is no significant association between MNCs’ parent company 
location or region  and agency costs of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
 
The next hypotheses concern firm operating industry and financial performances 
and agency costs of MNCs and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  The hypotheses are as 
follows. 
Hypothesis 14:  
Prior studies argue that the firm’s operating industry affects corporate financial 
performance and agency costs (Hewa-Wellalage & Locke, 2010; Waddock & 
Graves, 1997).  Hovey et al. (2003) find the industry in which a firm operates has 
significant effect on financial performance. This may arise due to differences in 
company ownership structure, capital structure and technology from industry to 
industry.  As an example, a high tech company’s technology know-how and assets 
structure is different from a firm that operates in the financial sector.   
Government rules and regulation may also vary between industries.  When 
considering foreign ownership of Sri Lankan companies, Sri Lanka allows 100% 
foreign ownership except in a few industries, including money lending, pawn 
broking, coastal fishing and education.  These ownership structure differences can 
affect financial performance and agency costs of firms.  Moreover, firms 
operating in monopoly and oligopoly industries can have different leverage ratios, 
assets structure and bankruptcy probability.  Hence, industry differences can 
determine the firm financial performance and agency costs.  
In contrast to the above findings, Hawawini et al. (2003) find that industry factors 
have little impact on firm financial performance.  They conclude industry factors 
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have no impact on the highest profitability group and lowest profitability group of 
companies.  In line with above findings, Brush et al. (1999) and Mauri & 
Michaels (1998) find corporate factors have a larger impact on firm profitability 
determinants than industrial factors.   
Therefore, the following hypotheses are formulated in regard to company 
operating industry, corporate governance and firm financial performance and 
agency costs as follows:   
H14a1 : There is no significant association between company operating industry 
and financial performance of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H14a2 : There is no significant association between company operating industry 
and PA agency costs of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H14a3 : There is no significant association between company operating industry 
and PP agency costs of MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
H14b1 : There is no significant association between company operating industry 
and financial performance of LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
H14b2 : There is no significant association between company operating industry 
and PA agency costs of LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
H14b3 : There is no significant association between company operating industry 
and PP agency costs of LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
 
The next hypothesis (H15) is about the type of governance mechanism of MNCs 
and LPCs.  The hypothesis is as follows. 
 Hypothesis 15:  
All the companies listed on the CSE need to adopt the corporate governance 
mandatory code of best practices on corporate governance effective from 1 April 
2008.  The key aspects of this code are to create effective, balanced and 
independent boards, enhance transparency of recruitment and auditing, enhance 
shareholders’ rights and increase sustainability and profitability of business. 
In addition to LPCs’ governance, firm level governance characteristics, the 
national institutional environment and internationalisation activities need to be 
considered in the governance of MNC subsidiaries.  MNCs corporate governance 
mechanisms cannot go against existing national law of the home country and 
governance norms cannot conflict with the institutional environment of the 
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company.  From 2000, OECD corporate governance practices guidelines for 
MNCs have existed.   These voluntary guidelines are an attempt to create a soft-
law framework for customary compromise and culturally appropriate corporate 
behaviour in MNC subsidiaries.  This OECD voluntary code includes a set of 
recommendations for industrial relations, human resource management, 
environment and information discourse, etc. Further, this hypothesis empirically 
tests adoption of specific corporate governance mechanisms, in particular, 
adherence to an overall code of governance practice, which is associated with 
agency costs benefits for LPCs and MNCs in Sri Lanka.   The proposed 
conceptual framework suggests that the bundle of corporate governance 
mechanisms of each MNC subsidiary is based on the host country’s corporate 
governance system, home country’s corporate governance system and firm-
specific characteristics, strategic, economic, cultural and environmental 
characteristics.  LPCs’ corporate governance systems are only based on home 
country’s corporate governance systems, firm-specific characteristics, and 
strategic, economic, cultural and environmental characteristics of the country.   
Therefore, the following hypothesis is postulated regarding the corporate 
governance mechanisms in MNCs and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
H15 : There is no significant difference between the governance mechanism of 
MNC subsidiaries and the governance mechanism of LPCs. 
 
The next hypothesis concerns the financial performance of MNC subsidiaries and 
LPCs in Sri Lanka regarding complying best practice on corporate governance 
code.  The hypothesis is as follows. 
Hypothesis 16:  
Believing that transparency and openness (achieved through higher corporate 
governance standards) would enhance Sri Lankan investors and shareholders it is 
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required to follow code of best practice on corporate governance mandatory code 
all listed companies in CSE from 1
st
 April 2008.  Before that, since 1997 Sri 
Lankan government bodies, CSE and SEC jointly introduced voluntary corporate 
governance code ensure transparency and accountability. This is confirmed by 
corporate governance survey (2007) results, which find over 80% of listed 
companies already adhered to corporate governance practices.  Therefore, this 
study may not find any significance difference of firms’ compliance corporate 
governance before and after introduce code of best practice on corporate 
governance. On the other hand, Cabraal (2003) explains that companies do not 
actually do what they disclose in their annual reports relating to corporate 
governance practices. Therefore, this study may find significant compliance 
differences before and after introduce code of best practice on corporate 
governance.  
Therefore, the following hypotheses are postulated regarding corporate 
governance code compliance and financial performance in MNCs and LPCs in Sri 
Lanka. 
H16a: There is significant difference in corporate governance of MNCs in Sri 
Lankan before and after introduced code of best practice on corporate governance 
in 2008.   
H16b: There is no significant difference in corporate governance of LPCs in Sri 
Lankan before and after introduced code of best practice on corporate governance 
in 2008.  
 
The next hypothesis concerns the financial performances of MNCs and LPCs in 
Sri Lanka.  The hypothesis is as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 17:  
The relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and a firm’s financial 
performances are mixed.  Sunday-O (2008) employed Nigerian listed firms to 
analyse the relationship of four corporate governance mechanisms (board size, 
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board composition, CEO status and committee) and firm financial performance 
using an ANOVA test and found a strong relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm financial performance  There are a large number 
of similar studies that align with the above results, finding a positive association 
between quality of corporate governance and company financial performance 
(Black & Kim, 2008; Gompers et al., 2003). While most studies considered 
individual countries, a number of studies covered cross-countries and found a 
positive relationship with country-level corporate governance mechanisms and 
corporate financial performance (Bruno et al., 2007; Kaplan, 1997).   In cross 
country analysis, Kaplan (1997) finds selected corporate governance mechanisms 
(executive compensation, board of directors, ownership, capital markets, 
takeovers and banking systems) affect German, Japanese and US company 
performance in different degrees.  Henry (2010) suggests there is a significant 
positive relationship between corporate governance adoption and agency cost in 
Australian companies. Conversely, Aman & Nguyen (2007) analysed Japanese 
firms and find a significant negative relationship with corporate governance 
quality and market returns.  Consistent with the above results, Suchard et al. 
(2007) find a negative relationship with corporate governance and stock return in 
Australia.   
However, in recent decades, a growing literature argues that the relationship 
between corporate governance and company financial performance is not robust 
(Core et al., 2006; Yen, 2005).   The effects of endogeneity and the causal effect 
of governance variables are unexplored in most of the previous studies.  
Governance variables are not strictly orthogonal to the error term, and may lead to 
biased coefficients. Therefore it is difficult and complex to understand the 
separate effect of each and every factor. 
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Therefore, the following hypotheses are postulated regarding the performance and 
corporate governance relationship in MNCs and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
H17a1 : There is no significant effect of corporate governance mechanisms on 
financial performance of   MNCs. 
H17a2 : There is no significant effect of corporate governance mechanisms on PA 
agency costs  of  MNCs. 
H17a3 : There is no significant effect of corporate governance mechanisms on PP 
agency costs of  MNCs. 
H17b1 : There is no significant effect of corporate governance mechanisms on 
financial performance of LPCs. 
H17b2 : There is no significant effect of corporate governance mechanisms on PA 
agency costs of LPCs. 
H17b3 : There is no significant effect of corporate governance mechanisms on PP 
agency costs on LPCs. 
 
The next hypothesis concerns the corporate governance mechanisms and their 
impact on MNC subsidiaries and LPCs in different financial performance 
quantiles. 
Hypothesis 18: 
Prior research mostly uses OLS regression and concludes effects of corporate 
governance variables and their effect on financial performance of selected market.  
However, corporate governance and firm financial performance might differ 
across different quantiles of performance proxies. Moreover, corporate 
governance variables may have different effect on same financial performance 
quantiles in MNCs and LPCs.  Ramdani & Witteloostuij (2010) using four Asian 
markets find the proportion of independent directors and CEO duality are different 
across financial performance quantiles.   
Therefore, the following hypotheses are postulated in regarding the corporate 
governance variables across the quantiles of firm financial performance in MNCs 
and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
H18a: Corporate governance practices impact differently in low performance MNC 
subsidiaries and high performance MNCs.  
H18b: Corporate governance practices impact differently in low performance LPCs 
and high performance LPCs.  
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4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter provides description of the conceptual models used for hypotheses 
development.  It then developed and explained hypotheses to be tested in the next 
chapter.  These hypotheses facilitated an understanding of corporate governance 
mechanisms in LPCs and MNC subsidiaries in Sri Lanka.  The next chapter will 
present the data collection method, definitions of the variables used in the study, 
econometric methods and models for testing the corporate governance and 
financial performance and agency costs in Sri Lankan LPCs and MNCs.  
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Chapter 5 
Methodology and Econometric Framework 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodological aspect of this study.  This includes the 
data collection methods and the sample size used to conduct this study and the 
method used to quantify the variables used in developing the hypotheses.  The 
chapter is structured as follows.  Section 5.1 presents the data collection method.  
Section 5.2 presents measurement, conceptualisation and operationalisation of 
variables and provides explanation of both dependent and independent variables 
used in this study.  Section 5.3 presents method; separated in two sub sections, 
financial performance measure and agency costs measure.  Section 5.4 presents 
Quantile regression.  Section 5.5 presents specification tests including auto-
correlation tests, over identification tests and estimation of standard errors.   
Section 5.6 concludes the chapter.  
5.1 Data Collection 
This study collected the data needed to tests hypotheses from the Handbook of 
Listed Companies - 2007, Fact Book - 2008 and Data library CD issued by the 
CSE.  Further data has been collected from firms listed on the CSE during 2006-
2010 that published audited annual reports. For the LPCs and MNCs, the 
sampling period is 2006 through 2010.  There are several reasons for selecting the 
time period between 2006-2010 (inclusive both years).  The first reason is that Sri 
Lankan corporate governance practices have been mandatory in CSE listed firms 
since April 2008.  To establish the best practice effect on Sri Lankan listed firms, 
the study sample covered company details from before and after regulatory 
changes to corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka. The second reason is that 
in the year 2006 there was a boom in FDI inwards in Sri Lanka and other Asian 
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countries. Consequently, the number of MNCs and their activities increased 
throughout the region following the year 2006. Sri Lankan corporate governance 
practices and adaptation levels have increased in recent years due to the high 
number of MNCs attracted to Sri Lanka.  This supports commencing data 
collection from 2006.  The third reason is, Sri Lankan listed company data 
availability is very poor.  Most of the listed companies provide their annual 
reports online after year 2005.  Data collection from 2006 is relating more sample 
and reliable. As at 30 September 2010, the CSE had 238 listed companies 
representing 20 business sectors.  There were 20 business sectors: the banking, 
finance and insurance sector, beverage, food and tobacco, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, construction and engineering, diversified holdings, footwear and 
textile, healthcare, hotels and travel, information technology, investment trusts, 
land and property, manufacturing, motors, palm oil, plantation, power and 
engineering, services, stores and suppliers, telecommunications and trading.  
Information on corporate governance mechanisms, such as board size, percentage 
of insider ownership, non-executive directors’ percentage, board diversity, female 
director percentage, minority director percentage and CEO duality were gathered 
from the companies’ audited annual reports and each and every company website.   
This information was obtained manually by calculating the number of directors on 
the board, the number of shares owned by directors, the number of non-executive 
directors on the board, board diversity variables i.e. gender, ethnicity, age, 
education level and experience of board members, the number of females on the 
board, the number of minority directors on the board and determining duality role 
of CEO and chairman of the company for the years 2006 to 2010.   Furthermore, 
firm leverage, firm age and firm size are calculated by using each and every 
company’s annual report data and cross checked with DataStream database.  
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Moreover, ownership type, foreign manager presence or not and MNCs parent 
location is directly collected from company annual reports.  
In order to test hypotheses, sample data covers a representative sample of Sri 
Lanka’s non financial companies listed on the CSE.  According to Manawaduge et 
al. (2008) the banking, finance and insurance sector should be excluded from the 
study sample because applicable regulations from the finance sector are vastly 
different from firms in the other industrial sectors.  They explain that especially in 
shareholdings, profitability measurements and liquidity assessment there is a huge 
difference between the financial sector in Sri Lanka and other industrial sectors.  
To avoid this bias, the study sample consists of only 19 sectors from the CSE.  
At the end of 2010, a total of 203 companies belonging to 19 trading sectors were 
identified as meeting this criterion.  Of the 203 companies, 7 did not provide their 
annual reports for all years in the range 2006-2010, so it was decided to include 
the remaining 196 companies in the data collection instead of choosing a random 
sample. The final sample consists of 83 MNC subsidiaries and 113 LPCs.   It is 
unbalanced panel data because the shortest observation for a firm is one year and 
the longest is five years.  Furthermore, this dataset consists of many panels and 
few periods.  The following table lists the companies which observed separately 
for each year. 
Table 1Table 5.1 Number of firms included in the dataset for each year 
Year Total number of firms 
listed  
Study sample 
2006 237 195 
2007 235 196 
2008 234 195 
2009 237 195 
2010 238 196 
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5.2 Measurement, conceptualisation and operationalisation of the 
variables 
This section presents the dependent and independent variables used in this study.  
5.2.1Dependent Variables 
Financial performance will be calculated using several methods, including 
Tobin’s Q, return on assets (ROA) and rerun on equity (ROE). These have gained 
wide acceptance for governance research in mature markets (Reddy et al., 2008).  
Tobin’s Q serves as a proxy for company performance in a financial market.  The 
higher the Q value indicates that the market’s perception that the company 
performance is good (Weir et al., 2002).  It also signifies that the higher the Q 
value, the more effective governance mechanisms of the company. Also Tobin’s 
Q (market measure) is used as a dependent variable in the studies about the 
corporate governance and firm performance relationship by Agrawal & Knoeber 
(1996) and Beiner & Schmid (2005) in developing and developed financial 
markets.  A ratio devised by Tobin in 1969 is calculated as the market value of a 
firm divided by the replacement costs of the firm’s assets.  In this research, 
followed by McConnell & Servaes (1990)  and McKnight & Weir (2009), the 
Tobin’s Q ratio is defined as market capitalization plus total debt divided by total 
assets.   
 
 
If Tobin’s Q is greater than 1, it reflects market value is greater than the value of 
the company’s recorded assets.   Also, if Tobin’s Q is above 1, it indicates the 
firm is earning rates of return higher than that justified by the costs of its assets. 
This proposes that market value reflects some unmeasured or unrecorded assets of 
the company.   However, if Tobin’s Q is less than 1, the market value is less than 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 = 
(𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)
(𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)
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the recorded value of the assets of the company.   This suggests that the market 
may be undervaluing the company or alternatively that an acceptable return is not 
being achieved and a break-up (asset sales) may be appropriate.  Lang & Stulz 
(1993), explain that diversified companies have a lower Tobin’s Q ratio compared 
to niche market firms, due to markets penalising the value of the firm’s assets.  
Based on this argument, comparing LPCs and MNCs, MNCs can have low 
Tobin’s Q values.  Jonathan & Bichler (2009) explain that Tobin’s Q does not 
consider the intellectual assets of the company, such as goodwill, knowledge, 
technology and other intangible assets.  Therefore Tobin’s Q only partially 
represents the company value. They further argue that market hype and 
speculation can affect the value of Q.  However, many empirical studies use 
Tobin’s Q as a performance matrix. In recent studies Dybvig & Warachka (2010) 
show evidence that the relationship between firm performance and Tobin’s Q is 
confounded by endogeneity.  
As a second financial performance proxy, the accounting-based performance 
measure, return on assets (ROA), is used in this study.  This is an indicator of how 
profitable a company is relative to its total assets.  In other words, ROA gives a 
measure of the operating efficiency of the total business.   A company without 
higher ROA finds it almost impossible to generate high return on equity.   For 
public companies, ROA can vary substantially and is highly dependent on the 
industry.  ROA gives investors an idea of how effectively company management 
is at using its assets to generate earnings or what earnings were generated from 
invested capital. Higher ROA shows the company uses its assets effectively in 
serving shareholders’ economic interests.  Lower ROA numbers indicate the 
company is earning less money on high investment.   If a company has no debts, 
ROA and return on equity (ROE) will be the same.  Although ROA is widely used 
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in evaluating company performance, it is not a perfect tool. This accounting based 
performance measure only partially estimates future events in the form of 
depreciation and amortisation.  Furthermore, this accounting based profit measure 
is criticised as being a backward looking measurement. The formula for ROA is:  
 
An earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) is the amount remaining when total 
operating costs are deducted from total revenue, but before either interest or tax 
expenses have been deducted.   Total operating costs include direct factory costs, 
administration, selling and distribution overheads. 
As a third financial performance proxy, the return on equity (ROE), is used in this 
study.  This is also known as return on net worth (RONW).  This is the second 
complementary approach to return on investment (the first one is ROA).  ROA 
indicates the operating efficiency of the company, while ROE considers how that 
operating efficiency is translated into benefits to the owners of the specific 
company.  The ROE is defined as:  Net income is for the full fiscal year and 
considered earnings after tax (EAT). Shareholders’ equity does not include 
preferential shares.   
 
Following Ang et al. (2000) and Singh & Davidson (2003), the assets utilisation 
ratio is used as a first PA agency proxy for this study.   The assets utilisation is 
defined as:  
 
The asset utilisation ratio mentioned above measures how efficiently the firm is 
using its invested capital.  Agency cost is inversely related with the assets 
utilisation ratio.  This ratio provides the quantitative measure of management’s 
ability to employ the assets efficiently.  The poor assets utlisation ratio expresses 
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑆𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 = 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
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management’s poor investment decisions, such as negative net present-value 
projects, management shrinking, or using funds to purchase unproductive assets 
and creating higher agency costs for shareholders.  A higher assets turnover ratio 
shows that management is making optimal investment decisions and value-
creating ventures.  Further, it indicates that large amounts of cash flow are 
generated for a given level of assets.  The assets utilisation ratio can associate with 
measurement errors. A source of measurement errors includes differences in 
accounting methods chosen with respect to the recognition and timing of the 
revenue and costs and poor record keeping (Frederikslust et al., 2008). 
The second PA agency costs proxy is represented as a measure of free cash flow 
into Q dummy (QFCF) of the company.   Free cash flow (FCF) represents the 
cash that the company is able to generate after laying out the all positive net 
percent value projects when discounted at the relevant cost of capital.  Jensen 
(1986) explains that when the company generates a considerable amount of free 
cash flow, it increases the conflict between managers and shareholders because 
managers tend to invest money, not maximize shareholder value.    Managers with 
considerable free cash flow can increase the dividend payment or repurchase 
stocks rather than investing in negative or low return projects.  Following Doukas 
et al. (2000) and McKnight & Weir (2009), FCF is calculated as follows:  
Followed by McKnight & Weir (2009) and McConnell & Servaes (1990) for each 
year growth opportunities are measured by Tobin’s Q dummy. Growth dummy 
takes 1 if the firm’s Tobin’s Q is less than 1 (indicating poorly managed firms) 
and 0 otherwise. Creating dummy variables for growth prospect is consistent with 
Doukas et al. (2000). 
 
𝐹𝐶𝐹 = 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠
+ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠  
𝑄𝐹𝐶𝐹 =  
𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠
 ∗ 𝑄𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 
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John & Knyazeva (2006) explain when firms have poor governance they may 
have a higher dividend payment policy.  Moreover, DeAngelo et al. (2004) find 
that firms with high agency conflicts are more likely to pay dividends than firms 
with fewer agency conflicts.  Therefore, this study employed dividend payout 
ratio as proxy for the PP agency cost.  Similar to Faccio et al. (2001) dividend 
payout ratio is defined as follows.  
 
 
This ratio indicates the proportion of earnings that are used to pay a dividend to 
shareholders. Most high growth firms have zero dividend payment and instead use 
their profits to reinvest in firm activities. This may be because corporate rates of 
return on reinvested capital are high.  However, in some circumstances dividends 
are doubly taxed.  Further, dividend payout ratios can vary from country to 
country.   
5.2.2 Explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables used in this study are found in the literature to have 
either positive or negative influence on company financial performance and 
agency costs.  These variables can be categorised as board composition, 
leadership structure, board size and control variables.  Hovey et al. (2003) 
recognise firm size as a control variable that has illustrative power when 
examining company financial performance and corporate governance.   Therefore, 
this study uses firm size as first control variable.  The size of the reporting 
company is a major variable for previous studies, and has been approximated by 
annual sales, total assets, fixed assets, paid up capital, shareholder equity, capital 
employed, and the market value of the firm (Karim, 2007).  In this study, natural 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷 = 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
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log of sales (LNSALES) is used as the proxies for the size of the company.  This 
is the most commonly used measure in prior research. The next control variable is 
firm maturity (AGE).  AGE is calculated by the number of years operating in the 
industry.    
The third control variable is industry type (INDUSTRY).  The study sample of 
approximately 196 firms belongs to 19 industry sectors. However, due to a limited 
number of companies in certain industries (e.g., the information technology 
industry sector had only one listed company on the CSE as at December 2010) 
this study combines some similar industries to create 7 industry dummy variables.  
The external monitoring independent variable is the debt to assets ratio (DEBT), 
calculated by the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets.   This is 
an excellent way to check a company’s long-term solvency.  The higher the ratio, 
the greater risk will be associated with the company’s operation.   Furthermore, 
Ang et al. (2000) propose that with more debt there is increased external 
monitoring from banks or restrictions on free cash flow to management, thus 
lowering agency costs.  Therefore, it is rational to include debt to assets ratio as an 
independent variable in this study as a corporate governance mechanism (external 
monitoring ability). 
As well as the variables discussed above, for best practice recommendations 
and/or good corporate governance in Sri Lanka, the following independent 
variables will also be considered in this study.  
Board size (BOARD) is measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of 
board directors on board.  The Companies Act No. 17 of 1982 in Sri Lanka allows 
public companies to have at least two directors.  This is a fundamental 
recommendation in the “code of best practices on corporate governance” new 
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version, 2008.  Previous research ranked this variable highly when measuring 
company performance (Cheng et al., 2008; Yermack, 1996).  
The next explanatory variable is the percentage of non-executive directors 
(NONE) on a board.  This is measured as a percentage of the total number of non-
executive directors divided by the total number of board directors.  The expected 
coefficients are positive for financial performance measures and negative for 
agency cost proxies.  According to the best practice recommendation principle 
A.5 in Sri Lanka, 
It was decided that the board of directors of a listed company 
should be comprised of both executive and non-executive 
directors. Taking into consideration companies with only two 
directors and comments received from listed companies it was 
decided to mandate that a board should comprise of “two non-
executive directors or such number of non-executive directors 
equivalent to one third of the total number of directors, whichever 
is higher.” Provision has also been made with respect to 
calculating this number and the procedure for filling casual 
vacancies which may occur. 
 
 
Prior empirical studies mostly report a significant impact with non-executive 
directors and a firm’s financial report (Mura, 2007).      
Insider ownership percentage (INSIDE) is a measure of the total number of shares 
owned by company directors divided by the total ordinary shares outstanding.   
This is one of the most widely used internal corporate governance mechanisms to 
reduce the misalignment of manager and shareholders’ interests.   Previous studies 
by Singh & Davidson (2003) posit that higher insider ownership aligns 
managerial and shareholders’ interest and lowers agency costs. Family ownership 
is prevalent in Sri Lanka and therefore higher insider ownership is prominent in 
Sri Lankan listed firms. Furthermore, weak institutional environment leads to high 
reliance on internal corporate governance mechanisms.  Therefore, it is important 
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to analyse insider ownership percentage and firm financial performance and 
agency costs in Sri Lankan companies.   
To capture CEO duality a CEO variable is created.  CEO is equal to 1 if CEO 
duality is present; otherwise it is set equal to zero.  Recently, an increasing 
number of firms have converted to a non-duality CEO structure. Therefore, CEO 
duality is expected to be negatively correlated with financial performance and to 
positively affect agency cost proxies in this study.  However, according to the 
stewardship perspective, CEO duality facilitates clear and strong leadership. On 
the other hand, some studies find evidence that supports agency theory, so no 
convincing conclusion can be drawn from prior studies on the impact of board 
leadership and firm performance.  Therefore, it is reasonable to include CEO 
duality as an independent variable in this study.  
The next explanatory variable used in this study is board diversity (DIVERSITY).  
This measures board diversity using Blau index, a measure widely used in 
ecology, genetics, linguistics and economics.  This index quantifies the diversity 
of a group with regard to nominal features, such as ethnicity, gender, or education. 
(Blau, 1977).  The Blau index is calculated by   − ∑   
  
     where p is the 
proportion of board members in each category and n is the total number of board 
members.  However, this different diversified category results cannot correlated 
due to difference in the categories.  Therefore, study correct the Balu index by 
multiplies by  ( −  )⁄  vector. The Blau index value range for diversity is 0 
from 1.0, which can be achieved only when a board has fully diversified directors.  
This measure is used by Campbell & Minguez-Vera (2007) and others when 
studying gender diversity in the boardroom.  
The percentage of female directors on a board (FEMALE) is measured as a 
percentage of the number of female directors divided by total board size.  This 
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measure is also used by Campbell & Minguez-Vera (2007). Although female 
representation on boards has increased in recent years, the link between female 
board members and corporate board performance is unclear, especially in 
emerging market contexts. Therefore, it is rational to include a FEMALE variable 
in this study to check female directors’ percentage influence in Sri Lankan LPCs’ 
and MNCs’ financial performance and agency costs.  A variable minority 
director’s percentage (MINORITY) is calculated by the percentage of the number 
of minority directors divided by the total number of board directors.  Minority 
composition on boards has attracted more research interest in recent years.  For 
Sri Lanka, a multinational country with minimal and limited minority 
representation on its boards, investigating the links between minority 
representation and financial performance of the company is important. 
Ownership type (OWNER) is set equal to 1 if company ownership is institutional; 
otherwise it is set to equal 0.  Manawaduge et al. (2008) suggest that a very high 
percentage of shares on the Sri Lankan stock market are owned by institutional 
investors. Lee (2010) explains that due to the undeveloped equity market and 
weak investor protection, domestic investors are reluctant to invest in emerging 
markets with low levels of corporate governance reform. This may be one reason 
why institutional ownership is dominant in Sri Lanka. 
The following two explanatory variables are only acceptable for MNCs.  The first 
is the foreign manager (FOREIGN).  If a company has a foreign manager 
(FOREIGN) it is set equal to 1, otherwise zero.  However, in different cultural and 
institutional environments, a foreign manager’s contribution to local firm 
performance is so far inconclusive.  To check the influence of foreign managers in 
Sri Lankan subsidiaries, this study included foreign managers as a dummy 
variable in regression models.  The second variable is MNC parent company 
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original location.  This study classifies all MNC subsidiaries into five regions 
according to their parent company’s location (REGION).  Using these 
classifications, five region dummy variables are introduced.   
Table 5.2 provides the description of the research variables.  
Table 2Table 5.2 Description of the Research Variables 
Variable Acronym Description 
Dependent variables: 
Tobin’s Q 
 
TOBINSQ 
 
Value of the firm’s assets (as measured by 
the market value of its outstanding stock 
and debt) 
Return On Assets ROA An indicator ratio of how profitable a 
company is relative to its total assets. 
Measured by net profit before taxes / total 
assets 
Return On Equity ROE An indicator ratio of how that operating 
efficiency is translated into benefits to the 
owner. Measured by earn after taxes / 
owners fund 
Dividend payout ratio DIVIDEND The amount of total dividend payment is 
divided by net sales  
Assets utilisation ratio ASSETS The proportion of Total sales/ Total assets 
 
Growth opportunity 
 
 
QFCF Free cash flow multiplied by the Tobin’s Q 
dummy 
Explanatory variables: 
Control variables 
Sales(proxy for size) 
 
 
LNSALES 
 
 
Natural log of the sales  
Leverage DEBT This ratio is calculated as total debt divided 
by total assets 
Maturity of the firm AGE Number of years operating in the industry 
Board size: 
Board size 
 
BOARD 
 
Number of board directors on board 
Board composition: 
Non-executive directors 
 
NONE 
 
Percentage of non-executive directors 
serving on the board 
Inside ownership INSIDE Proportion of general ownership on the 
board 
Board diversity DIVERSITY The Blau index is calculated.  This index 
value range for diversity is 0 from 1.0 
Female directors on the 
board 
FEMALE Percentage of the female directors serving 
on the board 
Minority directors on the 
board 
MINORITY Percentage of the minority directors 
serving on the board 
Leadership structure: 
CEO duality 
 
CEO 
 
Dummy variable, 1 if CEO duality on the 
board and 0 otherwise 
Ownership type OWNER Dummy variable,1 if the company 
ownership is institutional and 0 otherwise 
Foreign  manager FOREIGN Dummy variable,1 if the board have 
foreign  manager  and 0 otherwise 
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Industry INDUSTRY Effect of seven identified industries  
 INDUSTRY1 Dummy variable,1 if the firm from 
Beverage, food, drug and tobacco and 0 
otherwise 
 INDUSTRY2 Dummy variable,1 if the firm from 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals and 0 
otherwise 
 INDUSTRY3 Dummy variable,1 if the firm from 
construction and engineering and power 
and engineering and industrial transport 
and industrial mining and 0 otherwise 
 INDUSTRY4 Dummy variable,1 if the firm from 
diversified holding and healthcare, hotels 
and travel and 0 otherwise 
 INDUSTRY5 Dummy variable,1 if the firm from Land 
and property and 0 otherwise 
 INDUSTRY6 Dummy variable,1 if the firm from 
manufacturing, forestry and paper, general 
industries and motors industries and 0 
otherwise 
 INDUSTRY7 Dummy variable,1 if the firm from palm 
oil and plantation and 0 otherwise 
   
Parent company region REGION Effect of five identified regions of MNC 
parent 
 REGION1 Dummy variable,1 if the MNC parent from 
Europe and 0 otherwise 
 REGION2 Dummy variable,1 if the MNC parent from 
Scandinavia and 0 otherwise 
 REGION3 Dummy variable,1 if the MNC parent from 
America and 0 otherwise 
 REGION4 Dummy variable,1 if the MNC parent from 
Australasia and 0 otherwise 
 REGION5 Dummy variable,1 if the MNC parent from 
Asia and 0 otherwise 
5.3 Method  
This section includes the models used to test the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm financial performances, and corporate governance and 
agency costs in LPCs and MNC subsidiaries. The econometric tests discussed in 
this chapter include panel OLS regression analysis, dynamic panel GMM 
regression tests for the complementarities of corporate governance instruments 
and Tobit regression, ANOVA test and difference-in-difference model. Further 
investigate of corporate governance mechanisms and its impact used quantile 
regression analysis. Figure 5.1 shows concept map of methodology used in this 
study. 
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 3  
Figure  
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Figure 5.1 Concept map of the methodology 
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5.3.1 Model specification for MNCs’ and LPCs’ financial performance 
This study sample consists of cross sectional and time series data. The probability 
of using a panel dataset, which typically provides a larger number of observations 
and allows the exploitation of dynamic effects that are difficult to detect with 
cross-sectional data appears appropriate.  Before setting up the panel it is 
imporatant to testing for various homogeneity restrictions. A Chow test was used 
to investigate the poolability of the data.  The null hypothesis is: 
The null hypothesis of the poolability test is 
 
        =    
 
Suggesting the slopes remain constant in fixed and random effect models and only 
intercepts and error variances matter.  
The poolability test is undertaken under the assumption of 
 
    (       ) 
 This test uses the F statistic:  
 
 
  
 
where  e'e is the SSE of the pooled OLS and e'ei is the SSE of the OLS regression 
for group i. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the panel data are not poolable.  
 
5.3.1.1 Panel data OLS regression 
Panel data analysis is the most efficient statistical method, widely used in 
econometrics, social science and epidemiology (Madalla, 2001).  The panel data 
sample consists of cross sectional and time series data.  The panel data structure 
allows for taking into account the unobservable and consistent heterogeneity, 
which are specific features of each selected company. Another reason is that it 
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may be possible to use the panel data to exploit dynamics that are difficult to 
detect with cross-sectional data.  A third attraction for using panel data sets is that 
they typically provide large number of observations. 
Previous studies consider board structure, board composition and leadership 
structure as exogenous variables (Bauer et al., 2009; Bozec & Bozec, 2007; 
Ibrahim et al., 2008). Based on these assumptions, an ordinary least squares 
regression (OLS) is employed to establish if governance and control mechanisms 
have an effect on company financial performance and agency costs.  Thus, the 
above thoughts form the base for the following equations system:  
 
 
 
 
Equation (1) determines the relationship between financial performance, agency 
costs and governance mechanisms of MNCs in Sri Lanka during 2006-2010.   
Equation (2) determines the relationship between financial performance, agency 
costs and governance mechanisms of LPCs in Sri Lanka 2006-2010.   
Where i goes from company 1- n and t  takes the values of the year from 2006 to 
2010.  The β parameters are the estimated coefficients for the constant and each of 
the explanatory variables included in the model.   The dependent variables are 
Tobin’s Q (TOBINSQ) and ROA and ROE is used as proxy for company 
financial performance.  The dependent variable is assets utilisation ratio (ASSET) 
and dividend pay-out ratio (DIVIDEND) is used as proxy for agency costs.   
PERFORMANCE/AC = β0 +β11INSIDE i,t + β12NONE i,t + β13CEO i,t + 
β14DIVERSITY   i,t+ β15FEMALE i,t       +    β16MINORITY i,t+ 
β17BOARD i,t+ β18OWNER i,t + β19FOREIGN i,t+ 
β110LNSALES i,t+ β111DEBT i,t+ β112AGE i,t+ β113INDUSTRY i,t 
+ β114REGION i,t +ε             
                                 -----------------(1) 
 
PERFORMANCE/AC= β1 +β21INSIDE i,t + β22 NONE i,t + β23CEO i,t + 
β24DIVERSITY  i,t +β25FEMALE i,t+  β26MINORITY i,t+ 
β27BOARD i,t+β28OWNER i,t +  β29LNSALES i,t+ i,t 
β210DEBT i,t+β211AGE i,t+ β212INDUSTRY i,t +ε        
                                   ---------------(2) 
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The dataset does have random missing observations. An unbalanced data analysis 
method appears to be appropriate.   Before proceeding with an unbalanced panel 
data analysis, the individual and time effects (two-way error components), are 
considered.  A test for unbalanced panel two-way error components using the 
Breush- Pagan LM test for unbalanced two-way error components based on the 
modelling of  Baltagi & Li (1990) was run. 
Random or fixed effect model in Panel data OLS regression 
An advantage of panel data is that it permits analysis which might otherwise have 
been precluded due to insufficient observation over time (time-series).  Another 
benefit is the more powerful properties in its testing procedures compared to 
standard time-series methods.  However, panel data can also give rise to statistical 
problems in regression analysis.  In particular, it is important to determine 
whether there are fixed effects present in the variables.  Hausman's specification 
test or m-statistic differentiates between random and fixed effects models by 
testing for correlation between the variables (x) and the individual random effects 
(εi).  The Fixed effects model (FE) explores the relationship between predictor and 
outcome variables within an entity.  The FE model assumes that something within 
the individual can impact or bias the outcome variables and this need to be 
controlled.    The fixed effects model may be written:    =      +        
Where,   (i=1…,n) is the unknown intercept for each entity (n entity - specific 
intercepts),     is the dependent variable where i= entity and t=time,    represents 
independent variable.   is the coefficient for    ,    is the error term. 
Unlike the fixed effects model, random effects model assumes the variation across 
entities is to be random and uncorrelated with the independent variables included 
in the model. The general random effects model may be written:  
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                       Yit= βXit+ α+ uit+ εit 
Where i= 1,……., N firms, t= 1,….. T time period with k regressors in Xit and uit 
there is a normal error term and Yit is agency cost.   
Hausman Tests 
Hausman's specification test, or m-statistic, can be used to test the significance of 
estimators.  Consider the linear model, Hausman's m-statistic is as follows 
 =   +   
Where Y is univariate and X is vector of repressors,   is a vector of coefficients 
and   is the error term.    can have two estimates as follows.    β
 
     β
  
where 
under null hypothesis both estimators are consistent and only β
 
 is efficient.  
Under the alternative hypothesis only β
  
 is constant, the m-statistic is: 
 = (β
 
− β
 
)
 
(   (β
 
) −    (β
  
))  (β
 
− β
  
) 
Studies undertaken by Carter et al. (2003), Campbell & Minguez-Vera (2007) and 
Marinova et al. (2010a), show that problems arise with OLS regression if two or 
more variables are jointly endogenous.  The direction of causality can go both 
ways - meaning either that board size, board composition and leadership lead to 
high financial performance or that high financial performance firms tend to have 
more diversity, large board and high freedom of leadership.  To control the effect 
of inverse causality there needs to be an econometric method that can deal with 
endogeneity and also with the presence of unobservable fixed effects that are 
associated with each company and correlated with the rest of the explanatory 
variables.   When the unobservable effect is correlated with independent variables, 
pool OLS estimation produces estimators that are biased and inconsistent (Andres 
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& Vallelado, 2008).  According to Hermalin & Weisbach (2003b), it is rational to 
consider that the board is determined endogenously.   Further, Drakos & Bekiris 
(2010) explain board composition, leadership structure and board size are strongly 
endogenous.   If the strict exogeneity condition fails, then OLS is inconsistent and 
will have a different probability limit.  Wintoki et al. (2007) explain most 
empirical research has identified corporate governance research to be explicitly 
affected by two major types of endogeneity, namely unobservable heterogeneity 
(arising when unobservable factors affect both dependent and explanatory 
variables) and determination of independent and dependent variable (arising when 
independent variables are a function of the dependent variable or expected value 
of the dependent variable).  Further, they include a third type of endogeneity issue 
arising in corporate governance where this firm’s current action will be effect its 
future environment and future performance, which they call  dynamic endogenity.  
Ignoring these three types of endogeneity can lead to biased inference about the 
relationship between governance and firm financial performance.  To overcome 
this econometric problem most previous studies use a two stage least squares 
(2SLS) regression technique (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Bartholomeusez & 
Tanewski, 2006; Ready, 2010).   However, 2SLS requires the identification of 
instruments that are correlated with the endogenous variables and uncorrelated 
with the error term of the model.   Researchers sometimes resist identifying 
possible instruments that are uncorrelated with error term and correlated with the 
endogenous variable.  This weak instrument leads to misinterpretation of 
coefficients.  According to McFadden (1999), when the sample is finite the 2SLS 
estimator is not behaving properly and if the sample is large enough, the 
asymptotic approximation is reliable. 
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As an alternative approach, Arellano (2003), and Wooldridge (2006) introduce a 
dynamic panel data routine to estimate unbiased coefficients.   The dynamic panel 
data estimator is capable of modelling a relationship through the lag of instrument 
variables, without the subsequent violation of the assumption that the error term 
and independent variables are uncorrelated.  First differencing will control for 
unobservable heterogeneity and eliminates potential omitted variables’ bias.  
Using company history (lag variable) as an instrumental variable provides two 
major benefits.  First, it avoids inconsistency of endogenity through instrumental 
(lag) variables and it provides instruments that allow for controlling potential 
simultaneous and reversing causality.   The second major advantage is the 
dynamic estimation procedure which allows an entire set of explanatory variables 
(here all the  governance variables) to be treated as endogenous (Wintoki et al., 
2007).  
5.3.1.2 Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test (DWH) 
The DWH test is applied to check the endogeneity of financial and agency costs 
proxies and other variables. 
Let  d=    −        Then a test can be based on  
 =  ′{         [ ]} −   ; 
The result of the DWH test for endogeneity indicates that it is appropriate to use 
dynamic panel GMM estimation. 
5.3.1.3 Dynamic panel generalised method of moment (GMM) estimation 
To obtain robust estimates, a GMM panel estimator is used to estimate the 
relationship between board composition, board size, leadership structure and 
financial performance.  The dynamic GMM method allows for building up 
instrumental variables for potential endogenous variables.  Hermalin & Weisback 
(2003) posit there is increased interest in the characteristics of the board as 
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endogenously to determine firm performances.  Dynamic dimensions of panel 
data allow for checking response processes across time and identifying the effect 
of board directors’ characteristics and their effects on company financial 
performance (Andres & Vallelado, 2008).   The dynamic GMM panel estimator 
was first introduced by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and further developed by 
Arellano & Bond (1991) Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998).  
The basic GMM estimation consists of two steps.  First, the dynamic model with 
first differenced form: 
  
Where X includes lag performance for explanatory variables, (yt-1) as well as 
dependent variables.  This first-differencing eliminates potential bias that arises 
from unobservable heterogeneity.   After first-differencing, GMM estimation uses 
lagged values as instruments for (Xt-Xt-1): 
    =  +  ∑      
 
+ β    +      +  ε                   ( ) 
An important aspect of the dynamic panel estimator is its use of company history 
as an instruments for explanatory variables.  If the exogeneity assumptions are 
valid, then the right following orthogonality conditions are required:  
 (     ε  ) =  (     ε  ) =  (     ε  ) =                   ( ) 
Researchers have found econometric shortcomings for the above GMM estimator.  
Beck et al. (2000) argue that if the original model is in levels, differencing may 
increase the signal to noise ratio and reduce the power of the test.   Another short 
coming pointed out by Arellano & Bover (1995) is that the variables in levels may 
be weak instruments for first-differenced equations.  Griliches & Hausman (1986) 
also explain differencing may worsen the impact of measurement errors in the 
dependent variables.  
      Yt - Yt-1  =  β ( t-Xt-1)  +  εt-εt-1 
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Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998) further develop the GMM 
estimator using first-differenced variables as instruments for the equations in a 
stacked system of equations that includes the equations in levels and differences.  
However, the equations in the stacks may include unobservable heterogeneity.  To 
deal with this problem, it is assumed that the ownership and other control 
variables exhibit a constant correlation over time.  This assumption leads to an 
additional set of orthogonality conditions. 
According to Wintoki et al. (2007), this assumption is rational for relatively short 
periods of time.   This system of dynamic GMM estimator enables efficient 
estimators to be obtained while maintaining all the essential elements for 
controlling unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneous and dynamic endogeneity.  
Therefore, the above assumption leads to an additional orthogonality condition as 
follows:  
 [      (  +    )] =  [      (  +    )] =  [      (  +    )] =         
      ( ) 
This study carried out dynamic GMM panel estimation using the orthogonal 
conditions of (2) and (3) equations under the assumption that there is no serial 
correlation in the error term, ε  
After model estimation, this study checks linearity assumption as well. 
5.3.1.4 Tobit model  
Most of the literature uses the Tobit model as an econometric model to describe 
the relationship between non-negative dependent variables and independent 
variables.  The cross–sectional non-dynamic Tobit model can be represented as 
follows (Tobin, 1958):  
 
𝑌𝑖
∗ = 𝛽𝑥𝑖 +∈𝑖 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑌𝑖
∗ 𝑟  
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Where    
∗  is a latent variable, this latent dependent variable has a linear 
relationship with    via a parameter   which determines the relationship between 
the dependent variable and independent latent variable.  Y represents an observed 
dependent variable, and r is a known constant. The normally distributed error term 
is denoted by  .  
According to Drakos & Bekiris (2010), it is rational to treat board composition, 
board size and leadership structure as endogenous.   Therefore, a dynamic panel 
Tobit model is used as regression analysis to test the relationship between 
corporate governance factors and company Q dummy free cash flow (QFCF) 
agency proxy, where the Q dummy takes the value 1 if the firm’s Tobin’s Q is 
less than 1 and 0 otherwise.   Free cash flow is scaled by market capitalisation 
based on Lehn & Paulsen’s model (1989). The cross-sectional non-dynamic Tobit 
model introduced by Tobin (1958) can be represented as follows.  
 
 
Where Y
*
 is a latent dependent variable, x is a vector of exogenous variables, Y 
represents an observed dependent variable, r is a known constant and can be 
recalled as zero even. In a dynamic panel data set, the Tobit model can be 
explained as follows:  
                                                       
 
Model (2) is characterised by lagged latent dependent variables.  The component 
   is an unobserved individual specific random disturbance which is constant over 
time, and       is an idiosyncratic error which varies across time and individuals.  
Chang (2002) assumes that    and      are Gaussian conditional on           .  The 
                                                   𝑌𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖                                              (1) 
𝑌𝑖  = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑌𝑖
∗ 𝑟  
 
  𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  𝑡 =      𝑇   𝑖 =
    𝑁 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑦𝑖 𝑡  
∗ 𝜆 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                   ( ) 
𝑌𝑖𝑡  = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑌𝑖
∗    
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one common approach for estimating the dynamic panel Tobit model is the fixed 
effect.  Honore (1993) posits that although a fixed effect Tobit model is valid 
under weak restrictions on the unobservable heterogeneity, it has major 
limitations; the model with the time-dummies’ variables cannot be estimated 
consistently.   Further, Hu (2003) explains that a dynamic panel Tobit with lagged 
latent dependent variables and fixed effects estimator creates more problems.  The 
second possible method for estimating the dynamic panel Tobit model is the 
random effects approach.  By specifying the distribution of the error conditional 
on the regressors, the random effects estimators can be obtained through 
maximising the corresponding likelihood functions (Geweke & Keane, 2000; 
Lillard & Willis, 1978).  A random effects Tobit estimator has the following 
advantages.  First, time-invariant, time-varying, and time-dummies’ variables can 
be incorporated in the model and they can be estimated constantly using the 
simulation estimator.   Secondly, this method allows for complicated dynamic 
panels, possibly with more than one lag variable.  Thirdly, it is a straightforward 
and easy way to accommodate serial correlations errors (Chang, 2002). 
5.3.1.5 Analysis of variance test (ANOVA) 
An ANOVA test is used to investigate whether the corporate governance variables 
have a significant relationship with MNCs’ and LPCs’ financial performance.  
ANOVA, in terms of linear models, make the following three assumptions about 
the probability distribution.  First, it is assumed the model simplifies the statistical 
analysis (independence of cases).  Secondly, the variance of data in the group is 
equality (homoscedasticty).  Finally, it assumes that the errors are independently, 
identically, and normally distributed for fixed effect models (normality); that is, 
that the errors are independent and:  Є ≈ N ( 0 σ2) 
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5.3.1.6 Difference-in-difference method (DID) 
This study uses a DID method to test whether the financial performance and 
agency conflicts of MNCs and LPCs, after complying corporate governance 
voluntary code differ.  The major short-falls of ANOVA test to check the mean 
differences of two variables is that it is unable to isolate the impact of corporate 
governance code compliance on firm financial performance from concurrent 
effects of other internal and external economic factors.  Therefore, to evaluate the 
impact of corporate governance compliance with the financial performance of 
firms it is necessary to separate the impact of corporate governance compliance 
itself from other factors.  There are two dimensions for comparison. The first 
comparison is to compare the difference across two groups i.e. compliance and 
non-compliance groups (difference across category).  The second is to compare 
the difference before and after the compliance of code (difference across time).  
This estimator (D1) is calculated as the difference between pre and post estimates.  
Next the control group’s estimator  
(D2), is subtracted from D1, capturing the time trend γ form the treatment group’s 
estimator  is then calculated as: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐸 𝛿 
^ = 𝐸[𝑌 
𝑇] − 𝐸[𝑌 
𝑇] 
= [ +𝛽 + 𝛾 + 𝛿] − [ +𝛽] 
= 𝛾 + 𝛽 
𝛿 
^ = 𝑌 
𝑇 − 𝑌 
𝑇                                                                                                             
(D1) 
Taking the expectation of this estimator: 
 
              
𝐸 𝛿 
^ = 𝐸[𝑌 
𝑇] − 𝐸 𝑌 
𝐶  
= [ +𝛽 + 𝛾 + 𝛿] − [ +𝛾] 
= 𝛽 +  𝛿 
𝛿 
^ = 𝑌 
𝑇 − 𝑌 
𝐶                                                                                                             
(D2) 
Taking the expectation of this estimator: 
 
              
𝛿𝐷𝐷 = 𝐸 [𝑌 
𝑇] −  𝐸 [𝑌  
𝑇 ] − (𝐸  𝑌 
𝐶𝑇 −  𝐸 [𝑌 
𝑇])  
= +𝛽 + 𝛾 + 𝛿 − (𝛼 + 𝛽) − (𝛼 + 𝛾 − 𝛾) 
= (𝛾 + 𝛿) − 𝛾 
= 𝛿 
𝛿𝐷𝐷 = 𝑌 
𝑇 − 𝑌 
𝑇 − (𝑌 
𝐶 − 𝑌 
𝐶)                                                                                
(DD) 
Taking the expectation of this estimator: 
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5.4. Quantile regression  
In order to investigate the corporate governance and firm financial performance 
relationship further, financial performance is subjected to testing of 0.05, 
0.25,0.50,0.75 and 0.90 quantiles in this study.  Quantile regression is designed to 
estimate the relationship of explanatory variables at different points (i.e quantiles) 
in conditional distribution of the dependent variables.  By using this regression 
model, a complete picture can be derived of how corporate governance 
mechanisms relates to firm performance at different conditional quantiles.  By 
applying quantile regression, this study addresses the question of whether the sign 
and/or magnitude of corporate governance variables and firm financial 
performance are different for different levels of financial performance. The OLS 
regression only estimates the relationship between variables for the conditional 
mean of firm financial performance and agency costs.  However, quantile 
regression is more powerful than OLS regression, because it produces separate 
estimates for all conditional quantiles of a response variable’s distribution 
(Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2010).  Further, they explain quantile regression 
works better than OLS regression, especially with skewed data, unequal variance 
(heteroscedasticity) and the existence of outliers. Quantile regression as 
introduced by Koenker & Bassett (1978) seeks to complement classical linear 
regression analysis. Quantile regression essentially transforms a conditional 
distribution function into a conditional quantile function by splitting it into 
segments.  In OLS, modelling a conditional distribution function of a random 
sample (y1,……yn) with a parametric function μ(xi,β) where xi represents the 
independent variables, β the corresponding estimates and μ the conditional mean, 
can present the following minimization problem: 
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Obtains the conditional expectation function E[Y | xi] can proceed in quantile 
regression. The central feature thereby becomes ρτ, which serves as a check 
function. 
In Quantile regression one now minimises the following function: 
 
 
Here, in contrast to OLS, the minimisation is done for each subsection defined by 
ρτ, where the estimate of the τth-quantile function is achieved with the parametric 
function ξ(xi,β) (Koenker & Hallock, 2001). 
5.5 Specification tests 
5.5.1 Autocorrelation test 
The serial correlation (i.e. successive residuals appear to be correlated with each 
other) is often encountered in econometric models (Jung, 2005).  However, 
previous literature addressed this issue in a time-series based context (Taylor & 
Wilson, 1964) and very few addressed it in a panel context (Ahn & Schmidt, 
1997; Jung, 2005).  For consistent estimation, the panel data estimators require 
that the error     be serially uncorrelated. If     are uncorrelated, then      are 
correlated with         because Cov(             ) =Cov(                  −
      )=-Cov(             ) ≠ 0.  However,      will not be correlated with         
for k ≥ 2.  
mi 𝛽 ∈ 𝑅 ∑(𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖  
− 𝜇(𝑥𝑖  𝛽))  
𝜌𝜏
=  
𝜏 ∗ 𝑥                                                   𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≥  
(𝜏 −  ) ∗ 𝑥                                        𝑖𝑓 𝑥 <                 
  
mi 𝛽 ∈ 𝑟 ∑𝜌𝜏
𝑛
𝑖  
(𝑦𝑖 − 𝜖(𝑥𝑖 𝛽)) 
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5.5.2 Tests of over identifying restrictions 
This research uses the Hansen-Sargan test which is a heteroskedasticity-consistent 
test for over identifying restrictions.   The standard test for over identifying 
restrictions associated with Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982) is the test given by 
the minimised value of the GMM criterion function under the  continuous 
updating procedure (Hansen et al., 1996).  In a GMM context, when there are 
more moment conditions than parameters to be estimated, a chi-square test can be 
used to test the over-identifying restrictions.  The test statistic can be called the J 
statistic. The GMM method has solved the problem of solving the equation 
 ( ) =   with the minimisation of a certain quadratic form. Such minimisation 
can always be carried over, even when no θ0 such that  ( ) =    exists or closer 
to zero.   The testable hypotheses for the proposed J tests are  
 
 
 
5.5.3 Test for joint significance 
One of the universal methods for hypothesis testing and obtaining confidence 
intervals is the Wald method. Polit (1996) and Agresti (1990)  identify the Wald 
test as one of a number of ways of testing parameters associated the with a group 
of explanatory variables to determine whether the explanatory variables jointly 
contribute zero explanatory power.  If the Wald test is significant then, the group 
of explanatory variables (in this study, board size, board composition, board 
leadership and control variables), have parameters that are not zero.  Hence, all 
the explanatory variables can be included in the models.  If the Wald test is not 
significant then the model formulation needs to be redesigned, excluding variables 
with zero parameters.  The Wald test statistic compares the maximum likelihood 
H0: ń(𝜃) =    (mo el i  “v li ”)      
H0: ń(𝜃)  ≠    𝜃 ∈  𝜃 (𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑖𝑠  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑 )   
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estimate  ^ with the proposed value  , assuming the difference between the two 
will be normal. In the univariant case, the Wald statistic is 
Alternatively, the difference can be compared to a normal distribution.  In this 
case, the test statistic is:  
 
 
 
Where   ( ^) is the standard error of the maximum likelihood estimate.  
 
5.5.4 Estimate of standard errors 
When estimating the governance relationship and firm financial performance and 
agency costs, variance-covariance matrix of the estimator (VCE) is reported.  
VCE (robust) uses the robust estimator.  This study uses the two step estimator; 
the Windmeijer (2004) WC-robust estimator.  For the one-step estimator, the 
Arellano-Bond robust VCE estimator is used. When the residuals are independent 
and identically distributed, OLS standard errors are unbiased.   But when using 
the panel data, standard errors can be biased, either over or underestimating the 
true variability of the coefficient estimates.   In literature that includes panel data, 
42% of the papers did not adjust the standard errors for possible dependence in the 
residuals (Petersen, 2009).  He further explains, even though literature has used 
different methods to observe standard errors in panel data, those chosen methods 
are not appropriate in all instances.  There are two types of residual errors that can 
be occurring in a panel data set.  According to Wooldridge (2007), the first type of 
error  is the unobserved firm effect; that is, the residual of a given company may 
be correlated across a year.  The second type of error is introduced by Petersen 
(2009); that is, a time effect when the residual of a given year may be correlated 
across different companies (cross-sectional dependence).  
(𝜃^ − 𝜃 )^ 
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝜃^)
 
(𝜃^ − 𝜃 )
𝑆𝐸(𝜃^)
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This study uses Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear dynamic panel data 
estimation.  This estimator is apposite for many panels and limited time period 
datasets (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009).  Furthermore, this method assumes that there 
is no autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors and requires the initial condition 
that the panel level effects be uncorrelated with the first difference of the first 
observation of the dependent variable.  
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the econometric analysis used for hypothesis testing and 
highlights the role of the variables in relation to corporate governance.   Variable 
definitions and a summary of variables are given.  Panel OLS regression, dynamic 
panel GMM estimation, Tobit model, ANOVA, DID, Quantile regression, 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and specification tests are described.  This chapter also 
discussed data collection methods and sample selection of this study.  The next 
chapter will describe the findings and examine the important corporate 
governance variables and models for MNCs on the basis of the econometric 
results obtained by applying the methods discussed in this chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Econometric results and discussion of corporate 
governance practices, financial performance and agency 
costs in MNC subsidiaries 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical study and analyses the 
information about the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, 
financial performance and agency costs in Sri Lanka’s MNCs.   
This chapter is organised as follows.  Section 6.1 provides descriptive statistic of 
the sample data. This is followed by presentation of pair-wise correlation of 
variables (section 6.2).  Section 6.3 provides financial performance analysis and 
discussion.  Section 6.4 provides agency costs analysis and discussion.  
Thereafter, section 6.5 provides panel Tobit regression results.  Section 6.6 is 
about the specification tests for this study.  Finally, section 6.7 concludes the 
chapter.  
6.1 Descriptive statistics for MNC subsidiaries 
The sample consists of 86 MNC subsidiaries listed on the CSE for the period of 
2006 to 2010.  Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics of the dependent and 
independent variables used in this study.  The table depicts the number of 
observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum value of 
each variable.  There are four categories for independent variables.  First category 
is board size. The second category is board composition. The third category is 
board leadership.  The fourth category is control variables.  
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Table 3Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics of MNCs 
Variables Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
TOBIN’S Q 
 
424 
 
.9539069 
 
1.000997 
 
0.41299 
 
-3.6541 
 
2.517831 
ROA 424 0.015289 3.92E-06 0.04882 -0.26401 0.227802 
ROE 402 8.857214 8.625 3.293844 -294.85 148.54 
ASSETS 424 0.962075 0.828652 0.815175 0 3.914783 
DIVIDEND 420 0.013639 0.005429 0.615057 0 6.238527 
QFCF 424 133233 0 608044.1 -397163 6913873 
Independent 
variables 
Board size 
BOARD 
 
 
408 
 
 
7.615196 
 
 
8 
 
 
1.976885 
 
 
3 
 
 
14 
Board composition 
NONE 
 
381 
 
.6135439 
 
0.6666666 
 
.2552809 
 
0 
 
1 
INSIDE 430 0.065959 0.000203 0.148441 0 1 
DIVERSITY 430 .4240208 .44849 .1164966 0 0.6875 
FEMALE 426 0.020579 0 0.045417 0 0.5 
MINORITY 424 0.312792 0.333333 0.278424 0 1 
Leadership structure 
CEO 
 
430 
 
0.155814 
 
0 
 
0.363101 
 
0 
 
1 
OWNER 430 0.953488 1 0.210836 0 1 
FOREIGN 430 0.760465 1 0.427297 0 1 
Control variables 
LNSALES 
 
420 
 
13.60088 
 
13.86738 
 
2.440985 
 
6.369901 
 
17.6787 
AGE 430 42.88372 42 30.3136 4 104 
LNAGE 430 3.507893 3.332205 0.725386 1.386294 4.644391 
DEBT 331 .2307946 2.155547 .1909195 0 .8288749 
REGION1 430 0.337209 0 0.473308 0 1 
REGION 2 430 0.046512 0 0.210836 0 1 
REGION3  430 0.05814 0 0.23428 0 1 
REGION 4 430 0.55814 0 0.497187 0 1 
INDUS1 430 0.05814 0 0.23428 0 1 
INDUS2 430 0.011628 0 0.107329 0 1 
INDUS3 430 0.104651 0 0.30646 0 1 
INDUS4 430 0.244186 0 0.430104 0 1 
INDUS5 430 0.127907 0 0.334375 0 1 
INDUS6 430 0.011628 0 0.107329 0 1 
INDUS7 430 0.44186 0 0.497187 0 1 
Note: For the detail description of above variables (2006-2010), refer to Table 5.2 in 
Chapter 5 
1) Tobin’s Q:-The mean Tobin’s Q value is 0.95.  This is much closer to value 1.0, 
and indicates MNCs create value for their shareholders.  This is consistent with 
Pantzalis (2001) who finds that MNCs in developing markets have significantly 
higher excess Tobin’s Q value. The maximum Tobin’s Q value is 2.52 and 
minimum is -3.65.  This is consistent with Doukas & Kan (2006) who explain that 
due to global diversification MNCs destroy their company value.   
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2) ROA:-The maximum value of ROA is 0.23 and the minimum is -0.26.  The mean 
value of ROA is 0.015.  Though the mean ROA is small, this positive value 
indicates that the sample MNCs create shareholder value over the sampling period.  
This positive value indicates effective utilisation of company assets in business to 
generate an operating surplus.   
3) ROE:-The ROE mean is 8.86%. This positive mean value indicates MNCs create 
value for their shareholders. This indicates operating efficiency is positively 
translated into benefits to the owners.   
4) ASSETS:-The mean assets utilisation ratio is 0.96 with a median 0.83 for the 
sample companies.  The average assets utilisation is closer to one and a positive 
figure, which means that companies efficiently utilise invested capital.  The 
maximum value for assets utilisation for companies in this sample is 3.91 and the 
minimum value is 0.   
5) DIVIDEND:-The minimum value for dividend payout ratio for MNCs is 0 and 
maximum value is 6.24.  The mean dividend payout ratio is 0.0136.  It is clearly 
visible that more than fifty percent of firms have less than a 0.005% dividend 
payout ratio.  Overall, this finding indicates MNCs’ earnings do not well support 
dividend payments.   
6) QFCF:-The median value zero indicates fifty percent of companies are highly 
managed firms (Tobin’s Q is greater than 1).   
7) BOARD:-The mean value of board size is 7.61. This size is smaller than the 
average European board size of 11.8 average as at 2009 ("Corporate Governance 
Report 2009: Boards in Turbulent Times", 2009). Table 6.1 indicates that the 
minimum value for board size is 3 and the maximum value is 14.  This average 
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board size of Sri Lankan MNCs is consistent with the recommendations of the 
European and US code for ideal board size of between 5 and 15 members.   
8) NONE:-The minimum percentage of non-executive directors on MNC subsidiary 
boards is zero and the maximum percentage is 100.  The mean value of non-
executive directors is 61%.  The high number of non-executive directors may be 
due to the fact that the new listing rules require one third of a board to be non-
executive directors.   
9) INSIDE: - In the sample period 2006-2010, fifty percent of companies have zero 
insider shareholdings.  The average insider shareholding is 6.59% only.   However, 
minimum and maximum range varies between zero insider holdings to 100% 
insider shareholdings.  
10) DIVERSITY:-The minimum value for diversity of MNC subsidiaries is 0 and 
maximum value is 0.6875. The value zero indicates non-diversified board 
(homogenous board) and 1.0 indicates fully diversified board.  According to the 
descriptive statistics, more than fifty percent of firms have non diversified boards.   
11) FEMALE:-The sample mean percentage of female directors is 2.0. This is 
lower than the female board numbers reported from the European average (10%) 
in 2009 ("Corporate Governance Report 2009: Boards in Turbulent Times", 2009). 
Further, findings shows fifty percent of MNCs have no female directors on their 
boards.  
11)  MINORITY:-The mean proportion of ethnic minority directors is 31%.  The 
minimum minority directors’ percentage on a board is zero and the maximum is 
100%. This suggests total minority board do exists in Sri Lankan MNCs. The 
minority directors’ representation in Sri Lankan MNCs is approximately three 
times higher than US listed companies in the sample used by Carter et al. (2008).  
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12) CEO:-The mean proportion of CEO duality in subsidiaries is 15.6%.  Hence, in 
this sample 84.4% of MNCs separate the CEO and chairman roles.  This is 
consistent with European findings; “Corporate Governance Report 2009: Boards 
in Turbulent Times” (2009) states more than 84% of European firms split the 
functions of chairman and CEO. This may be multinational companies try to 
maintain balance between the board and CEO.   
13) OWNER:-The mean proportion of institutional ownership is 0.95.  Due to weak 
legal protection, individual investors are reluctant to invest in Sri Lanka.   
Therefore, institutional ownership is high.  
14) FORIGN:-The mean proportion of foreign managers in Sri Lankan subsidiaries 
is 76%. This indicates more than two thirds of MNCs operating in Sri Lanka 
would like to have foreign managers from their parent companies.    
15)  LNSALES:-The first company size measure is log of total sales. The mean Log 
of total sales is 13.06.  
17)  AGE:-The minimum value of age for MNCs is 4 years and maximum value is 
104 years.  The mean value is 42.88 years.  The median value indicates fifty percent 
of the sample consists of young firms with an age less than 42.   
18)  DEBT:-This variable indicates MNCs’ debt to assets ratio.  The average debt to 
assets ratio is 23.07.  This descriptive statistic highlights Sri Lankan MNCs are not 
highly leveraged.  This figure is less than the G7 countries’ sample use by Rajan & 
Zingales (1995a).  The minimum value of debt to assets ratio is zero, indicating 
there is existence of total equity companies in Sri Lanka listed MNCs. The 
maximum leverage ratio is 82.88.  The median value indicates fifty percent of 
companies have less than 21.55% debt to assets ratio.  
19) LOCATION:-These variables indicate MNCs’ parent locations.  A third or 33.7% 
of MNC subsidiaries are from Europe (LOC1), 4.6% of the sample is from 
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Scandinavia (LOC2) and 5.8% operating in Sri Lanka come from the American 
region (LOC3). Finally, 5.58% of subsidiaries are from Asia (LOC4). 
 20) INDUSTRIES:-Seven industry dummies are used to represent all industries in 
Sri Lanka (except the financial sector): 5.8% of companies operate in INDUS1; 1% 
of the sample of MNC subsidiaries are from INDSU2; 10% of companies are from 
industry 3; Industry 4 represents 24% of the sample; 12% of firms are from industry 
5 and 1% of firms from industry 6; Industry 7 represents 44% of total sample.  
The distribution of each variable was checked to determine if it was approximately 
a normal variant.  The Jarque-Bera test results indicated that all data are normally 
distributed.  Accordingly, a conditional mean estimator (OLS) is appropriate for the 
sample data set.  
6.2 Pair wise correlation  
The correlation matrix shown as Table 6.2  indicates that explanatory variables are 
positively and significantly correlated with the level of Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, 
ASSETS, DIVIDEND and QFCF, which offers tentative support for the claim that 
board size, board composition, leadership structure and control variables interact 
with MNCs’ financial performance and agency costs.   Further, highly correlated 
board size, board composition and leadership variables indicate a need for further 
attention to these variables.     
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Table  
Table 4Table 6.2 Correlation matrix 
 TOBIN’S Q ROA ROE ASSETS DIVIDENT QFCF BOARD 
TOBIN’S Q 1.0000       
ROA 0.0241 
(0.6201) 
1.0000      
ROE 0.0152 
(0.7612) 
0.1672*** 
(0.0008) 
1.0000     
ASSETS 0.1051** 
(0.0304) 
0.0269 
(0.5807) 
0.2409*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
DIVIDEND -0.1495** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0310 
(0.5270) 
-0.0106 
(0.8327) 
-0.2095*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
QFCF -0.1463** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0377 
(0.4390) 
0.3855*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1950*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0282 
(0.5638) 
1.0000  
BOARD 0.0427 
(0.3931) 
-0.0998** 
(0.0455) 
-0.0008 
(0.9876) 
0.0608 
(0.2240) 
-0.0651 
(0.1946) 
0.0283 
(0.5712) 
1.0000 
NONE 0.3132*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2066*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2230*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0513 
(0.3181) 
-0.0196 
(0.7045) 
-0.3008*** 
(0.0000) 
0.3276*** 
(0.0000) 
INSIDE 0.1461** 
(0.0026) 
0.2179*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0714 
(0.1529) 
-0.1280** 
(0.0083) 
-0.0007 
(0.9879) 
-0.0753 
(0.1217) 
-0.1333*** 
(0.0000) 
FEMALE -0.5258*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1221* 
(0.0119) 
0.1297*** 
(  0.0092) 
-0.2509 
(0.0000) 
0.2290*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2191 
(0.0000) 
-0.2352*** 
(0.0000) 
DIVERSITY -0.4047*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1559*** 
(0.0013) 
0.1687*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.2375*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2051*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2375*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2678*** 
(0.0000) 
MINORITY 0.3019*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1566*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.1756*** 
(0.0004) 
0.1048* 
(0.0310) 
-0.0003 
(0.9947) 
-0.2260*** 
(0.0000) 
0.3040*** 
(0.0000) 
CEO 0.1889 ***  
(0.0001) 
-0.1232* 
(0.0111) 
-0.0429 
(0.3910) 
-0.0582 
(0.2316) 
0.0989** 
(0.0428) 
-0.0899* 
(0.0643) 
0.1245** 
(0.0118) 
OWNER -0.0425 
(0.3823) 
0.0697 
(0.1517) 
0.0062 
(0.9022) 
0.0361 
(0.4587) 
0.0405 
(0.4078) 
0.0451 
(0.3542) 
-0.1017** 
(0.0400) 
FOREIGN -0.1821*** 
(0.0002) 
0.1200** 
(0.0134) 
0.1167* 
(0.0193) 
0.0097 
(0.8414) 
-0.0398 
(0.4163) 
0.1195 
(0.0138) 
-0.2258*** 
(0.0000) 
LNSALES 0.1363*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0045 
(0.9260) 
0.2316*** 
(0.0000) 
0.4601*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3220*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2388*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2519*** 
(0.0000) 
LNAGE -0.1437*** 
(0.0030) 
0.1421** 
(0.0034) 
-0.0960** 
(0.0544) 
-0.2151*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2235*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1033** 
(0.0335) 
-0.0681 
(0.1701) 
DEBT 0.0333 
(0.5472) 
-0.0498 
(0.3681) 
-0.0519 
(0.3627) 
0.2893*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2111*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.1141** 
(0.0386) 
0.1873*** 
(0.0009) 
REG1 0.0450 
(0.3554) 
0.0061 
(0.8998) 
-0.0883* 
(0.0769) 
-0.1209** 
(0.0127) 
-0.0688 
(0.1591) 
0.0586 
(0.2285) 
0.1599*** 
(0.0012) 
REG2 0.0227 
(0.6416) 
0.0574 
(0.2383) 
0.3011*** 
(0.0000) 
0.5214*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0347 
(0.4783) 
0.2514*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0660 
(0.1830) 
REG3 0.0189 
(0.6980) 
-0.0784 
(0.1068) 
0.0741 
(0.1379) 
0.2971*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0482 
(0.3241) 
-0.0007 
(0.9881) 
-0.0779 
(0.1162) 
 TOBIN’S Q ROA ROE ASSETS DIVIDENT QFCF BOARD 
REG4 -0.0614 
(0.2072) 
0.0069 
(0.8874) 
-0.0839* 
(0.0928) 
-0.2490*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1032** 
(0.0345) 
-0.1627*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.1433** 
(0.0037) 
INDS1 -0.0316 
(0.5165) 
-0.0785 
(0.1066) 
-0.0478 
(0.3391) 
0.0794 
(0.1025) 
-0.0489 
(0.3176) 
0.1930*** 
(0.0001) 
0.1964*** 
(0.0001) 
INDS2 0.0081 
(0.8674) 
-0.0342 
(0.4819) 
0.1827*** 
(0.0002) 
0.2435*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0115 
(0.8135) 
0.0930** 
(0.0557) 
-0.0347 
(0.4845) 
INDS3 0.0222 
(0.6487) 
0.3739*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0361 
(0.4709) 
-0.1989*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0093 
(0.8497) 
-0.0282 
(0.5627) 
-0.2689*** 
(0.0000) 
INDS4 0.0761 
(0.1178) 
-0.2617*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1412*** 
(0.0046) 
-0.0469 
(0.3357) 
-0.1002** 
(0.0401) 
-0.1136** 
(0.0193) 
0.0390 
(0.4325) 
INDS5 0.0572 
(0.2395) 
0.3677*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1415*** 
(0.0045) 
0.1995*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0574 
(0.2404) 
0.1089** 
(0.0249) 
0.1424*** 
(0.0040) 
INDS6 0.0203 
(0.6770) 
-0.0342 
(0.4818) 
0.0497 
(0.3201) 
-0.0507 
(0.2975) 
0.0440 
(0.3687) 
-0.0240 
(0.6227) 
0.1120** 
(0.0237) 
INDS7 -0.1093** 
(0.0244) 
-0.1973*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0286 
(0.5673) 
-0.0484 
(0.3203) 
0.1357*** 
(0.0053) 
-0.0629 
(0.1961) 
-0.0779 
(0.1161) 
 NONE INSIDER FEMALE DIVERSITY MINORITY CEO OWNER 
NONE 1.0000       
INSIDER -0.0503 
(0.3278) 
1.0000      
FEMALE -0.8334*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0916* 
(0.0589) 
1.0000     
DIVERSITY -0.8371*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1168** 
(0.0154) 
0.9801*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
MINORITY 0.9625*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0359 
(0.4612) 
-0.6827*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.7397*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
CEO 0.6178*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1175** 
(0.0148) 
-0.2567*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2861*** 
(0.0000) 
0.6956*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
OWNER -0.0480 
(0.3496) 
-0.0668 
(0.1668) 
0.0821* 
(0.0904) 
0.0796* 
(0.0994) 
-0.0852* 
(0.0796) 
-0.0269  
(0.5779) 
1.0000 
FOREIGN -0.7082*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0561 
(0.2455) 
0.3390*** 
(0.0000) 
0.3738*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.7648*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.7655*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0313 
(0.5176) 
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LNSALES 0.1677*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.2941*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3561*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3590*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1953*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0618 
(0.2063) 
-0.0356 
(0.4665) 
LNAGE -0.1605*** 
(0.0017) 
0.2461*** 
(0.0000) 
0.3739*** 
(0.0000) 
0.3715*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1759*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0352 
(0.4669) 
0.2371*** 
(0.0000) 
DEBT 0.2163*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.1427*** 
(0.0093) 
-0.4166*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.4674*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1426*** 
(0.0096) 
-0.2146*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0817 
(0.1380) 
REG1 -0.0263 
(0.6086) 
0.0553 
(0.2524) 
-0.0478 
(0.3250) 
-0.0382 
(0.4289) 
0.0055 
(0.9105) 
0.0462 
(0.3391) 
0.0407 
(0.3994) 
REG2 -0.0943* 
(0.0659) 
-0.0982 
(0.0418) 
0.0110 
(  0.8215) 
0.0279 
(0.5636) 
-0.0450 
(0.3553) 
-0.0340 
(0.4821) 
0.0488 
(0.3129) 
REG3 -0.0555 
(0.2800) 
0.0169 
(0.7264) 
0.0095 
(0.8450) 
0.0232 
(0.6314) 
-0.0531 
(0.2755 
-0.0519 
(0.2826 )  
0.0549 
(0.2562) 
REG4 0.0939* 
(0.0672) 
-0.0190 
(0.6946) 
0.0362 
(0.4565) 
0.0136 
(0.7781) 
0.0392 
(0.4205) 
-0.0051 
(0.9159) 
-0.0853* 
(0.0771) 
INDS1 0.0485 
(0.3448) 
-0.0980** 
(0.0422) 
-0.0487 
(0.3162) 
-0.0526 
(0.2762) 
0.0564 
(0.2463) 
0.0303 
(0.5313) 
-0.1811*** 
(0.0002) 
INDS2 -0.1550*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0483 
(0.3182) 
0.0853* 
(0.0786) 
0.1158** 
(0.0163) 
-0.1229** 
(0.0113) 
-0.0466 
(0.3350) 
0.0240 
(0.6203) 
INDS3 -0.2816*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1270*** 
(0.0084) 
0.1953*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2583*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2089*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0212 
(0.6612) 
0.0755 
(0.1179) 
INDS4 0.2021*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0707 
(0.1433) 
-0.1745*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.1751*** 
(0.0003) 
0.2067*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1439*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0030 
(0.9507) 
INDS5 -0.0321 
(0.5328) 
0.1248*** 
(0.0096) 
-0.1126** 
(0.0201) 
-0.1028** 
(0.0330) 
0.0223 
(0.6469) 
-0.0493 
(0.3074) 
0.0846 
(0.0798) 
INDS6 0.1438*** 
(0.0049) 
-0.0482 
(0.3182) 
-0.0672 
(0.1665) 
-0.0722 
(0.1348) 
0.1588*** 
(0.0010) 
0.1328*** 
(0.0058) 
0.0240 
(0.6203) 
INDS7 -0.0022 
(0.9653) 
-0.1563*** 
(0.0011) 
0.1258*** 
(0.0093) 
0.0769 
(0.1115) 
-0.0996** 
(0.0404) 
-0.1111** 
(0.0212) 
-0.0259 
(0.5928) 
 FOREIGNISE LNSALES LNAGE DEBT REG1 REG2 REG3 
FOREIGN 1.0000       
LNSALES -0.0230 
(0.6390) 
1.0000      
LNAGE 0.0487 
(0.3133) 
-0.4400*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
DEBT 0.1154** 
(0.0359) 
0.3443*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3086*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
REG1 -0.0146 
(0.7626) 
-0.0170 
(0.7281) 
-0.0861* 
(0.0744) 
0.0733 
(0.1834) 
1.0000   
REG2 0.0722 
(0.1349) 
0.2044*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0999** 
(0.0383) 
0.0209 
(0.7052) 
-0.1575*** 
(0.0010) 
1.0000  
REG3 0.0230 
(0.6341) 
0.0456 
(0.3516) 
-0.0371 
(0.4426) 
-0.0211 
(0.7017) 
-0.1772*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0549 
(0.2562) 
1.0000 
REG4 -0.0276 
(0.5687) 
-0.0933 
(0.0560) 
0.0571 
(0.2374) 
-0.0678 
(0.2188)   
-0.8017*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2482*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2792*** 
(0.0000) 
INDS1 -0.0934* 
(0.0529) 
0.1144** 
(0.0190) 
-0.1080** 
(0.0251) 
0.1700*** 
(0.0019) 
0.1381*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.0549 
(0.2562) 
0.1506*** 
(0.0017) 
INDS2 0.0609 
(0.2077) 
0.1004 
(0.0398) 
-0.1107** 
(0.0217) 
-0.1191** 
(0.0303) 
-0.0774 
(0.1091) 
-0.0240 
(0.6203) 
0.4366*** 
(0.0000) 
INDS3 0.0495 
(0.3061) 
-0.3285*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1905*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3091*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1579*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0755 
(0.1179) 
-0.0849* 
(0.0785) 
INDS4 -0.1630*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0028 
(0.9541) 
-0.1065** 
(0.0272) 
0.0482 
(0.3824) 
0.0526 
(0.2765) 
-0.1255*** 
(0.0092) 
0.2058*** 
(0.0000) 
INDS5 0.0518 
(0.2839) 
0.1631*** 
(0.0008) 
0.2367*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1089 
(0.0477) 
0.0951** 
(0.0489) 
0.2461*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0951** 
(0.0486) 
INDS6 -0.1424 
(0.2839) 
0.1631*** 
(0.0008) 
0.2367*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1089** 
(0.0477) 
0.0951** 
(0.0489) 
0.2461*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0951** 
(0.0486) 
INDS7 0.1373*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.0167 
(0.7323) 
-0.0838* 
(0.0828) 
0.0178 
(0.7472) 
-0.2384*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0259 
(0.5928) 
-0.2211*** 
(0.0000) 
 REG4 INDS1 INDS2 INDS3 INDS4 INDS5 INDS6 INDS7 
REG4 1.0000        
INDS1 -0.1792*** 
(0.0002) 
1.0000       
INDS2 -0.1219** 
(0.0114) 
-0.0269 
(0.5773) 
1.0000      
INDS3 -0.0783 
(0.1051) 
-0.0849 
(0.0785) 
-0.0371 
(0.4431) 
1.0000     
INDS4 -0.0938* 
(0.0519) 
-0.1412  ** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0617 
(0.2020) 
-0.1943 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
INDS5 -0.1500*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0951** 
(0.0486) 
-0.0415 
(0.3902) 
-
0.1309*** 
(0.0066) 
-
0.2177*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
INDS6 0.0965** 
(0.0455) 
-0.0269 
(0.5773) 
-0.0118 
(0.8078) 
-0.0371 
(0.4431) 
-0.0617 
(0.2020) 
-0.0415 
(0.3902) 
1.0000  
INDS7 0.3202*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2211*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2211** 
(0.0455) 
-
0.3042*** 
(0.0000) 
-
0.5057*** 
(0.0000) 
-
0.3408**
* 
(0.0000) 
-
0.0965** 
(0.0455) 
1.0000 
*denotes correlation is significant at 10% level,  ** denotes correlation is significant  at 5% level, ** * denotes correlation 
is significant  at 1% level 
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6.3 Dynamic panel GMM regression of financial performance 
variables and explanatory variables 
Most prior studies ignore the endogeneity between corporate governance variables 
and firm financial performance.  However, some recent studies have pointed out 
the possibility of endogeinety between corporate governance variables and 
financial performance (Kaserer & Moldenhauer, 2008).  Drakos & Bekiris (2010) 
explain board composition, leadership structure and board size are strongly 
endogenous for financial performance, measured as Tobin’s Q and ROA.  The 
DWH test analyses the endogenous relationship between corporate governance 
variables and financial performance proxies.  The results presented in Table 6.3 
indicate that following listed corporate governance variables (denoted by*) and 
company financial performance proxies have significant endogeneity problems, 
suggesting a need to address the issue of potential endogeneity.   
H0: Regressors are exogeneous 
Table 5  
Table 6 Table 6.3 The DWH test for endogeneity of regressors 
 TOBIN’S Q ROA ROE 
BOARD 0.01392 9.7565** 5.971465** 
NONE 3.75198** 6.346766*** 7.28494** 
INSDIE 34.6979*** 4.21823** 9.806593*** 
DIVERSITY 4.34673** 8.89710*** 8.39373*** 
FEMALE 12.7163*** 8.208247** 6.6318*** 
MINORITY 4.292530* 4.08247** 4.771548** 
CEO 7.59600* 7.839177* 5.05485*** 
OWNER 0.08764 0.07865 3.71133 
FOREIGN 1.1257* 5.63559** 2.175521* 
To overcome the endogeneity problem, previous studies used a two stage least 
square (2SLS) method.  However, 2SLS requires the identification of instruments 
that are correlated with endogenous variables and uncorrelated with the error term 
of the model.  In this study almost all the corporate governance variables (except 
the board size variable) have an endogeneity effect on TOBIN’S Q, ROA and 
ROE. Therefore, finding instrumental variables are difficult and if weak 
instrumental variables are used, it can lead to misinterpretation of coefficients.  
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Therefore, as an alternative approach, dynamic panel GMM estimation is used to 
model the relationship between explanatory and dependent variables.  There are 
two major advantages gained from using the dynamic panel model.  First, it 
avoids inconsistency of endogeneity through instrumental variables (lag variables) 
and it provides instruments that allow for controlling potential simultaneously and 
reversing causality.  The second major advantage is the dynamic estimation 
procedure allows an entire set of explanatory variables to be treated as 
endogenous.  Furthermore, this study sample covers a short time period (t=5) and 
has a considerably larger number of companies (N=86).  The Arellano-Bond 
dynamic panel GMM model is appropriate for short T panel (Mileva, 2007).  
Moreover, “generalised method of moment (GMM) estimator minimises an 
objective function that is a quadratic form in sums” (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009).  
The models for the company financial performance are selected on the basis of 
strong diagnostics and the valid relationship between the MNC’s financial 
performance and corporate governance mechanisms.  The model is adjusted for 
first order autocorrelation (AR1) and second order autocorrelation (AR2).  
Further, Wald-chi test results and Hansan-Sargan J statistic are also reported.  
Table 6.4 presents the results for the corporate governance and firm financial 
performance.  Columns 2-4 of Table 6.4 present OLS Fixed effect
2
 results and 
columns 5-7 present dynamic panel GMM results.  An examination of the results 
                                                 
2
 Hausman’s specification test is used to differentiate between random and fixed effects models. 
The test statistics have p<0.05 for all three ratios, so the null hypothesis of no correlation is 
rejected and the fixed-effects model is appropriate for all three performance measures.  
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in Table 6.4 reveals that endogenity is a significant concern of corporate 
governance variables.  
Table 7 Table 6.4 Panel data OLS regression/ Dynamic Panel GMM 
regression results for financial performance proxies 
Variable (1) TOBINS-OLS 
(2)  
ROA- OLS 
(3) 
ROE-OLS 
(4) 
TOBINS-
GMM  (5) 
ROA-GMM 
(6) 
ROE-GMM 
(7) 
Number of 
obs= 430a 
Number of 
groups=86 
L1 
    
   
 
 
-.0730925*** 
(.0163197) 
 
 
 
 
.4425396*** 
(.017722) 
 
 
 
 
-.5147529*** 
(.0683444) 
Board size: 
BOARD 
 
-.0085306** 
(.0043625) 
 
.0021643 
(.0022669) 
 
-.0418827 
(.0496227) 
 
.0103922*** 
(.0015568) 
 
-.0013244*** 
(.0005014) 
 
.0551413*** 
(.02007) 
Board 
composition: 
NONE 
 
-.0110885*** 
(.0014408) 
 
.0001355 
(.0007487) 
 
-.0430931** 
(.017562) 
 
-.0097725*** 
(.0007286) 
 
-.0011731*** 
(.0001929) 
 
-.0298117*** 
(.0110343) 
INSIDE .7500542*** 
(.0538054) 
-.0223098 
(.0279586) 
-1.144666** 
(.5469543) 
.3290994*** 
(.0902603) 
.0038877 
(.0037864) 
-.1904204 
(.3478029) 
DIVERSITY 7.1917*** 
(.9136947) 
-.77545 
(.4747782) 
9.693124 
(10.32313) 
1.833623*** 
(.4931071) 
.0601965 
(.258039) 
.4683476*** 
(5.296905) 
FEMALE -12.4006*** 
(1.423267) 
1.116675 
(.7395644) 
-18.49544 
(16.01109) 
-4.693139*** 
(.7967541) 
-.1630557 
(.393001) 
-.5681247*** 
(8.615909) 
MINORITY 1.040705*** 
(.1161454) 
-.0693758 
(.060352) 
2.194771 
(1.420334) 
.9442358*** 
(.0708175) 
.1061856*** 
(.0150734) 
4.9244*** 
(.6182049) 
Leadership 
structure: 
CEO 
 
.005269 
(.0230765) 
 
-.0127563 
(.0119911) 
 
.742467*** 
(8.816669) 
 
-.0664613*** 
(.009175) 
 
-.0460121*** 
(.0101812) 
 
.7434564*** 
(.1015918) 
OWNER    .274065 
(.4125424) 
.1280665*** 
(.0426648 ) 
-.2622281 
(.8520767) 
FOREIGN -.0253554 
(.0237483) 
-.024226** 
(.0123402) 
-.0108841 
(.3288676) 
.0090492 
(.0056599) 
-.0186327*** 
(.0027837) 
-.0348564 
(.1323851) 
Control 
Variables: 
LNSALES 
 
.0553662*** 
(.0153114) 
 
.0135136** 
(.0079562) 
 
.1506745 
(.1890663) 
 
.0286753*** 
(.0070749) 
 
.0003327 
(.0016381) 
 
.4455688*** 
(.0824376) 
LNAGE .0280258 
(.0803259) 
-.0078649 
(.0417393) 
-1.353969 
(.8913668) 
.2468977*** 
(.0354831) 
.0076202 
(.0066498) 
-1.186633*** 
(.3269011) 
DEBT .0013661*** 
(.0005732) 
.0006217** 
(.0002978) 
.0078882 
(.0075655) 
.0002908 
(.0001873) 
-.0000646 
(.0001312) 
.0096766*** 
(.0036922) 
REG1    -.0422167 
(1.602108) 
-.1131202*** 
(.00991) 
.0017232 
(.4848864) 
REG2       
REG3    -.1123719 
(1.669601) 
-.114077*** 
(.0371485) 
2.802728*** 
(.7395459) 
REG4    .3414344 
(1.5622) 
-.0119967 
(.0084121) 
-1.195787* 
(.6503429) 
INDUS1    2.299357 
(1.723984) 
.6492148*** 
(.1361653) 
3.731774*** 
(1.217118) 
INDUS2    1.457893* 
(0.01347) 
4.431664 
(1.788118) 
8.975866** 
(1.253969) 
INDUS3    1.259332 
(1.439663) 
.4258478*** 
(.0896351) 
1.88957** 
(.9840089) 
INDUS4    .9359713 
(1.455707) 
.4020085*** 
(.096192) 
2.604189** 
(1.229509) 
INDUS5    .7761583 
(1.377776) 
.3610299*** 
(.0895569) 
2.033771** 
(1.237247) 
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INDUS6       
INDUS7    .5019726 
(1.351674) 
.3143*** 
(.0871628) 
3.899435*** 
(1.307481) 
Regression 
summary 
statistics 
R2 
AR(1) 
AR (2) 
 
 
 
0.1345 
 
 
 
0.0125 
 
 
 
0.2355 
 
 
 
 
0.7127 
0.1562 
 
 
 
 
0.1075 
0.1832 
 
 
 
 
0.1401 
0.1090 
J-statistics 
Chi2(21) 
   49.40164 
1.5e+05 
40.6552 
5.7e+07 
22.27743 
2.4e+05 
a
 unbalanced panel; * Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% 
level; This model provides standard errors which are in parentheses 
Board size and the MNCs’ financial performance 
The independent variable BOARD is positively related to MNCs Tobin’s Q value 
and ROE, at the 1% significant level, indicating board size positively affects 
company financial performance and shareholders’ value generation.  This 
phenomenon can be better explained by resource dependency theory.  According 
to prior literature large boards provide a firm with greater expertise managers and 
accessibility to scarce resources (Dalton et al., 1999).  Therefore, larger MNCs 
may provide companies with easy access to foreign markets, new technology and 
raw materials.   As a developing country, Sri Lanka’s political and economic 
uncertainty is high.  Therefore, MNCs with larger, diversified boards are 
positively related to company financial performance.  However, board size is 
negatively related to MNCs’ ROA at the 5% significant level, indicating larger 
boards reduce company return on assets. This may be because board size 
decreases effective communication and coordination among shareholders, thereby 
decreasing the financial performance of companies.   This finding is in line with 
Yermack (1996) who finds a negative relationship between board size and firm 
financial ratios.  Overall, the finding indicates that if an extra board member is 
included on an MNC board, there is a potential trade-off between diversity and 
coordination.  
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Non-executive directors and the MNCs’ financial performance 
Consideration of the NONE variable in Table 6.4 reveals it is negatively related to 
all three financial performance proxies at the 1% significance level, indicating 
non-executive directors have a negative impact on MNCs’ financial performance.  
It may be that non-executive directors serving on MNC boards are not 
independent, have less information availability and lack of business knowledge.  
The Higgs report (2003) indicates that most non-executive directors are recruited 
via personal contacts rather than through formal interviews.  Therefore, there is a 
high possibility for non-executive directors not to be independent in decision 
making processes and less efficient in board monitoring. Jensen (1993) explains 
another two reasons for a negative relationship between the proportion of non-
executive board directors and company financial performance.  The first reason is 
non-executive directors lack an ability to monitor managers.  The second reason is 
that on larger boards with many non-executive directors the CEO’s influence may 
swamp that of the outside directors.  Presumably, due to the above reasons, the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the boards of MNCs can hinder company 
financial performance and shareholders’ value creation.    
Insider ownership and the MNCs’ financial performance 
The coefficient of INSIDE variable is positively and statistically significant at a 1% 
level for Tobin’s Q, indicating that working owners increase MNCs’ financial 
performance.  This may be due to weak investor protection and the absence of 
well-developed markets for corporate control, which in turn leads to internal 
control mechanisms being more vigilant in Sri Lankan MNCs.  Conceptually, the 
result is consistent with Jensen & Meckling (1976) who proposed ‘convergence of 
interests’ hypothesis, which explains that the managers’ value maximisation is an 
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increasing function of insider ownership.  When insider ownership is increased, 
control cannot easily be disputed and the resulting concentration of ownership 
might increase company financial performance.   
Diversity and the MNCs’ financial performance 
Board diversity has a positive effect on Tobin’s Q and ROE at a 1% significance 
level, indicating highly diversified boards have higher financial performance.  
This finding is consistent with Barnhart et al. (1994) explain that through 
discussion, the exchange of ideas on a diversified board improve firm financial 
performance.  Apparently, diversification adds a new perspective that is value 
enhancing and it has become more prevalent on boards and is associated with 
enhanced company shareholder value. Further, board diversity promotes more 
effective global relationships for MNCs. Cultural sensitivity prior experience and 
knowledge are critical factor for MNCs survival. Therefore, board diversification 
has a positive effect on MNCs financial performance.   
Female board directors and the MNCs’ financial performance 
The coefficient of FEMALE variable is negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level for Tobin’s Q and ROE, indicating female directors reduce MNCs’ 
financial performance and destroy shareholder value. This finding is consistent 
with Adams & Ferreira (2008) who suggest a strong negative relationship 
between female representation on the board and stock return.  Based on their 
argument, it may be that Sri Lanka’s high uncertainty environment means female 
board directors are not an effective factor for the performance of MNCs.   Further, 
personal qualities and behaviours as well as cultural influences may also affect 
women directors’ effectiveness in Sri Lankan MNCs.   
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Ethnic minority directors and the MNCs’ financial performance 
Ethnic minority board directors have positive effects on all three financial 
performance proxies at a 1% significant level.  These results indicate that ethnic 
minority board directors increase MNCs’ accounting and market based financial 
performance and generate shareholder value.  This may be because ethnic 
diversity increases a company’s external networking, human capital and 
information availability, all of which are critical to corporate financial 
performance and for generating value for shareholders.  This finding is consistent 
with Dwyer et al. (2003)  who argue that minority directors positively affect firm 
strategic decision and organisational cultural developments and positively 
influence company financial performance.   
 CEO duality and the MNCs’ financial performance 
This study indicates company financial performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA) have 
significant negative correlation with CEO duality, which is consistent with Pi & 
Timme (1993) who propose that CEO duality decreases board independence and 
vigilance, leading to poor financial performance.  Moreover, this finding is in line 
with corporate governance best practices, which promote separate CEO and 
chairman roles. In contrast, this finding suggests CEO duality has a positive effect 
on shareholders’ value creation.  This is consistent with stewardship theory, 
because duality presents unity of command and avoids potential conflicts between 
CEO and board chair.  This finding is consistent with Peng et al. (2007) who 
argue CEO duality is appropriate for resource scarcity and environmental 
dynamism.   
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Institute ownership and the MNCs’ financial performance 
Consideration of the OWNER variable in Table 6.4 reveals it is positively related 
with ROA at the 1% significance level, indicating institutional ownership has a 
positive impact upon MNCs’ financial performance.   This finding is consistent 
with Gürbüz et al. (2010) who analyse 164 firms from the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange and demonstrate a positive relationship between institutional ownership 
and financial performance.  It is apparent that institutional owners have a greater 
incentive to monitor management in companies and that has a positive effect on 
company financial performance.   
Foreign managers and the MNCs’ financial performance 
The coefficient of FOREIGN variable is negatively and statistically significant at 
1% level for MNC subsidiaries ROA. This indicates that foreign managers 
decrease firm financial performance.  This may be because foreign managers find 
it difficult to maintain productive and satisfying social relationships with local 
people in Sri Lanka.  As an Asian country with traditional culture and norms, 
foreign managers from Western countries may have difficulty making cultural 
adjustments in Sri Lanka.  Furthermore, foreign managers may lack knowledge 
about local markets and local businesses functions which can also affect 
negatively on MNCs’ financial performance.  This finding is consistent with 
earlier findings about many foreign managers experience serious problems on 
their international assignment (Banai, 1992; Stening & Hammer, 1992).  
Company size and the MNCs’ financial performance 
Though the coefficient of LNSALES (firm size) variable is not significantly 
related with ROA, it is statistically significant at 1% level for ROE and Tobin’s Q , 
indicating MNC size positively affects financial performance.  It also indicates 
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large MNCs create more value for their shareholders than their smaller 
counterparts.  This finding is consistent with Klapper & Love (2003) who use 
sales as proxy for firm size and find a positive relationship between firm size and 
financial performance. This may be because larger firms have optimal capital 
structure, less probability of bankruptcy and their diversified workforce leads to 
better financial performance.  
 Company age and the MNCs’ financial performance 
The independent variable LNAGE is positively related to company Tobin’s Q 
value at the 1% significant level indicating older MNCs are more efficient than 
younger ones.  This may be due to companies operating for many years in 
industries that are supposed to already have well-established systems and 
operations, and are equipped with enough resources in a well-established in 
market.  These factors would lead to an increase in financial performance for 
mature MNCs operating in the Sri Lankan market.  This finding is consistent with 
Hopenhayn (1992) who finds that individual firm productivity increases with the 
age of the firm; hence older firms have higher profit and value.  Further, this study 
results reveal that MNCs age is significant at 1% and negatively affects 
shareholders’ value creation.  This indicates mature MNCs hinder their 
shareholders’ value.   
Leverage ratio and the MNCs’ financial performance 
This finding indicates debt is a non-significant factor for MNC financial 
performance (TOBIN’S Q and ROA).    This result is consistent with Sarkar et al.  
(2006) who find a non-significant relationship between Tobin’s Q and leverage 
level in listed manufacturing firms in India.  However, DEBT is positively and 
statistically significant at 1% level for MNCs’ ROE, indicating higher leverage 
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firms generate higher values for shareholders.  The core reason may be that debt 
reduces a manager’s commitment to pay out excess cash flows and curbs 
overinvestment.  Therefore, debt reduces the overinvestment problem which 
reduces the market value of the firm and thereby impacts shareholders’ value 
positively. This leads to better value generation for shareholders while reducing 
managerial expropriation.    
Parent location and MNCs’ financial performance 
The significant relationship between MNCs’ financial performance and their 
location indicates that MNC parent location has significant effect on MNC 
performance.  The results clearly indicate REG1 and REG3 (MNCs from 
European region and American region) are 1% negatively significantly related 
with subsidiaries’ ROA value. This may be due to discrepancies between rule-
based expectations of a Western MNC culture and relationship-based expectations 
of Sri Lankan culture which then hinders financial performance of MNCs from 
European and American regions.   However, compared to other locations, MNCs 
from the American region (LOC3) generate more value for their shareholders.  
Further, it is noted that MNC parent location plays an important role, which is 
similar to the observations of Ambos & Birkinshaw (2010).    
Industry and the MNCs’ financial performance 
Results indicate that the industry in which a subsidiary finds itself is another 
significant determinant of financial performance.  Similar to subsidiary parent 
location, some industries are more prone to subsidiary financial performance than 
others.  This finding is consistent with Erhardt et al. (2003) who find industry has 
a significant affect on company financial performance, measured as ROI (Return 
on Investment).  As per this study’s findings, INDUS1 significantly positively 
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affects ROA and ROE financial performance proxies.  Furthermore, INDUS1, 
INDUS3, INDUS4, INDUS5 and INDUS7 have positive impacts on shareholders’ 
value generation and company ROA.   Regression summary statistics, i.e. serial 
correlation in order 1 and serial correlation in order 2, overidentification 
restriction statistics (J-statistic) and joint-significance (Chi2) also reported 
separately for each financial performance regressions.  
6.4 Dynamic panel GMM regression of agency costs variables and 
explanatory variables 
Prior empirical research in corporate governance has explicitly recognised 
potential endogeneity that may bias corporate governance results (Florackis, 2008; 
Ward & Filatotchev, 2009). To check the endogeneity of all agency proxies and to 
correlate them with the rest of the variables, this study uses the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test (DWH).  Table 6.5 shows the DWH test results for agency proxies.  
This study indicates, except for the CEO and OWNER variables, all other 
variables have an endogeneity effect on PA agency costs proxy (ASSETS).  
Further, this study reveals all the corporate governance variables have an 
endogeneity effect on PP agency costs proxy (DIVIDEND).   
H0: Regressors are exogeneous 
Table 8 Table 6.5 The DWH test for endogeneity of regressors 
 ASSETS DIVIDEND 
BOARD .035689* 1.48484* 
NONE 5.7082*** 5.3871** 
INSDIE 7.2903* 72.0978*** 
DIVERSITY 6.9925*** 4.37106** 
FEMALE 2.19204* 6.38047*** 
MINORITY 9.87764** 10.8856*** 
CEO .00648 2.65783* 
OWNER .05815 .93558* 
FOREIGN 2.09407* 1.58897* 
Therefore, this study uses dynamic panel GMM estimator to build instruments for 
those variables identified as endogeneous.  To test model specification validity, 
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this study calculates the Hansen-Sargen test of overidentification of restrictions.  
Further robustness check AR (1) and AR (2) depict there is no serial correlation.  
Explanatory variables’ joint significance results are also reported as Wald-Chi 
tests statistic.   
Table 6.6 presents the results for the corporate governance and ASSETS (assets 
utilisation and DIVIDEND (dividend payout ratio).  Columns 2-3 of Table 6.6 
present OLS Fixed effect
3
 results and columns 4-5 present dynamic panel GMM 
results.   
Board size and MNCs’ agency costs 
This study finds a significant negative relationship between MNCS’ board size 
and their PA agency costs proxy.  This finding is consistent with Pearce & Zahra 
(1992) who identify that larger corporate boards are one of the most important 
governance mechanisms that align shareholders’ interests by monitoring 
managerial activities.  Hence it reduces PA conflicts.  In contrast, most prior 
literature suggests smaller boards are less susceptible to PA and PP agency 
problems (Henry, 2010; Ning et al., 2010).  Moreover, this study finds a non-
significant relationship between subsidiary board size and PP agency costs, 
indicating board size is not an important determinant of subsidiaries’ PP agency 
costs.   
                                                 
3
 Hausman’s specification test is used to differentiate between random and fixed effects models. 
The test statistics have p<0.05 for all three ratios, so the null hypothesis of no correlation is 
rejected and the fixed-effects model is appropriate for all three performance measures.  
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Non-executive directors and MNCs’ agency costs 
Though Sri Lanka’s mandatory corporate governance best practices (2008) 
recommended non-executive directors should make up at least one-third of the 
board, this study indicates company PA agency costs have no significant impact 
on non-executive director proportion on MNC boards.   This finding is consistent 
with McKnight & Weir (2009) who find a non-significant relationship between 
non-executive directors’ proportion and company agency costs in a UK context.  
The coefficient of NONE variable is negatively and statistically significant at 1% 
level for DIVIDEND and indicates non-executive directors reduce conflicts 
between minority and majority shareholders.  This finding is in line with 
corporate governance best practices recommendations of Sri Lanka and other 
countries, because non-executive directors prevent expropriation of minority 
shareholders.  
Insider ownership and the MNCs’ agency costs 
The coefficient of INSIDE variable is positively and statistically significant at 1% 
level for ASSETS and indicates working owners increase a firm’s assets 
utilisation ratio.  This finding is consistent with Jensen & Meckling (1976) who 
argue that there is a convergence of interest between managers and shareholders 
and this increases when managerial share ownership increases.   Further, Kern & 
Kerr (1997) explain insider ownership increases monitoring efforts of managers 
and reduces agency costs.  A similar conclusion is drawn by McKnight & Weir 
(2009) in a UK context.   Hence, this study indicates MNCs with higher insider 
ownership have fewer PA agency problems, and furthermore, this study indicates 
a negative and statistically significant relationship for INSIDE and DIVIDEND 
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variables.  It may be higher insider ownership leads to less conflict between 
minority and majority shareholders.  
Board diversity and MNCs’ agency costs 
Consideration of the DIVERSITY variable in Table 6.6 reveals it has a non-
significant relationship with assets utilisation ratio (ASSETS) and is 1% 
negatively significant with dividend payout ratio (DIVIDEND).  This indicates 
board diversity has no impact upon MNC subsidiary companies’ PA problem and 
has a negative impact on PP problems by reducing conflicts between minority and 
majority shareholders.    Diversified boards reduce conflict between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders because diversity increases effective 
relationships and communication. Diversity also increases board independence 
because diversified board members may ask questions different from those in an 
homogenous group Carter et al. (2008).  This leads to increased effective 
monitoring of board members.  Hence, board diversity negatively affects PP 
agency costs.   
Female board members and MNCs’ agency costs 
The coefficient of FEMALE variable is non-significantly related with ASSETS 
and indicates that female directors have no impact on PA agency costs.  This 
finding is consistent with most European studies which find an insignificant 
relationship with female board directors and firm financial performance 
(Marinova et al., 2010; Rose, 2007).  Moreover, this study finds the coefficient of 
FEMALE variable is positively and statistically significant at the 1% level of 
DIVIDEND, indicating that female directors increase MNC subsidiaries’ PP 
agency costs. 
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Ethnic minority directors and MNCs’ agency costs 
This study finds ethnic minority board directors have a non-significant effect on 
PA agency proxy, indicating ethnic minority directors are a non significant factor 
for determining MNCs’ PA agency costs.   However, ethnic minority directors 
have positive and 1% statistically significant relationship with PP agency proxies, 
indicating minority directors increase MNCs’ PP agency costs.  
CEO duality and MNCs’ agency costs 
This study’s finding indicates company PA and PP agency costs have significant 
correlation with CEO duality.  The coefficient of CEO variable is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level for assets utilisation, indicating that CEO 
duality reduces MNCs’ assets utilisation.  This may be due to CEO duality 
mitigating board independency in decision making and increasing misalignment 
of interests between managers and shareholders.  This leads to poor assets 
utilisation.  Hence, CEO duality increases PA agency costs for MNCs.   
Furthermore, from a PP agency costs’ perspective, this study indicates a 
significant positive relationship between CEO duality and dividend payout ratio.  
This indicates CEO duality increases MNCs’ majority and minority shareholder 
conflicts.  This finding is consistent with Jensen (1993)  who proposes that CEO 
duality gives too much power and control over others to one person in the 
decision making process.    
Institutional ownership and MNCs’ agency costs 
Consideration of the OWNER (institutional ownership or not) variable in Table 
6.6 reveals it  is negatively related with DIVIDEND ratio at the 1% significance 
level, indicating institutional ownership negatively  impacts upon MNCs’ PP 
agency costs.  This finding is consistent with Brickley et al. (1988) and Pound 
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(1988) who argues, based on efficient monitoring hypothesis, that institutional 
owners have greater expertise managers and resources and can monitor 
management at lower cost.  Further, Brickley et al. (1988) explain that 
institutional investors are quicker than non institutional shareholders at 
responding to anti-takeover amendments and they are more likely to react to 
proposals that appear to be harmful to shareholders.   On the other hand, this study 
finds no evidence that institutional ownership affects PA agency costs, measured 
by assets utilisation.  This finding is consistent with Singh & Davidson (2003) 
who find a non-significant relationship between assets utilisation ratio and 
institutional ownership in an Australian context.  
Foreign managers and MNCs’ agency costs 
This study finds no evidence that foreign managers affect PP agency costs when 
measured by dividend payout ratio.  Nevertheless, the coefficient of FOREIGN 
variable is negatively and statistically significant at 1% level for ASSETS, 
indicating that foreign manager increase PA agency costs. Differences in 
behavioural patterns, social norms and interpersonal relationships between foreign 
managers and local managers may be the reason for lower assets utilisation ratio 
or high PA agency conflicts.  
Company size and MNCs’ agency costs 
The coefficient of LNSALES (logarithm of total sales) variable is positively and 
statistically significant at 1% level for ASSETS and negatively and statistically 
significant at 1% level for DIVIDEND.  This finding indicates that large firms 
have higher assets utilisation ratio than small firms.  Hence, larger firms have 
fewer PA agency costs problems.  This finding is consistent with Henry (2010) 
who explains that due to larger firms having better utilised assets, their PA agency 
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problem is considerably less than small firms.   Further, these findings show 
larger firms have fewer PP agency conflicts as well.  This may be because 
compared to smaller firms, larger firms’ ownership is more scattered.  Therefore, 
the existence of one larger shareholder is not prevalent in large firms.  Hence, 
large MNCs have fewer PP agency problems than their smaller counterparts.  
Company age and MNCs’ agency costs 
The coefficient of LNAGE is positively and statistically significant at 1% level for 
dividend payout ratio agency costs proxy, indicating older firms have high PP 
agency costs.  An explanation for this might be that when the MNC's age, the 
influence of controlling shareholders increase. Nevertheless, this study finds the 
coefficient of LNAGE is non-significantly related with PA agency costs proxy, 
measured as assets utilisation ratio.  This indicates firm maturity has no impact on 
PA agency costs in MNC subsidiaries.  This finding is inconsistent with Ibrahim 
et al. (2008a) who find a significant positive relationship between firm age and 
assets utilisation agency proxy in Malaysian family and non-family businesses.   
Leverage ratio and the MNCs’ agency costs 
DEBT is negatively and statistically significant at 1% level for dividend pay-out 
ratio, indicating highly leveraged MNCs have fewer PP agency problems.  This 
finding is consistent with Hewa-Wellalage & Locke (2010) who find significant 
negative relationship between firm debt level and PP agency costs in New 
Zealand firms.  This control function of debt may be more important in MNCs 
with larger cash flows and low growth rates.   Further, this study finds debt has a 
significant positive impact on MNCs’ PA agency costs, indicating higher 
leveraged MNCs have lower assets utilisation ratio.  This finding is consistent 
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with Singh & Davidson (2003) who find significant positive relationship between 
leverage and firm PA agency costs, measured as assets utilisation ratio.    
Parent location and the MNCs’ agency costs 
This study confirms MNC parent location is an important determinant of MNC 
subsidiaries’ agency costs.   The finding indicates MNC parent location 1 (REG1) 
and location 4 (REG4) have significant positive impacts on MNC subsidiaries’ 
PA agency costs.  However, MNC parent location has no significant impact on 
subsidiaries’ PP agency costs.  
Industry and impact on MNCs’ agency costs 
The findings show industry is a significant factor for MNC PP agency costs. This 
indicates MNCs operating in INDUS3, INDUS4, INDUS5 and INDUS7 have 
fewer PP agency problems than other industries.    However, the study indicates 
industry has no impact on PA agency costs, measured as assets utilisation ratio. 
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Table 9 Table 6.6 Panel data OLS regression/ Dynamic Panel GMM 
regression results for agency costs proxies 
Variables (1) ASSETS-OLS (2) DIVIDEND-OLS (3) ASSETS-GMM (4) DIVIDEND-GMM (5) 
Number of obs= 232a 
Number of 
groups=86 
L1 
   
 
-.1013298*** 
(.0172063) 
 
 
.1090023*** 
(.0108514) 
Board size: 
BOARD 
 
.0226297 
(.0151774) 
 
-.0034352 
(.026671) 
 
.0308295*** 
(.0064207) 
 
.005083 
(.0107055) 
Board composition: 
NONE 
 
.0100614** 
(.0050127) 
 
.0187062** 
(.0088088) 
 
-.0032145 
(.0026988) 
 
-.0074872*** 
(.0020324) 
INSIDE .1029126 
(.1871906) 
-4.262743*** 
(.328947) 
.1547562*** 
(.0384212) 
-3.471596*** 
(.4782899) 
DIVERSITY   -6.5082** 
(3.178773) 
-20.36043*** 
(5.586004) 
-2.768251 
(2.256458) 
-11.32977*** 
(2.737968) 
FEMALE 9.532776** 
(4.95159) 
34.13813*** 
(8.701347) 
3.397803 
(3.315498) 
18.13365*** 
(4.073969) 
MINORITY -1.138607*** 
(.4040737) 
-1.629816** 
(.710072) 
.1071227 
(.2125674) 
.580281*** 
(.1608486) 
Leadership structure: 
CEO 
 
-.2126068*** 
(.0802838) 
 
-.0044975 
(.1410814) 
 
-.3702357*** 
(.0629008) 
 
.2066679*** 
(.0552377) 
OWNER   .6265713 
(.629944) 
-.9317777*** 
(.2042271) 
FOREIGN -.0784407 
(.0826212) 
.1086261 
(.1451888) 
-.0931171*** 
(.0318854) 
.0161947 
(.0283107) 
Control Variables: 
LNSALES 
 
.5693586*** 
(.0532689) 
 
-.2471096*** 
(.0936085) 
 
.5128188*** 
(.0258353) 
 
-.5228692*** 
(.0290162) 
LNAGE .7154492** 
(.2794563) 
.4180338 
(.491084) 
.0462991 
(.0764118) 
.5251771*** 
(.1500031) 
DEBT -.0024472 
(.0019942) 
-.0036471 
(.0035043) 
-.0042328*** 
(.0008824) 
-.0085802*** 
(.0015613) 
REG1   -1.179329*** 
(.1997288) 
.0732931 
(.1629738) 
REG2   -.7702354 
(.315798) 
.0458974 
(.1005312) 
REG3   -.8811642 
(.8430978) 
-1.307876 
(.9773128) 
REG4   -.8251884*** 
(.1283967) 
.0562196 
(.1889126) 
INDUS1   3.534113 
(3.015594) 
-.314093 
(.8167881) 
INDUS2   .45695396 
(1.014324) 
.75639588 
(1.875967) 
INDUS3   .9165246 
(1.123014) 
-2.621236*** 
(.6596955) 
INDUS4   .4446342 
(1.21729) 
-1.084229*** 
(.3235665) 
INDUS5   .5639574 
(1.083137) 
-.8693281** 
(.4605794) 
INDUS6     
INDUS7   .4693003 
(.9821346) 
-.7619869* 
(.4551493) 
Regression summary  
R2 
AR(1) 
AR (2) 
 
0.3664 
 
0.0534 
 
 
 
0.9134 
0.1577 
 
 
 
0.1920 
0.1008 
J-statistics 
Chi2 (21) 
  58.35108 
3.3e+06 
52.80985 
9.9e+05 
a unbalanced panel; * Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level; This 
model provides standard errors which are in parentheses 
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6.5 Panel Tobit regression of agency costs variable and 
explanatory variables 
Panel datasets provide a very rich source of information for empirical economists, 
providing the scope to control for individual heterogeneity.  Panel data Tobit 
model is used in this study to identify the relationship between Q-dummy free 
cash flow and explanatory variable.  This Q-dummy free cash flow dependent 
variable is a discrete non-negative censored variable.  Therefore, Tobit regression 
is ideal for this model.  Table 6.7 presents the results for the Q-dummy free cash 
flow measure of agency costs.  The positive coefficients indicate higher agency 
costs and the negative coefficients indicate lower agency costs.   
Board size and MNCs’ agency costs  
This finding indicates board size of a MNC has no impact on agency costs.  
However, based on resource based theory and agency costs theory, most of the 
prior studies find a significant relationship between board size and company 
agency costs (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003b; Ning et al., 2010).   
Non-executive directors and MNCs’ agency costs  
NONE is negatively and statistically significant at 10% level for Q-dummy free 
cash flow and indicates non-executive board directors on MNCs have a negative 
impact on MNCs’ agency costs.  This finding is consistent with Fama & Jensen 
(1983) who explain non-executive directors are an effective resolution for agency 
problems between managers and shareholders.   This is consistent with Sri 
Lanka’s corporate governance best practice mandatory code (2008) which 
requires boards of listed companies to have at least two thirds non-executive 
directors.  
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Insider ownership and the MNCs’ agency costs  
Though the coefficient of INSIDE variable is positively related with Q-dummy 
free cash flow dependent variable, it is non-significant.  Therefore, as shown in 
Table 6.7, insider ownership does not have a significant impact of MNCs’ free 
cash flow which is a proxy for PA agency costs.  
Board diversity and the MNCs’ agency costs  
Table 6.7 indicates DIVERSITY is statistically significant at 1% level for Q-
dummy free cash flow, indicating highly diversified boards increase MNCs’ 
agency costs, presumably because diversification increases communication and 
monitoring costs for MNCs.  This finding is consistent with the argument that 
when MNCs operate in a high uncertainty environment like Sri Lanka, 
heterogeneous boards increase agency costs (Adams & Ferreira, 2008).  
Female board directors and MNCs’ agency costs  
The coefficient of FEMALE variable is negatively and statistically significant at 1% 
level for Q-dummy free cash flow dependent variable.  This indicates that female 
board directors reduce MNCs’ agency costs.  This finding is consistent with 
Adams & Ferreira (2008) who find female board directors reduce agency conflicts 
because they are always tough monitors of boards compared with their male 
counterparts.   
Ethnic minority directors and MNCs’ agency costs  
Results indicate that ethnic minority directors have a positive impact on agency 
costs in MNCs.  This result is consistent with Adams & Ferreira (2008) who 
suggest that when uncertainty is high, group homogeneity is more valuable.  
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Therefore, Sri Lankan high uncertain environment is suggested ethnic diversity is 
not an effective factor for the Sri Lankan MNCs.   
CEO duality and MNCs’ agency costs  
Similar to board size findings, this study’s results indicate CEO duality has no 
impact on agency costs, as measured by Q-dummy free cash flow.  However, 
based on agency theory, most prior studies identify a significant positive impact 
on CEO duality and agency costs.  This may be because CEO duality increases 
potential conflict of interest between managers and shareholders and decreases 
board independence (Arlman, 2004).  
Institutional ownership and MNCs’ agency costs  
The coefficient of OWNER variable is positively and statistically significant at 10% 
level for Q-dummy free cash flow dependent variable.  This indicates institutional 
ownership has a positive impact on MNCs’ PA agency costs.  This finding is 
consistent with McKnight & Weir (2009) who finds a significant positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and firm agency costs, as measured 
by Q-dummy free cash flow.  Further, Doukas et al. (2000) have similar findings 
and they further explain that due to institutional owners being less effective in 
monitoring board activities, institutional ownership increases company agency 
costs.  
Foreign managers and MNCs’ agency costs  
This study indicates Q-dummy free cash flow agency proxy and foreign managers 
have no significant relationship with MNCs’ agency costs. 
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Company size and MNCs’ agency costs  
This study uses logarithm of total sales (LNSALES) as proxies for company size.  
Though firm size proxy indicate a positive relationship with the Q-dummy free 
cash flow agency costs proxy, it is insignificant.  Hence, according to this finding, 
MNC subsidiary size is not an important factor for determining agency costs.  
Company age and MNCs’ agency costs  
Consideration of the LNAGE (logarithm of company age) variable in Table 6.7 
reveals it is negatively related with Q-dummy free cash flow at the 5% 
significance level, indicating company age has a negative impact upon MNCs’ 
agency costs.  This may be due to old firms having more established monitoring 
and controlling systems than young firms where they can align managers and 
shareholders’ interests and mitigate PA agency costs.  Moreover, according to 
Niskanen et al. (2007), firm age and firm leverage accessibility have a positive 
relationship.  Therefore this high leverage in old firms increases monitoring and 
controlling and leads to low agency costs.  
Leverage ratio and MNCs’ agency costs  
Consistent with the findings of McKnight & Weir (2009) regarding firm leverage 
level and Q-dummy free cash flow agency costs findings, this study finds a non-
significant relationship between MNCs’ debt level and agency costs.  However, 
Ang et al. (2000) find a significant negative relationship between firm debt and 
agency costs indicating debt is an external monitoring mechanism for firms.  
Parent location and MNCs’ agency costs  
This study confirms that MNC parent location has no significant impact on 
subsidiaries agency costs, measure as Q-dummy free cash flow.  
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Industries and MNCs’ agency costs  
Table 6.7 reveals that industry factors play a significant role in determining MNC 
subsidiaries’ agency costs. It shows INDUS1 is 1% significantly positively related 
in Q-dummy free cash flow proxy, indicating INDUS1 (industrial engineering, 
industrial mining and industrial transport)  have higher impact on their agency 
costs than other industries.  This finding is consistent with Chrisman et al .(2004), 
they conclude Industry difference determines the PA agency cost. 
Table 10 Table 6.7 Panel-data Tobit regression of corporate governance 
variables and agency cost (Q-dummy free cash flow) 
 Cof. Std.Err 
Number of obs= 279a 
Number of groups=86 
  
Board size: 
BOARD 
-.5242801 .7703827 
Board composition: 
NONE 
-.4692292* .2582863 
INSIDE .1240566 .5547437 
DIVERSITY .5700782*** .1450776 
FEMALE -.8270777*** .223e0778 
MINORITY .5002360** .2263816 
Leadership structure: 
CEO 
-.5402737 .2500862 
OWNER .9258613* .4990664 
FOREIGN .3062709 .2270887 
Control Variables: 
LNSALES 
.8378952 .1038567 
LNAGE -.4909265** .2126701 
DEBT -.2188895 .1517713 
LOC1 -.6645319 .5672537 
LOC2   
LOC3 -.4724786 .8155236 
LOC4 -.661103.3 .5144604   
INDUS1 .1965903*** .7567639 
INDUS2   
INDUS3 .3363286 .8740494 
INDUS4 .7919128 .8041518 
INDUS5 .1069563 .8155822 
INDUS6   
INDUS7 .6333483 .8740148 
Regression summary statistics 
Log likelihood 
Chi2 (21)  
 
-.802.65521 
109.57*** 
 
a
 unbalanced panel; * Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% 
level; This model provides standard error which are in parentheses. 
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6.6 Specification tests results 
Serial correlation test- To test the model specification validity, this study 
examines autoregressive level 1 AR (1) and autoregressive level 2 AR (2) 
statistics to measure first and second order serial correlation.  Table 6.4 depicts 
first order and second order serial correlation for TOBIN’S Q, ROA and ROE 
respectively.   AR (1) and AR (2) for TOBIN’s Q and explanatory variables are 
0.7127 and 0.1562.  Therefore, this results rejects order 1 and order 2 serial 
correlation, because p=0.7127 > 0.05 and p=0.1562> 0.05.   Moreover, AR (1) 
and AR (2) for ROA ratio also greater than 0.05, indicate there is no evidence of 
serial correlation in order 1 and order 2. (p=0.1075 and p= 0.1832).  Finally, ROE 
and AR (1) and AR (2) show 0.1401 and 0.1090 respectively.  The null hypothesis 
of serial correlation existing between ROE and explanatory variables is also 
rejected.  Hence, there is no serial correlation in the original error of financial 
performance proxies     as desired.  Table 6.6 indicates first order and second 
order serial correlation levels for agency costs proxies.  Column 2 indicates AR (1) 
and AR (2) figures as 0.9134 and 0.1577.  The null hypothesis that 
   (            ) =   for k=1, 2 is rejected at a level of 0.05 if p>0.05.  
Therefore, this study finds assets utilisation ratio (ASSETS) and explanatory 
variables are serially uncorrelated at both levels.  There is no serial correlation in 
the original error      as desired.  Similarly column 3 reports AR (1) and AR (2) 
figures as 0.1920 and 0.1008.  At orders 1 and 2 there is no evidence of serial 
correlation between DIVIDEND and explanatory variables (p=0.1920 > 0.05 and 
p=0.1008 > 0.05).  
Test of overidentification restrictions- A second specification test is a test for 
over-identifying restrictions. This test examines the lack of correlation between 
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instruments and the error term.   Table 6.4 indicates J statistics (49.40164, 
40.6552 and 22.27743) are not significant at the 5% significance level for 
financial performance metrics, which means that the instruments are valid.  
Further, all independent variables and agency costs proxies (ASSETS and 
DIVIDEND) J statistic is reported in Table 6.6.  Hasna-Sargan J statistics for 
ASSETS and DIVIDEND proxies are 58.35108 and 52.80985 respectively.   
Moreover, Table 6.6 indicates J statistics are not significant at the 5% significance 
level for agency costs proxies, which means that the instruments are valid.  
Test for joint significance- This study reports the Wald test of overall 
significance for all independent variables.  The Wald test is a popular method of 
testing the significance of particular explanatory variables in statistical models.   
Table 6.4 and Table 6.6 report jointly significance values for all independent 
variables. The Wald test figure for TOBIN’S Q, ROA and ROE are reported as 
chi2 (21) = 1.5e+05, 5.7e+07 and 2.4e+05 in Table 6.6 and further indicates 
significance at 1% level.  It is indicating groups of all explanatory variables’ 
parameters associated with these variables are not zero, so that all independent 
variables can be included in the model.   Table 6.6 indicates agency costs proxies 
Wald-Chi test results as follows.  ASSETS regression Chi (21) is 3.3e+06.  
DIVIDEND regression Chi (21) value is 9.9e+05.  For both regressions the Wald 
test is significant at 1% level, and then this study can concludes as that the 
parameters associated with these variables are not zero.  Hence, all selected 
explanatory variables can be included in agency costs models.   Further, in panel 
Tobit regression analysis, chi2 (21) value = 109.57 and the Wald-chi test is 
significant at 1% level.  Consequently, the group of all explanatory variables can 
be included in the panel Tobit regression model.  
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Table 11 Table 6.8 Summary of MNC findings 
Variable Issue 1   Interpretation 
Board Size 
BOARD 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in firm ROA 
Positively effect in firm ROE 
 
Confirm 
Reject 
Confirm 
 
 Large boards’ increase MNCs 
market based financial 
performance and shareholders 
wealth.  
 Large boards reduce MNCs 
accounting based financial 
performance 
Non-
executive 
directors 
NONE 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in firm ROA 
Positively effect in firm ROE 
 
Reject 
Reject 
Reject 
 Non-exécutive directors 
reduces MNCs financial 
performance 
Insider 
ownership 
INSIDE 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in firm ROA 
Positively effect in firm ROE 
 
Confirm 
Non significant 
Non significant 
 High insider ownership 
increase MNCs market based 
financial performance 
Board 
diversity 
DIVERSITY 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in firm ROA 
Positively effect in firm ROE 
 
Confirm 
Non significant 
Confirm 
 
 Board diversity increase MNCs 
market based financial 
performance and shareholders 
wealth. 
Female 
board 
directors 
FEMALE 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in firm ROA 
Positively effect in firm ROE 
 
Reject 
Non significant 
Reject 
 
 Female directors’ decrease 
MNCs market based financial 
performance and shareholders 
wealth. 
Minority 
board 
directors 
MINORITY 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in firm ROA 
Positively effect in firm ROE 
 
Confirm 
Confirm 
Confirm 
 
 Minority board directors 
increase MNCs financial 
performance 
CEO 
duality 
CEO 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in firm ROA 
Positively effect in firm ROE 
 
Reject 
Reject 
Confirm 
 CEO duality decrease MNCs 
market based and accounting 
based financial performance. 
 CEO duality increase MNCs 
shareholders value creation 
Ownership 
type 
OWNER 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in firm ROA 
Positively effect in firm ROE 
 
Non significant 
Confirm 
Non significant 
 
 Institutional ownership increase 
MNCs accounting based 
financial performance 
Foreign 
manager 
FOREIGN 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in firm ROA 
Positively effect in firm ROE 
 
Non significant 
Reject 
Non significant 
 
 Foreign managers reduce 
MNCs accounting based 
financial performance 
Firms size 
LNSALES 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in firm ROA 
Positively effect in firm ROE 
 
Confirm 
Non significant 
Confirm 
 
 Large MNCs  increase their 
market based financial 
performance and shareholders 
wealth 
 
Firm age 
AGE 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in firm ROA 
Positively effect in firm ROE 
 
Confirm 
Non significant 
Reject 
 Mature MNCs increase their 
market base financial 
performance. 
 Mature MNCs decrease their 
shareholders value 
Firm 
leverage 
DEBT 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in firm ROA 
Positively effect in firm ROE 
 
Non significant 
Non significant 
Confirm 
 Highly levered MNCs increase 
their shareholders value 
  
181 
 
Firm parent 
location 
REGION 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Significantly effect in firm Tobin’s 
Q 
Significantly effect in firm ROA 
Significantly effect in firm ROE 
 
Rejects 
Confirm 
Confirm 
 MNCs parent location is 
significantly impact on their 
accounting based financial 
performance and shareholders 
value 
Firm 
operating 
industry 
INDUSTRY 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Significantly effect in firm Tobin’s 
Q 
Significantly effect in firm ROA 
Significantly effect in firm ROE 
 
Confirm 
Confirm 
Confirm 
 MNCs operating industry has 
significant impact on their 
financial performance. 
Variable Issue 2   Interpretation 
Board Size 
BOARD 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in firm assets 
utilisation ratio 
Positively effect in firm Q dummy 
free cash flow 
confirm 
 
Non significant 
 
 Large boards’ decrease MNCs 
PA agency conflicts.   
 
Non-
executive 
directors 
NONE 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in firm assets 
utilisation ratio 
Positively effect in firm Q dummy 
free cash flow 
Non significant 
 
Reject 
 Non-executive directors 
decrease MNCs PA agency 
costs 
Insider 
ownership 
INSIDE 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in firm assets 
utilisation ratio 
Positively effect in firm Q dummy 
free cash flow  
Confirm 
 
Non significant 
 
 High insider ownership 
decrease MNCs PA agency 
costs 
Board 
diversity 
DIVERSITY 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in firm assets 
utilisation ratio 
Positively effect in firm Q dummy 
free cash flow  
Non significant 
 
Confirm 
 Board diversity increase MNCs 
PA agency costs. 
Female 
board 
directors 
FEMALE 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in firm assets 
utilisation ratio 
Positively effect in firm Q dummy 
free cash flow  
Non significant 
 
Reject 
 Female directors’ decrease 
MNCs PA agency conflicts. 
Minority 
board 
directors 
MINORITY 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in firm assets 
utilisation ratio 
Positively effect in firm Q dummy 
free cash flow  
Non significant 
 
Confirm 
 Minority board directors 
increase MNCs PA agency 
conflicts. 
CEO 
duality 
CEO 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in firm assets 
utilisation ratio 
Positively effect in firm Q dummy 
free cash flow  
Reject 
 
Not significant 
 CEO duality increase MNCs 
PA agency conflicts. 
 
Ownership 
type 
OWNER 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in firm assets 
utilisation ratio 
Positively effect in firm Q dummy 
free cash flow  
Non significant 
 
 
Confirm 
 Institutional ownership increase 
MNCs PA agency costs. 
Expatriate 
manager 
FOREIGN 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in firm assets 
utilisation ratio 
Positively effect in firm Q dummy 
free cash flow  
Reject 
 
Non significant 
 
 Expatriate managers increase 
MNCs PA agency costs. 
Firms size 
LNSALES 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in firm assets 
utilisation ratio 
Positively effect in firm Q dummy 
free cash flow  
Confirm 
 
Reject 
 
 Large MNCs  decrease their 
PA agency costs 
 
Firm age 
(AGE) 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in firm assets 
utilisation ratio 
Positively effect in firm Q dummy 
free cash flow  
Not significant 
 
Reject 
 Mature MNCs decrease their 
PA agency conflicts. 
Firm 
leverage 
(DEBT) 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in firm assets 
utilisation ratio 
Positively effect in firm Q dummy 
free cash flow  
Reject 
 
Non significant 
 
 Highly levered MNCs increase 
PA agency conflicts. 
Firm parent 
location 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
Significantly effect in firm assets 
utilisation ratio 
Rejects 
Confirm 
 MNCs parent location is 
significantly impact on PA 
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(REGION) agency conflict Significantly effect in firm Q 
dummy free cash flow 
Confirm agency conflicts 
Firm 
operating 
industry 
INDUSTRY 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Significantly effect in firm assets 
utilisation ratio 
Significantly effect in firm Q 
dummy free cash flow 
Confirm 
Confirm 
Confirm 
 MNCs operating industry has 
significant impact on their PA 
agency conflicts. 
Variable Issue 3   Interpretation 
Board Size 
BOARD 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in firm Dividend 
pay-out ratio 
Non significant 
 
 MNC board size has no 
significant impact on their PP 
agency conflicts.   
 
Non-
executive 
directors 
NONE 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in firm Dividend 
pay-out ratio 
Reject  Non-executive directors 
decrease MNCs PP agency 
costs 
Insider 
ownership 
INSIDE 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in firm Dividend 
pay-out ratio 
Reject 
 
 High insider ownership 
decrease MNCs PP agency 
costs 
Board 
diversity 
DIVERSITY 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in firm Dividend 
pay-out ratio 
Reject  Board diversity decrease  
MNCs PP agency costs. 
Female 
board 
directors 
FEMALE 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in firm Dividend 
pay-out ratio 
Confirm  Female directors increase 
MNCs PP agency conflicts. 
Minority 
board 
directors 
MINORITY 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in firm Dividend 
pay-out ratio 
Confirm  Minority board directors 
increase MNCs PP agency 
conflicts. 
CEO 
duality 
CEO 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in firm Dividend 
pay-out ratio 
Confirm  CEO duality increase MNCs 
PP agency conflicts. 
 
Ownership 
type 
OWNER 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in firm Dividend 
pay-out ratio 
Reject  Institutional ownership 
decrease MNCs PP agency 
costs. 
Foreign 
manager 
FOREIGN 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in firm Dividend 
pay-out ratio 
Non significant 
 
 An foreign manager has no 
significant effect on MNCs PP 
agency costs. 
Firms size 
LNSALES 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in firm Dividend 
pay-out ratio 
Reject  Large MNCs  decrease their PP 
agency costs 
Firm age 
AGE 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in firm Dividend 
pay-out ratio 
Confirm 
 
 Mature MNCs increase their PP 
agency conflicts. 
Firm 
leverage 
DEBT 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in firm Dividend 
pay-out ratio 
Reject 
 
 
 Highly levered MNCs decrease 
PP agency conflicts. 
Firm parent 
location 
REGION 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in firm Dividend 
pay-out ratio 
Not significant  MNCs parent location is not 
significantly impact on PP 
agency conflicts 
Firm 
operating 
industry 
INDUSTRY 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in firm Dividend 
pay-out ratio 
Confirm 
 
 MNCs operating industry has 
significant impact on their PP 
agency conflicts. 
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6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed and explored the results of the corporate governance 
mechanisms and MNCs’ financial performance and agency costs relationship. 
Overall, this study finds large boards positively affect MNCs’ financial 
performance.  However, that MNC board size has a negative impact on PA agency 
costs and no impact for PP agency costs.   
This study finds non-executive directors negatively affect all three financial 
performance metrics.  This may be due to selection biases or lack of information 
availability.  Moreover, finding indicates non-executive directors mitigate both 
PA and PP agency conflicts in MNCs.  Results indicate insider ownership is an 
appropriate corporate governance mechanism in MNCs in Sri Lanka.  Insider 
ownership reduces MNCs’ PA and PP agency conflicts as well.   
Board diversity has both positive and negative impacts on MNCs’ financial 
performance and agency costs.  First, board diversity negatively contributes to 
shareholder value and MNCs’ Tobin’s Q.  Though board diversification decrease 
PA agency costs, but it increases PP agency conflicts between majority and 
minority shareholders of MNCs.  The results indicate that careful consideration 
should be taken before selecting female directors on corporate boards.  
Results show that ethnic minority directors increase subsidiaries’ financial 
performance. Further, minority directors have a positive effect on subsidiaries’ PA 
and PP agency costs. Overall, the result indicates that from an agency costs 
perspective, ethnic minority directors are not an effective governance mechanism 
in MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
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CEO duality negatively affects Tobin’s Q and ROA financial performance and has 
a positive effect on ROE, which indicates to some extent CEO duality increases 
MNCs’ shareholders value. Further, results indicate CEO duality increases MNCs’ 
PA and PP agency costs.  The finding reveals that institutional ownership is 
contributing positively towards MNC financial performance.  However, 
institutional ownership significantly increases PA agency conflicts between 
shareholders and managers and significantly decreases company PP agency costs.  
Overall finding suggests institutional ownership is more effective than board or 
individual ownership in MNCs.  This may be because institutional investors are 
more active monitors than passive investors in MNCs in Sri Lanka.  This study 
finds foreign managers have a negative effect on ROA.   This may be due to high 
cultural and institutional differences that create a high probability of failure rates 
among foreign managers.  Therefore, foreign managers are not an effective 
governance mechanism for MNCs in Sri Lanka.  Results show that, foreign 
managers positively affect subsidiaries’ PA agency costs and have no impact on 
PP agency costs.  This includes that foreign managers are not an optimal 
mechanism for agency costs in MNCs in Sri Lanka.   
Large MNCs have high financial performance and low PA and PP agency costs.  
This may be because larger businesses have high resource availability, technology 
and well developed corporate governance systems that mitigate agency costs and 
increase financial performance.  Mature firms show higher financial performance.  
This may be because when a firm grows, it’s monitoring efficiency between 
managers and shareholders increases.  Further results indicate that when a firm 
matures it decreases shareholders’ value creation.  However, results depict that 
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lower PA agency costs and higher PP agency cost of mature firms.   This may be 
due to large shareholders having more incentive to control minority shareholders.     
The results find that firm leverage variable is significantly positively related with 
ROE.  Further study shows subsidiary leverage ratio is one of the best external 
control mechanisms for PP agency costs for MNCs in Sri Lanka.  This indicates 
bank based external monitoring mechanisms positively affect MNCs in Sri Lanka.   
This study also indicates that MNC parent locations determine the MNC 
subsidiaries’ financial performance and agency costs.  Due to parent companies’ 
financial support, technology know-how and information availability for 
subsidiaries can vary according to the parent company location.  This can have an 
effect on financial performance and agency costs in MNCs.  Further, this finding 
indicates there is an industry effect on financial performance and agency costs in 
MNCs.  
Finally, three financial performance models (TOBIN’SQ, ROA and ROE) and 
three agency costs models (ASSETS, DIVIDEND and Q-dummy free cash flow) 
are statistically robust.  First, testing serial correlation of order 1 and order 2 
indicates there is no serial correlation of all models.  Second, the Hansen-Sargan J 
statistic accepts the over-identification restriction which means instruments are 
valid.  Third, joint significance test results suggest the significance of explanatory 
variables in all financial performance and agency costs models.    
The next chapter reports econometric results, discussion of corporate governance 
practices, financial performance and agency costs in LPCs.  
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Chapter 7 
Econometric results and discussion of corporate 
governance practices, financial performance and agency 
costs in LPCs 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of empirical study and analyses the information 
about the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and Sri Lankan 
local public companies’ (LPCs) financial performance, PA and PP agency 
conflicts.   Further, it discusses the tests for complementarities of corporate 
governance instruments that affect firm financial performance and agency 
conflicts, and incremental tests are also carried out for the importance of each 
variable in the corporate governance model for LPCs,  Econometric treatment 
regarding serial correlation, over-identification restriction and joint significance 
are also presented.  
This chapter is organised as follows.  Section 7.1 provides descriptive statistics for 
the sample data.  This is followed by a presentation of pair-wise correlation of 
variables (section 7.2).  Section 7.3 provides financial performance analysis. 
Section 7.4 provides agency costs analysis. Thereafter, section 7.5 provides panel 
Tobit regression results.  Section 7.6 is about the specification tests of this study.  
Finally, section 7.7 concludes the chapter.  
7.1 Descriptive statistics for LPCs in Sri Lanka 
The sample consists of 113 LPCs listed on the CSE for the period 2006-2010.  As 
discussed in chapter 5, the descriptive statistics for the dependent proxies and 
explanatory variables are calculated to ascertain the general characteristics of the 
LPC firms in the Sri Lankan market.  Table 7.1 provides descriptive statistics of 
variables used in this study.  Table 7.1 depicts a number of observations, mean, 
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median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum value for each variable.  All 
explanatory variables belong into four categories.  Board size, board composition, 
board leadership structure and control variable category.  
1) TOBIN’S Q: - Table 7.1 shows mean Tobin’s Q value as 1.003821, with a 
median of 1.000832.  This greater than 1 Tobin’s Q value indicates that the 
market value of assets is greater than their replacement cost.  It also indicates that 
LPCs create value for their shareholders.   
2) ROA: - This study sample mean ROA value is 0.032.  This less than one ROA 
value indicates less efficiency of earnings generated by LPCs.  This study sample 
mean ROA value is less than Sri Lankan listed public companies sample ROA, 
used by Manawaduge et al. (2008).  This low ROA figure indicates LPCs are not 
very profitable relative to their total assets.  
3) ROE: - Table 7.1 reports the mean value of LPCs’ ROE is 7.05 with a median 
of 9.24.  This higher than one mean value suggests LPCs create value for their 
shareholders.  The mean value of sample LPCs’ ROE is less than the sample of 
MNC subsidiaries’ ROE mean value (8.86) used in this study.   
4) ASSETS: - The mean asset utilisation ratio is 0.77 which indicates that assets 
utilisation in LPCs is closer to 1 and it is significantly at a high level.  Table 7.1 
shows LPC assets utilisation varies between zero and 4.035.   
5) DIVIDEND: - This ratio suggests how well earnings support the dividend 
payments.  The mean dividend payment for LPCs is 0.062 and varies between 
zero and 1.99 in dividend payment range.   
6) QFCF: - The median value zero indicates fifty percent of companies are highly 
managed firms (Tobin’s Q is greater than 1).   
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7) BOARD: - Sample LPC board size for this study varies between three and 13. 
The mean value of board size is 7.1.  This study’s sample mean board size is 
consistent with Lipton & Lorsch (1992) who recommend optimal board size as 
seven or eight.   
8) NONE: - Table 7.1 shows the mean value of non-executive directors is 61.15%.  
Furthermore, the study indicates the maximum percentage of non-executive 
directors on boards is 100% and the minimum is zero percent.  The high existence 
of non-executive directors indicates Sri Lankan LPCs rely on the new mandatory 
code of best practice on corporate governance (2008) which states that one third 
of non-executive directors are required to be on a board.  
9) INSIDE: - The minimum value for insider ownership for LPCs is zero and the 
maximum value is 100%.  This is consistent with the view that insider ownership 
of listed companies in Sri Lanka is relatively high.  The study reports mean 
insider ownership is 13.85%.  
10) DIVERSITY:- Board diversity in the LPCs ranges from zero to 0.5125, 
indicating fully diversified board do not exist in the LPC sample (full diversity is 
indicated by 1.0).  The mean value of diversity is 0.21073 and the median is 0.20.  
However, the MNC study sample used in this study shows high board diversity 
than LPCs.  
11) FEMALE: - The minimum value for female board directors’ representation 
is zero percent for LPCs and maximum value is 50%.  This suggests total female 
board do not exist in Sri Lankan LPCs.  The mean value of female percentage is 
6.7. This is significantly less than European countries average female 
representation (10%) on boards (Boards in turbulent times: Corporate Governance 
Report, 2009).  The one possible explanation is that more than 50% of Sri Lankan 
LPCs are family firms.   
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12) MINORITY:-The minimum value for ethnic minority board representation is 
zero for LPCs and maximum value is 100%.  This indicates total minority director 
boards exist in Sri Lanka.  The mean minority representation is 34.68%.  This is 
significantly higher than the USA sample mean minority representation value 
(10.47%) used by Carter et al. (2008).  Nevertheless, Haniffa & Cooke (2005) 
report minority directors’ presence in Malaysian listed firms at 47%.   
13) CEO:-Average CEO duality firm percentage is only 29.64%.  This may be as 
a result of companies coming into line of the best practices on corporate 
governance mandatory code (2008). LPCs prefer to separate the two leadership 
roles to ensure balance of power and authority in a company.   
14) OWNER:-The mean value 0.8 indicates 80% of sample LPCs have 
institutional ownership. This high existence of institutional ownership may be due 
to the undeveloped equity market and weak investor protection in Sri Lanka with 
individual investors reluctant to invest in emerging markets. Therefore, 
institutional ownership is dominant in Sri Lanka.   
15) LNSALES:-This is proxy for LPC firm size. The mean value of LNSALES 
is 13.46 and the median value is 13.69.  This indicates fifty percent of LPCs are 
smaller than 13.69.  Furthermore, results show the size of the LPCs ranges from 
6.54 and 22.57.   
16) AGE:-The age of LPCs ranges from three to 97 years, indicating mean value 
for age is 27.68 years.  Moreover, median value indicates fifty percent of LPCs 
are less than 24 years’ old.  This suggests the LPC sample consists of relatively 
young firms.   
17) DEBT:-The minimum value for debt to assets ratio of LPC is 0 and the 
maximum value is 96.09.  The mean value of debt ratio is 22.54.  The median 
value of 21.33 indicates fifty percent of LPCs have less than 21.33 debts to assets 
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ratio.  This indicates most of the LPCs prefer internal generate cash flows than 
external debt.  Furthermore, this is in line with Colombage (2007) he explains that 
only about one third of Sri Lankan listed firms claimed to have target debt ratio.   
18) INDUSTRIES:-Seven industry dummies are used to represent all industries 
(except the financial sector) in Sri Lankan LPCs.  Table 7.1 shows 0.8% of 
companies operate in INDUS1; 14.16% of sample LPCs are from INDSU2;  13.27% 
of companies are from industry 3;  industry 4 represents 24.78% of sample;  15.92% 
of firms are from industry 5; 2.65% of firms are from industry 6 and industry 7 
represents 44% of the total sample.  
The distribution of each variable was checked to determine if it was 
approximately a normal variant.  The Jarque-Bera test results indicated that all 
data are normally distributed.  Accordingly, a conditional mean estimator (OLS) is 
appropriate for the sample data set.  
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Table 12 Table 7.1 Descriptive statistics of LPCs in Sri Lanka 
Variables Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
TOBIN’S Q 
 
 
546 
 
 
1.003821 
 
 
1.000832 
 
 
.0943042 
 
 
.4997591 
 
 
2.652893 
ROA 548 .0321316 2.13E-05 .0782406 -.1240458 .7346142 
ROE 529 7.05242 7.24 5.304081 -894.9   350.27 
ASSETS 548 0.771517 0.733306 .5873418 0 4.035737 
ASSETS 541 -0.5915715 -0.29535 1.197116 -5.638669 7.382873 
DIVIDEND 542 .062074 0.005459 .2082891 0 1.98955 
QFCF 550 3.08e+07 0 4.19e+08 -125329 6.64e+09 
Independent variables 
Board size 
BOARD 
 
 
 
532 
 
 
 
7.12594 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
1.906754 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
13 
Board composition 
NONE 
 
532 
 
.6114741 
 
0.6 
 
.2822366 
 
0 
 
1 
INSIDE 517 .1365018 0.09171 0.010008 0 1 
DIVERSITY 535 .2107391 0.20 .0018513 0 0.51250 
FEMALE 532 .0670822 0 .1063078 0 .5 
MINORITY 536 .3467586 0.285714 .2861164 0 1 
Leadership structure 
CEO 
 
 
560 
 
 
.2964286 
 
 
0 
 
 
.4570905 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
OWNER 560 .8 1 .4003576 0 1 
Control variables 
LNSALES 
 
 
542 
 
13.45541 
 
13.68787 
 
 
1.976383 
 
6.536692 
 
22.5656 
AGE 565 27.68142 24 17.40489 3 97 
LNAGE 565 3.133499 3.178054 .6292439 1.098612 4.574711 
DEBT 435 22.54317 21.33167 19.6647 0 96.09035 
LNDEBT 405 2.535112 3.121151 1.682633 -7.293418 4.565289 
INDUS1 565 .0088496 0 .0937379 0 1 
INDUS2 565 .1415929 0 .3489411 0 1 
INDUS3 565 .1327434 0 .3395978 0 1 
INDUS4 565 .2477876 0 .4321104 0 1 
INDUS5 565 .159292 0 .3662725 0 1 
INDUS6 565 .0265487 0 .1609027 0 1 
INDUS7 565 .2831858 0 .4509452 0 1 
Note: For the detailed description of the above variables, refer to Table 5.2 in Chapter 5. 
7.2 Pair-wise correlation 
A pair-wise correlation matrix for the dependent variables and independent 
variables is provided in Table 7.2.  The significance of correlation between 
financial performance dependent variables, agency costs dependent variables, 
board size, board composition, board leadership structure and control variables 
offers tentative support for the claim that selected independent variables interacts 
with LPCs’ financial performance and agency costs.   Moreover, high correlation 
of corporate governance variables and dependent variables indicate a requirement 
for further attention of these variables. 
  
192 
 
Table 13 Table 7.2 Correlation matrix 
 TOBIN’S Q ROA ROE ASSETS DIVIDENT QFCF BOARD 
TOBIN’S Q 1.0000       
ROA -0.0557 
(0.1941) 
1.0000      
ROE 0.0123 
(0.8010) 
0.3625 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
ASSETS -0.0584 
(0.1757) 
0.0941** 
(0.0286) 
0.3213*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
DIVIDEND -0.0148 
(0.7309) 
0.1489*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0177 
(0.7172) 
-0.2546*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
QFCF -0.0139 
(0.7453) 
-0.0175 
(0.6830) 
0.0967** 
(0.0469) 
0.2866*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0181 
(0.6741) 
1.0000  
BOARD -0.0660 
(0.1333) 
-0.0609 
(0.1655) 
0.0404 
(0.4201) 
0.0365 
(0.4085) 
-0.0047 
(0.9151  ) 
0.0102 
(0.8157) 
1.0000 
NONE 0.2899*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1177** 
(0.0068) 
-0.0759 
(0.1263) 
-0.0947** 
(0.0304) 
-0.1409*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0969** 
(0.0259) 
0.0185 
(0.6796) 
INSIDE -0.0287 
(0.5182) 
0.2030*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0506 
(0.3167) 
0.0886** 
(0.0461) 
0.0035 
(0.9369) 
-0.0344 
(0.4375) 
0.2645*** 
(0.0000) 
FEMALE 0.0250 
(0.5696) 
-0.1143*** 
(0.0090) 
-0.1024** 
(0.0403) 
-0.1062** 
(0.0160) 
0.0336 
(0.4471) 
-0.0393 
(0.3707) 
0.0250 
(0.5650) 
DIVERSITY -0.6921*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1816*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0867* 
(0.0783) 
-0.1390*** 
(0.0014) 
0.2197*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0544 
(0.2093) 
-0.0357 
(0.4217) 
MINORITY 0.3719*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1250** 
(0.0037) 
-0.0772 
(0.1162) 
-0.1285** 
(0.0031) 
-0.1271** 
(0.0034) 
-0.1173*** 
(0.0066) 
0.0073 
(0.8704) 
CEO 0.2788*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0346 
(0.4183) 
-0.0836* 
(0.0859) 
-0.1761*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0300 
(0.4856) 
-0.0399 
(0.3508) 
-0.0077 
(0.8593) 
OWNER 0.2771*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1361*** 
(0.0014) 
0.0940* 
(0.0534) 
0.0321 
(0.4562) 
-0.1894*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1268*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0263 
(0.5465) 
LNSALES -0.0336 
(0.4360) 
-0.0484 
(0.2611) 
0.2157*** 
(0.0000) 
0.6157*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1708**** 
(0.0001) 
0.2743*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2877*** 
(0.0000) 
LNAGE 0.0163 
(0.7043) 
-0.1512*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.1049** 
(0.0311) 
0.1501*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.2680*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0264 
(0.5359) 
-0.0399 
(0.3587) 
LNDEBT 0.0692 
(0.1678) 
-0.1502** 
(0.0026) 
0.0433 
(0.4404) 
0.2188*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3406*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0349 
(0.4858) 
0.0014 
(0.9783) 
INDS1 -0.0017 
(0.9677) 
-0.0394 
(0.3567) 
-0.0956** 
(0.0493) 
0.1299** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0264 
(0.5390) 
-0.0070 
(0.8690) 
-0.0780* 
(0.0722) 
INDS2 -0.0642 
(0.1342) 
0.2560*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0035 
(0.9435) 
0.0607 
(0.1584) 
0.1986*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0290 
(0.4978) 
0.1616*** 
(0.0002) 
INDS3 0.0704 
(0.1003) 
0.1001** 
(0.0191) 
-0.0337 
(0.4895) 
-0.4210 
(0.0000) 
0.2167*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0288 
(0.5008) 
-0.1333** 
(0.0021) 
INDS4 -0.0167 
(0.6969) 
-0.2315*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1456** 
(0.0027) 
-0.0780* 
(0.0697) 
-0.0986** 
(0.0217) 
0.1264** 
(0.0030) 
-0.0309 
(0.4767) 
INDS5 -0.0002 
(0.9961) 
0.1071** 
(0.0121) 
0.0377 
(0.4397) 
0.1481*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0954** 
(0.0264) 
-0.0319 
(0.4555) 
-0.0346 
(0.4262) 
INDS6   0.0041 
(0.9236) 
-0.0235 
(0.5832) 
-0.0194 
(0.6905) 
0.0550 
(0.2017) 
-0.0348 
(0.4183) 
-0.0114 
(0.7888) 
-0.0552 
(0.2037) 
INDS7 0.0106 
(0.8043) 
-0.1191*** 
(0.0053) 
0.1449*** 
(0.0028) 
0.1777*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1229*** 
(0.0042) 
-0.0464 
(0.2772) 
0.0700 
(0.1068) 
 NONE INSIDER FEMALE DIVERSITY MINORITY CEO OWNER 
NONE 1.0000       
INSIDER 0.1468*** 
(0.0011) 
1.0000      
FEMALE -0.0198 
(0.6585) 
0.0068 
(0.8778) 
1.0000     
DIVERSITY -0.7633*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0763* 
(0.0891) 
0.0990** 
(0.0257) 
1.0000    
MINORITY 0.9710*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1362*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0259 
(0.5594) 
-0.6628*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
CEO 0.7923*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1223*** 
(0.0053) 
0.0794* 
(0.0678) 
-0.3701*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8377*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000  
OWNER 0.6322*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0497 
(0.2590) 
0.0026 
(0.9532) 
-0.8730*** 
(0.0000) 
0.5376*** 
(0.0000) 
0.3245*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000 
LNSALES -0.0538 
(0.2196) 
-0.1204*** 
(0.0066) 
-0.1332*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.2645*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0854** 
(0.0496 
-0.1752*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1586*** 
(0.0002) 
LNAGE 0.1279*** 
(0.0031) 
0.1766*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0661 
(0.1278) 
-0.1058** 
(0.0143) 
0.1232*** 
(0.0043) 
0.0700* 
(0.0979) 
0.1358*** 
(0.0013) 
DEBT 0.1816*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0265 
(0.6124) 
-0.2211*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.3547*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1209* 
(0.0162) 
-0.0567 
(0.2562) 
0.2754*** 
(0.0000) 
INDUS1 -0.0569 
(0.1898) 
0.0173 
(0.6939) 
0.1036** 
(0.0169) 
-0.0309 
(  0.4763) 
-0.0234 
(0.5894) 
-0.0200 
(0.6360) 
0.0000 
(1.0000) 
INDUS2 0.0585 
(0.1778) 
0.1231*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0373 
(0.3902) 
0.0396 
(0.3610) 
0.0372 
(0.3904) 
0.0702 ** 
(0.0968) 
-0.0510 
(0.2279) 
INDUS3 -0.0451 
(0.2995) 
-0.0755** 
(0.0862) 
0.1713*** 
(0.0001) 
0.1148*** 
(0.0079) 
-0.0172 
(0.6903) 
0.0318 
0.4529) 
-0.0918** 
(0.0299) 
INDUS4 0.1315*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0425 
(0.3352) 
-0.0835* 
(0.0543) 
-0.0832* 
(0.0545) 
0.1348*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0525 
(0.2151) 
0.0599 
(0.1566) 
INDUS5 -0.1011* -0.0598 -0.1084** 0.0952** -0.1220*** -0.0392 -0.0486 
  
193 
 
(0.0196) (0.1744) (0.0124) (0.0277) (0.0047) (0.3549) (0.2507) 
INDUS6 0.0575 
(0.1854) 
0.1096* 
(0.0127) 
0.0570 
(0.1895) 
-0.0952** 
(0.0277) 
0.1088** 
(0.0117) 
0.0298 
(0.4820) 
0.0771* 
(0.0683) 
INDUS7 -0.0603 
(0.1649) 
0.0222 
(0.6142) 
-0.0309 
(0.4775) 
-0.0727* 
(0.0930) 
-0.0745* 
(0.0850) 
-0.1028* 
(0.0149) 
0.0655 
(0.1217) 
 LNSALES LNASSET LNAGE DEBT INDS1 INDS2 INDS3 
LNSALES 1.0000       
LNAGE 0.0955** 
(0.0263) 
0.1501*** 
(0.0005) 
1.0000     
DEBT 0.2493*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2188*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0812 
(0.1029) 
1.0000    
INDUS1 0.0215 
(0.6178) 
0.1299*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0548 
(0.1931) 
-0.0295 
(0.5535) 
1.0000   
INDUS2 0.0599 
(0.1639) 
0.0607 
(0.1584) 
-0.2258*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0714 
(0.1513) 
-0.0384 
(0.3626) 
1.0000  
INDUS3 -0.3214*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.4210*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0967** 
(0.0215) 
-0.1855*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0370 
(0.3804) 
-0.1589*** 
(0.0001) 
1.0000 
INDUS4 -0.0978** 
(0.0227) 
-0.0780** 
(0.0697) 
0.1760*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0304 
(0.5423) 
-0.0542 
(0.1980) 
-0.2331*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2245*** 
(0.0000) 
INDUS5 0.1072** 
(0.0125) 
0.1481*** 
(0.0006) 
0.1928*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0094 
(0.8506) 
-0.0411 
(0.3291) 
-0.1768*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1703*** 
(0.0000) 
INDUS6 0.1652*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0550 
(0.2017) 
0.1068** 
(0.0111) 
0.0985** 
(0.0477) 
-0.0156 
(0.7113) 
-0.0671 
(0.1113) 
-0.0646 
(0.1250) 
INDUS7 0.1415*** 
(0.0010) 
0.1777*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1043** 
(0.0131) 
0.1782*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0594 
(0.1586) 
-0.2553*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2459*** 
(0.0000) 
*denotes correlation is significant at 10% level,  ** denotes correlation is significant  at 5% level, ** * denotes correlation 
is significant  at 1% level 
 
7.3 Dynamic panel GMM regression of financial performance 
variables and explanatory variables 
In recent studies Hermalin & Weisbach (2003a) and Harris & Raviv (2008) 
suggest that board structure is dynamically endogenous.   Further, they explain 
that at any time in a firm life cycle, board structure will be related to past 
performance and reflect the operating and contracting environment the firm faced 
in the past.  Further, Wintoki et al. (2007) find observable and unobservable 
heterogeneity is another major endogenity problem that arises between firm 
financial performance and board structure as determined by panel OLS regression. 
Therefore, it is within reason to suspect non-orthogonality between regressors and 
errors.   This study employed the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) econometric test 
to identify the endogeneity effect of corporate governance variables used in this 
study.   
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H0: Regressors are exogeneous 
Table 14 Table 7.3 The DWH test for endogeneity of regressors 
Variables TOBIN’S Q ROA ROE 
BOARD SIZE .832211 .147371 1.07157* 
NONE 7.14238*** 1.11576* .086732 
INSIDE 8.8057** 1.95107* .000642 
DIVERSITY 19.6327*** 2.21562** .504091 
FEMALE .011345 .016231 2.70907** 
MINORITY 6.62661*** 1.5733** 5.8e-07 
CEO 6.14752*** 1.23757* 8.80527* 
OWNER 6.98343*** 1.29534* 9.83943* 
DWH tests results indicate (Table 7.3) NONE, INSIDE, DIVERSITY, MINORITY, 
CEO and OWNER have a significant endogenity effect on TOBIN’S Q.  Moreover, 
NONE, INSIDE, DIVERSITY, MINORITY, CEO and OWNER have an 
endogeneity effect on LPCs’ ROA.   Finally, BOARD SIZE, FEMALE, CEO and 
OWNER have an endogeneity effect on the ROE variable.  In order to empirically 
examine the possible relationship between corporate governance variables and LPC 
financial performance, this study employed the dynamic panel generalised method 
of moment (GMM) estimator.   
Table 7.4 presents the results for the corporate governance and firm financial 
performance.  Columns 2-4 of Table 7.4 present OLS Fixed effect
4
 results and 
columns 5-7 present dynamic panel GMM results.  An examination of the results in 
Table 7.4 reveals that endogenity is a significant concern of corporate governance 
variables.  
                                                 
4
 Hausman’s specification test is used to differentiate between random and fixed effects models. 
The test statistics have p<0.05 for all three ratios, so the null hypothesis of no correlation is 
rejected and the fixed-effects model is appropriate for all three performance measures.  
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Positive coefficients denote a positive relationship between explanatory variables 
and dependent variables, and negative coefficients denote a negative relationship 
between explanatory and dependent financial performance proxies. Each financial 
performance regression model reports order 1 and order 2 auto correlation, over-
identification restriction (J-statistcs) and joint significance values (Chi) under 
regression summary statistics.  
Board size and LPCs’ financial performance 
Table 7.4 reveals that board size has no significant relationship with LPCs’ 
financial performance proxies, indicating that board size is not an important 
corporate governance determinant of LPCs’ financial performance.   This finding is 
in line with Chaganti et al. (1985) and Van-Ees et al. (2003), who find a non-
significant relationship between board size and firm financial performance.   
Non-executive directors and LPCs’ financial performance 
The coefficient of NONE variable is positively and statistically significant at 1% 
level for Tobin’s Q and indicates that non-executive directors increase LPCs’ 
market-based financial performance. This may be based on the “effective-
monitoring” concept; outside directors are an effective resolution for PA agency 
costs (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This finding is in line with Yermack (1996) who also 
finds a positive relationship between non-executive directors and firm financial 
performance measured as Tobin’s Q.   
Inside ownership and LPCs’ financial performance 
The independent variable INSIDE is positively related to company ROA value at 
the 10% significant level, indicating higher insider ownership increases LPCs’ 
financial performance.  The one possible explanation for that is based on the 
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“convergence-of-interest” hypothesis that PA agency costs reduce as insider 
ownership increases since insider interests’ converge with shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).   
Board diversity and LPCs’ financial performance 
The DIVERSITY variable is negatively and statistically significant at 1% level for 
LPC Tobin’s Q value and indicates that highly diversified company boards destroy 
LPCs’ financial performance.  This is consistent with Hambrick et al. (1996) and 
Knight et al. (1999) who find a significant negative impact on board diversity and 
company financial performance.  Furthermore, Table 7.4 shows board diversity has 
a positive impact on LPCs’ ROA and shareholders’ value creation. This is 
consistent with Carter et al.  (2003),  who find a positive relationship between 
board diversity and firm ROA in a USA context.   
Female board directors and LPCs’ financial performance 
The coefficient of FEMALE variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level for LPCs Tobin’s Q and indicates that female board directors’ increase LPCs’ 
market-based financial performance. This may be female directors’ moderate firm 
strategic orientation and organisational culture.  Hence, they increase firm financial 
performance. Nevertheless, the FEMALE variable is negatively and statistically 
significant at 5% level for LPCs’ ROA and shareholders’ value, which indicates 
female board directors have a negative impact on LPCs’ accounting-based financial 
performance and shareholders’ value creation.  According to Andreoni & 
Vesterlund (2001), this may be due to female board directors are less altruistic than 
male board directors.   
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Ethnic minority directors and LPCs’ financial performance 
The coefficient of MINORITY is positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level for LPCs’ ROE indicating that minority directors on boards increase 
shareholders’ wealth.   In line with above findings, Haniffa & Cooke (2005) find in 
a Malaysian context that minority directors have a positive relationship of adopting 
corporate governance disclosures.   
CEO duality and LPCs’ financial performance 
This study indicates LPCs’ Tobin’s Q has a significant negative correlation with 
CEO duality, indicating unitary leadership negatively impacts on LPCs’ financial 
performance.  This is consistent with Sri Lanka’s mandatory code of best practice 
on corporate governance (2008), principal 2, which promotes separation of 
chairman and CEO roles.   
Institutional ownership and LPCs’ financial performance 
Consideration of the OWNER variable, as shown in Table 7.4, reveals it is 
negatively related with TOBIN’S Q at the 1% significance level, indicating 
institutional owners have a negative impact on LPCs’ market based financial 
performance. This study indicates that in Sri Lankan LPCs’ institutional ownership 
is less aligned with the efficient monitoring hypothesis.   
Company size and LPCs’ financial performance 
LNSALES is positively and statistically significant at 1% level for firm ROE and 
indicates that large firms generate more value for their shareholders. This finding is 
consistent with Kakani & Kaul (2002) who find larger firms can access cheaper 
sources of finance and create shareholder value in an Indian context. This may be 
due to firm size and corporate governance practices have a positive relationship, 
firm size increase leads to increase LPCs financial performance.   
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Company age and LPCs’ financial performance 
The independent variable LNAGE is negatively related to company Tobin’s Q 
value at the 1% significant level, and to company ROE value at 5% significance 
level, indicating mature firms destroy company financial performance and 
shareholders’ value.  This may be because when a firm matures, profitability drops, 
costs rise, growth slows, assets become obsolete and R & D investments decline 
(Loderer & Waelchli, 2010).    
Leverage ratio and LPCs’ financial performance 
The coefficient of DEBT (debt to assets ratio) variable is negatively and statistically 
significant at 1% level for LPCs’ Tobin’s Q value, indicating high leveraged LPCs 
have lower financial performance than low leveraged LPCs.  This may be based on 
finance gap theory; Sri Lankan LPCs find external financing is more costly and less 
available.  This finding is consistent with Rao et al. (2007) who find similar results 
in an Oman context, which also has an undeveloped capital market.   
Industry and LPCs’ financial performance 
As this study finds, INDUSTRY has a significant influence on LPCs’ financial 
performance proxies.  This finding is in line with McGuire et al. (1988) who find 
financial risk and financial performances vary between industries.   
Regression summary statistics, i.e auto-correlation in order (1) and auto-correlation 
in order (2), over-identification restriction statistic (J-statistics), and joint 
significance (Chi 2) also report separately for each financial performance regression.  
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Table 15 Table 7.4 Panel data OLS regression/ Dynamic Panel GMM 
regression results for financial performance  
Variable (1) TOBINS-
OLS (2)  
ROA- OLS 
(3) 
ROE-OLS (4) TOBINS-
GMM  (5) 
ROA-GMM 
(6) 
ROE-GMM 
(7) 
Number of obs= 
565a 
Number of 
groups=113 
L1 
    
 
 
 
.006095*** 
(.0013147) 
 
 
 
 
-.0071885 
(.0118424) 
 
 
 
 
-.0599115 
(.0515118) 
Board size: 
BOARD 
.0006544 
(.0013256) 
-.0123468** 
(.0053347) 
.0509045 
(.0493075) 
-.0003185 
(.0002724) 
-.0017817 
(.0015183) 
.0806252 
(.0572612) 
Board 
composition 
NONE 
.0551458 
(.0237821) 
-.1996372** 
(.0957085) 
-3.299571*** 
(1.186171) 
.0537091*** 
(.0100043) 
-.0690184 
(.0507994) 
-1.49532 
(1.099468) 
INSIDE .0139428 
(0163182) 
-.0106519 
(.0656711) 
.1791648 
(.3841493) 
-.0087844 
(.0053601) 
.0523482* 
(.0318396) 
1.385185 
(.9046111) 
DIVERSITY -4.26322** 
(2.252906) 
-25.67365*** 
(9.066594) 
-142.0226 
(96.43432) 
-8.759412*** 
(.7757314) 
13.11671*** 
(3.719678) 
207.7911** 
(92.98711) 
FEMALE -.0085696 
(.0332509) 
.0269543 
(.1338149) 
-1.14612 
(.8324551) 
.0594215*** 
(.0164253) 
-.0962293** 
(.0446596) 
-2.384986** 
(1.158603) 
MINORITY -.0063649 
(.020891) 
.1879446** 
(.0840736) 
2.208779** 
(1.016975) 
-.0102162 
(.0078934) 
.0600567 
(.0461938) 
1.707525** 
(.8191319) 
Leadership 
structure: 
CEO 
 
.0070724 
(.0043471) 
 
-.0087774 
(.0174946) 
 
.3288386 
(.2240813) 
 
-.0039598*** 
(.0014284) 
 
.0004559 
(.0027802) 
 
.0819878 
(.1551256) 
OWNER -.0015566 
(.0066474 ) 
-.1356234*** 
(.0267518) 
-.1687808 
(.2919003) 
-.0201595*** 
(.0017641) 
.0225083 
(.0185108) 
.5002072 
(.3810189) 
Control 
Variables: 
LNSALES 
 
-.0005546 
(.0027633) 
 
.0271902** 
(.0111207) 
 
.658314*** 
(.1116738) 
 
.0009675 
(.0008892) 
 
.0025218 
(.0042059) 
 
.9035826*** 
(.1192046) 
LNAGE .0131627 
(.0152413) 
.0223727 
(.0613372) 
-.3248949** 
(.1692952) 
-.0083704*** 
(.0028265) 
-.0006867 
(.0155376) 
-.9362365** 
(.4097415) 
DEBT   -.0000189 
(.0011803 ) 
-.0190555*** 
(.00475) 
-.0467143 
(.0401436) 
-.0033178*** 
(.0007276) 
.0012549 
(.0028224) 
-.0247086 
(.0421623) 
INDUS1   -2.113168** 
(.9429545) 
   
INDUS2   -.075809 
(.2984087) 
-.007726* 
(.0319725) 
.0614196 
(.0658209) 
2.456419 
(1.498544) 
INDUS3   .6616491* 
(.3540534) 
-.0048448 
(.0330159) 
-.025901* 
(.1069791) 
3.690527** 
(1.588423) 
INDUS4   -.2932566 
(.2831321) 
-.0205989 
(.0326055) 
.0062903 
(.1021276) 
-.4826192 
(2.377012) 
INDUS5   -.1061996 
(.2944239) 
-.0191805 
(.0343853) 
.0286379 
(.1403252) 
1.91579 
(1.791325) 
INDUS6   -.0497814 
(.6734428) 
-.0610168 
(.0504601) 
-.0317339 
(.0966175) 
1.376964 
(1.884347) 
INDUS7    -.0184758 
(.0316387) 
-.0136178 
(.0710458) 
3.143535** 
(1.471905) 
Regression 
summary 
statistics 
R2 
AR(1) 
AR (2) 
 
 
 
0.3273 
 
 
 
0.0041 
 
 
 
0.2120 
 
 
 
 
0.3361 
0.3129 
 
 
 
 
0.7234 
0.2751 
 
 
 
 
0.1078 
0.3294 
J-statistics 
Chi2(21) 
-.0006544 
(.0013256) 
-.0123468** 
(.0053347) 
.0509045 
(.0493075) 
7351.86 
38.97241*** 
1719.94 
35.39037*** 
1830.51 
40.38474*** 
This model provides standard errors which are in parentheses. a unbalanced panel. * significant at 10% level, 
** significant at 5% level, ***significant at 1% level 
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7.4 Dynamic panel GMM regression of agency costs variables and 
explanatory variables 
A DWH test (Table 7.5) is used as a diagnostic test for endogeneity of agency 
costs proxies and corporate governance variables.  Table 7.6 presents the results 
for the corporate governance and ASSETS (assets utilisation and DIVIDEND 
(dividend payout ratio).  Results show NONE, INSIDE, DIVERSITY, FEMALE, 
MINORITY, CEO and OWNER variables have significant endogenous effect in 
ASSETS or/and DIVIDEND agency costs proxies. 
Columns 2-3 of Table 7.6 present OLS Fixed effect results and columns 4-5 
present dynamic panel GMM results.   
H0: Regressors are exogeneous 
Table 16 Table 7.5 The DWH test for endogeneity of regressors 
 ASSETS DIVIDEND 
BOARD .211435 .001622 
NONE 7.42598*** 2.5232* 
INSDIE .00327 -.000138 
DIVERSITY .493372 1.81101* 
FEMALE .004317 2.43413* 
MINORITY 4.35842** 1.61681* 
CEO .029435 1.7034* 
OWNER 5.26092** .349376 
Positive coefficients between ASSETS and explanatory variables denote high 
assets utilisation by LPCs.  Hence, positive coefficients of ASSETS regression 
indicate a negative impact on PA agency costs proxy.  A positive coefficient of 
DIVIDEND regression indicates explanatory variables have a positive impact on 
PP agency cots proxy.    Regression summary statistics, i.e., auto-correlation order 
(1) and order (2), joint significance (J-statistcs) and over-identification restriction 
statistics (Chi) are reported separately at the end of each regression.  
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Table 17 Table 7.6 Panel data OLS regression/ Dynamic Panel GMM 
regression results for agency costs 
Variables (1) ASSETS-OLS 
(2) 
DIVIDEND-
OLS (3) 
ASSETS-GMM 
(4) 
DIVIDEND-
GMM (5) 
Number of obs= 
565a 
Number of 
groups=113 
L1 
   
 
 
1.034548*** 
(.0656997) 
 
 
 
.6721373*** 
(.0678646) 
Board size: 
BOARD 
 
.017524 
(.01311) 
 
-.0064952 
(.0109641) 
 
.0287677* 
(.0172652) 
 
.0004004 
(.0072941) 
Board 
composition: 
NONE 
 
-.0526267 
(.2782639) 
 
.3271881 
(.2327158) 
 
-.2359395 
(.315794) 
 
-.2272482*** 
(.0752629) 
INSIDE -33.59054 
(80.3473) 
2.833002 
(67.19551) 
26.00027 
(53.44376) 
-16.38039 
(44.31115) 
DIVERSITY -39.29078 
(24.59474) 
55.02452*** 
(20.56891) 
66.94676** 
(35.74063) 
-64.69949*** 
(16.52911) 
FEMALE -.1664773 
(.3534527) 
.2606248 
(.2955972) 
-.3956137 
(.4897412) 
.3825861** 
(.1840538) 
MINORITY -.0879322 
(.2397527) 
.005392 
(.2005084) 
.3558392 
(.2722931) 
.1347058** 
(.0626393) 
Leadership 
structure: 
CEO 
 
.034546 
(.0523288) 
 
.0209516 
(.0437633) 
.0634949 
(.0879488) 
.0535883** 
(.0212361) 
OWNER -.0795042 
(.0606427) 
-.078405 
(.0507163) 
.1208603** 
(.0676927) 
-.2141024*** 
(.0551242) 
Control Variables: 
LNSALES 
 
.3063921*** 
(.0305744) 
 
-.0190953 
(.0255698) 
 
.2480172*** 
(.0540272) 
 
-.0401031 
(.0266672) 
LNAGE .2020228 
(.1487015) 
.643929*** 
(.124361) 
-.179347 
(.2101701) 
-.0214882 
(.1236868) 
DEBT .0016184 
(.0014297) 
-.0033237*** 
(.0011957) 
.0063285*** 
(.0018135) 
-.0003667 
(.0008944) 
INDUS1   -.7140378 
(1.245997) 
-2.97193 
(4.51511) 
INDUS2   -.6553129* 
(.815192) 
.6097598** 
(.3145414) 
INDUS3   -.8517332 
(.8230184) 
.4321763 
(.4330995) 
INDUS4   .8082733 
(.6785891) 
.0756773 
(.2351522) 
 
INDUS5   -.4084027 
(1.038718) 
.3617427 
(.3922977) 
INDUS6   -.4912728 
(.8127645) 
1.169976 
(1.168671) 
INDUS7     
Regression 
summary statistics 
R2 
AR(1) 
AR (2) 
 
 
 
0.1120 
 
 
 
0.0336 
 
 
 
0.3085 
0.8772 
 
 
 
0.2323 
0.3255 
J-statistics 
Chi2 (21) 
  1480.98 
20.31856*** 
18.73737 
8321.05*** 
a
 unbalanced panel; * Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% 
level; This model provides standard errors which are in parentheses 
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Board size and LPCs’ agency costs 
The coefficient of BOARD (board size) variable is positively and statistically 
significant at 10% level for LPCs’ ASSETS proxy, which indicates large boards 
increase LPCs’ assets utilisation ratio.  Hence, large boards have fewer PA agency 
costs.  The one possible explanation for this is Sri Lanka’s environmental 
uncertainty, which leads to large boards, and apparently large boards have expert 
managers and more diversified human resources.  This leads to fewer agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders.  Nevertheless, this study finds no 
significant relationship between LPC board size and dividend pay-out ratio.   This 
indicates LPCs’ board size has no significant impact on LPCs’ PP agency 
conflicts.   
Non-executive directors and LPCs’ agency costs 
Consideration of the NONE variable in Table 7.6 reveals it is 1% negatively and 
significant with the DIVIDEND.  This indicates non-executive directors’ reduce 
LPCs’ PP agency conflict.  This finding is consistent with policy statements such 
as the Cadbury Report (1992), Higgs Report (2003), and the code of best practice 
on corporate governance in Sri Lanka (2008) has focused attention on non-
executive directors’ special contribution to board monitoring and independence. 
Nevertheless, this study couldn’t find any significant relationship between non-
executive directors on LPC boards and PA agency costs.  This finding is 
consistent with McKnight & Weir (2009) who find a non-significant relationship 
between non-executive directors and assets utilisation ratio in a UK context.   
Insider ownership percentage and LPCs’ agency costs 
Though the coefficient of INSIDE variable is positively related with LPCs’ assets 
utilisation ratio, it is insignificant.  Moreover, similar to PA agency costs, the 
  
203 
 
INSIDE variable is negatively related with dividend pay-out ratio and is also 
insignificant.  This finding indicates insider ownership has no impact on LPCs’ 
PA and PP agency costs.   
Board diversity and LPCs’ agency costs 
Consideration of the DIVERSITY variable in Table 7.6 reveals it is 5% positively 
significant with assets utilisation ratio.   This indicates that highly diversified 
boards have a higher assets utilisation ratio.  Mace (1971) explains an agency 
rationale for diversity is that board diversity may increase board independence, 
which leads to reduction of potential conflicts between managers and shareholders.  
Further, this study finds the coefficient of DIVERSITY variable is negatively and 
statistically significant at 1% level for LPCs’ DIVIDEND ratio, indicating board 
diversity reduces LPCs’ PP agency conflicts.  This finding is consistent with the 
argument that board diversity enhances the monitoring function of directors for 
the benefit of shareholders.  These PA and PP findings are consistent with 
behavioural theory of the firm.  Based on behavioural theory, diversified boards 
provide more comprehensive information and have quick decision making (Cyert 
& March, 1963).  
Female board members and LPCs’ agency costs 
The coefficient of FEMALE variable is positively and statistically significant at 5% 
level for DIVIDEND, which indicates female board directors increase LPCs’ PP 
agency conflicts. This is consistent with Jurkus et al. (2008) who explain that 
increasing the number of women on a board does not reduce agency costs in all 
markets.  In a highly competitive and uncertain environment like Sri Lanka 
shareholder conflicts may increase when boards have a high proportion of female 
directors. Nevertheless, this study finds female board directors have no significant 
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impact on LPCs’ PA agency costs, measuring assets utilisation ratio as proxy.  
This is consistent with Mohan & Chen (2004) and Wolfers (2006) who find 
female board directors have no effect on board and agency costs.   
Ethnic minority board members and LPCs’ agency costs 
The coefficient of MINORITY variable is positively and statistically significant at 
5% level for LPCs’ DIVIDEND; the agency costs proxy indicates ethnic minority 
board directors increase LPCs’ PP agency conflicts.  This is consistent with 
Adams & Ferreira (2008) who report that boards of directors need to be more 
homogeneous when firms operate in riskier environments.  This finding also 
indicates minority board directors have no significant effect on LPCs’ PA agency 
costs.    
CEO duality and LPCs’ agency costs 
Consideration of the CEO variable in Table 7.6 reveals it is positively related with 
DIVIDEND at the 5% significance level, indicating unitary leadership increases 
PP agency conflicts in Sri Lankan LPCs.  This is in line with Fama & Jensen 
(1983) who argue that CEO duality increases agency costs because duality 
leadership decreases board monitoring.   The finding is consistent with the 
Cadbury committee report (1992) that CEO duality gives too much decision-
making power and control to one person, hence, increased CEO entrenchment. 
Notwithstanding, this study finds CEO duality has no impact on LPCs’ PA agency 
proxy.   
Institute ownership and LPCs’ agency costs 
The results for LPCs’ and MNC subsidiaries’ PA and PP agency costs are the 
same, with a 5% significant positive relationship between institutional ownership 
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and assets utilisation agency proxy and 1% significant negative relationship 
between institutional ownership and dividend payout ratio. This indicates 
institutional ownership decreases LPCs’ PA and PP agency conflicts.  This 
finding is in line with the efficient monitoring hypothesis introduced by Shleifer 
& Vishny (1997).  Further this is confirmed by Aggarwal et al. (2009) who 
explain firms located in weak legal regimes have benefit more from institutional 
ownership than firms located in strong legal regimes.  
Company size and LPCs’ agency costs 
The coefficient of LNSALES variable is positively and statistically significant at 1% 
level for LPCs’ ASSETS and indicates large companies have a high assets 
utilisation ratio.  Hence, company size has a negative effect on LPCs’ PA agency 
conflicts.  This may be because the size of the firm has a positive effect on the 
quality of corporate governance as larger firms have comprehensive resources to 
adopt quality governance systems (Guillen, 2000a).  Therefore, larger firms suffer 
fewer agency conflicts.   Furthermore, Jurkus et al. (2008) use fortune 500 firms 
and find that firm size is negatively correlated with the agency costs of the firm.  
Notwithstanding, this study finds firm size (LNSALES) has no impact on LPCs’ 
PP agency costs.   
Company age and LPCs’ agency costs 
Though the coefficients of LNAGE are negatively related with both PA and PP 
agency costs proxies they are not significant.  This finding indicates LPC age has 
no significant impact on LPCs’ PA and PP agency costs, measured as assets 
utilisation ratio and divided pay-out ratio as proxies. This is consistent with Ang 
et al. (2000) who find a non-significant relationship between firm age and PA 
agency costs in a small firms’ context.   
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Leverage ratio and LPCs’ agency costs  
Consideration of the DEBT variable in Table 7.6 reveals it is positively related 
with ASSETS at the 1% significance level, indicating high leveraged LPCs have 
high assets utilisation ratio.  Hence, high leveraged LPCs have fewer PA agency 
conflicts. This finding is consistent with Ang et al. (2000).  This may be because 
in order to safeguard their loans, companies with high debt ratios find their 
investment decisions are closely and extensively monitored by their banks. 
(Anderson & Makhija, 1999).  Furthermore, this study could not find any 
significant relationship between LPCs’ debt level and their dividend-payout ratio 
agency costs proxy, indicating LPCs’ leverage ratio has no impact on their PP 
agency costs.  
Industry and LPCs’ agency costs 
This study finds that industry factors play an important role in agency perspective, 
with some industries being more prone to PA and PP agency costs than others.  
This is similar to the observations of Chrisman et al. (2004) and Hewa-Wellalage 
& Locke (2010a).  This study confirms INDUS2 has a significant positive effect 
on both PA and PP agency costs.   
7.6 Panel Tobit regression of agency costs variable and 
explanatory variables 
The Tobit model is also known as a censored model. This study constructs QFCF 
as a proxy for agency costs.  First, this study measured free cash flow following 
Doukas et al. (2000) and McKnight & Weir (2009).  Poor growth opportunities 
were then constructed by multiplying free cash flows with a growth dummy of 1, 
when the firm’s Tobin’s Q is less than one, otherwise 0. The positive coefficients 
of variables indicate a positive effect on agency costs and variables, and negative 
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coefficients indicate a negative effect on agency costs and variables.  This leads to 
the conclusion, that poorly governanced LPCs have higher free cash flows and 
high agency costs.   Table 7.7 reveals the relationship between QFCF agency costs’ 
dependent and explanatory variables.  
Board size and LPCs’ agency costs  
This study finds a non-significant relationship between LPC board size and Q-
dummy free cash flow agency proxy.   This indicates board size has no impact on 
LPCs’ PA agency costs.   
Non-executive directors and LPCs’ agency costs  
The coefficient of NONE variable is negatively and statistically significant at 1% 
level for Q-dummy free cash flow and indicates non-executive directors on LPC 
boards have a negative impact on LPCs’ PA agency costs.  This may be because 
companies with a high proportion of non-executive directors are more effective in 
monitoring management and reducing managerial discretion. However, using 
panel data Tobit regression, McKnight & Weir (2009) could not find any 
significant relationship between Q-dummy free cash flow and non-executive 
directors on boards in UK context.    
Inside ownership and LPCs’ agency costs  
INSIDE is positively and statistically significant at 1% level for Q-dummy free 
cash flow, indicating insider ownership on LPC boards has a positive impact on 
LPC agency costs.  This is consistent with entrenchment theory and suggests that 
higher levels of insider ownership increase the likelihood of expropriation of 
business profit for personal use (McConnell & Servaes, 1990).   
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Board diversity and LPCs’ agency costs  
Though the DIVERSITY variable is positively related with LPCs’ Q-dummy free 
cash flow agency costs, the DIVERSITY variable is not significant.  This 
indicates board diversity has no impact on LPCs’ agency costs.   
Female board directors and LPCs’ agency costs  
Though the FEMALE variable is negatively related with LPCs’ Q-dummy free 
cash flow agency costs proxy, the FEMALE variable is not significant.  This 
indicates female directors on LPC boards have no impact on LPC agency costs.  
After controlling for the endogeneity effect of female board directors in firm 
agency costs, Jurkus et al. (2008) find there is no significant relationship between 
female officers’ presence on a board and company agency costs using Q-dummy 
free cash flow as agency costs proxy.   
Ethnic minority board directors and LPCs’ agency costs  
Similar to diversity and female board member findings, this study finds a non-
significant relationship between the MINORITY variable and Q-dummy free cash 
flow agency proxy.   
CEO duality and LPCs’ agency costs  
Though coefficient of CEO is negatively related with LPCs’ Q-dummy free cash 
flow agency costs, CEO is not significant.  This indicates CEO duality has no 
impact on LPCs’ agency costs.   This finding is consistent with McKnight & Weir 
(2009) who find an insignificant relationship between CEO duality and Q-dummy 
free cash flow agency costs in a UK context.   
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Institutional ownership and the LPCs’ agency costs  
Though the coefficient of OWNER is negatively related with Q-dummy free cash 
flow, the OWNER variable is not significant.  This indicates ownership type has 
no impact on LPCs’ agency costs as measured by Q-dummy free cash flow.   
Conversely, McKnight & Weir (2009) find a significant positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and agency costs.    
Company size and LPCs’ agency costs  
LNSALES is negatively and statistically significant at 5% level for Q-dummy free 
cash flow and indicates large firms have less PA agency conflict than their smaller 
counterparts.  This may be due to higher rates of adoption of recommended 
governance structure by large companies.  This finding is consistent with Singh & 
Davidson (2003) who find a negative relationship between firm size and agency 
costs.  Moreover, Jurkus et al. (2008) also find a similar negative relationship 
between firm size and agency costs using Q-dummy free cash flow as agency 
costs proxy.    
Company age and LPCs’ agency costs  
Coefficient of LNAGE is negatively related with LPCs’ agency costs, measured 
as Q-dummy free cash flow.  However, the coefficient is not significant.  This 
indicates LPCs’ age has no impact on LPCs’ agency costs.   
Leverage ratio and LPCs’ agency costs  
Table 7.7 reveals the coefficient of DEBT variable is negatively and 5% 
significantly related to LPCs’ agency costs, measured as Q-dummy free cash flow.  
This finding is consistent with Ang et al. (2000) who explain debt increases 
external monitoring of a company.  Therefore, in high leveraged firms, managerial 
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expropriation and asymmetry information problems are less.  This debt 
monitoring advantage reduces PA agency conflicts.  However, McKnight & Weir 
(2009) find a non-significant relationship between company debt and agency costs, 
measured as Q-dummy free cash flow for agency proxy.    
Industry and LPCs’ agency costs  
Table 7.7 indicates industry factors have a significant impact on LPCs’ agency 
costs determinant, measured as Q-dummy free cash flow.  It may be concluded 
that industry factors play an important role in LPCs’ PA and PP agency conflicts.  
Table 18 Table 7.7 Panel-data Tobit regression of corporate governance 
variables and agency cost 
 Cof. Std.Err 
Number of obs= 565a 
Number of groups=113 
 
  
Board size: 
BOARD 
 
-.549013 
 
344568 
Board composition: 
NONE 
 
-.295328*** 
 
822963 
INSIDE .2.50069*** 780068 
DIVERSITY .295067 .336075 
FEMALE -.391345 .394017 
MINORITY -.552759 .765852 
Leadership structure: 
CEO 
 
-.8420202 
 
-.842020 
OWNER -.513843 .995179 
Control Variables: 
LNSALES 
 
-.128683** 
 
.577970 
LNAGE -.560314 .116555 
DEBT -.638954*** .192577 
INDUS1 .236242 .1521797 
INDUS2 -.815804*** .266329 
INDUS3 -.131098*** .237989 
INDUS4 -.1334507*** .254683 
INDUS5   
INDUS6 -.6.57072*** .7728176 
INDUS7 -.1474315*** .202786.9 
Regression summary statistics 
Log likelihood 
Chi2 (21)  
 
-1237.7091 
106.23*** 
 
a
 unbalanced panel; * Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% 
level; This model provides standard errors which are in parentheses. 
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7.8 Specification tests results 
Serial correlation test- Serial correlation in panel data models biases the standard 
errors and leads to less efficient results. Therefore, this study reports serial 
correlation in order 1 AR (1) and serial correlation in order 2 AR (2) which 
require identifying serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term in the panel-
data model.  Table 7.4 reports first order and second order serial correlation for all 
three financial performance proxies used in this study.   Table 7.4 column 5 
reports AR (1) and AR (2) for TOBIN’S Q as 0.3361 and 0.3129.  Both order (1) 
and order (2) p values are greater than 0.05. I.e. (p=0.3361>0.05 and p= 
0.3129>0.05).  Therefore, this study rejects first order and second order serial 
correlation of TOBIN’S Q regression.  Table 7.4 column 6 reports AR (1) as 
0.7234 and AR (2) as 0.2751.  There is no serial correlation existing in ROA 
regression for both order (1) and order (2) because 0.7234 is greater than 0.05 and 
0.2751 is greater than 0.05.  A third financial performance proxy (ROE) 
regression result is reported in Table 7.4 column 7.   It shows AR (1) as 0.1078 
and AR (2) as 0.3294.  These regression AR (1) and AR (2) values are greater 
than 0.05(i.e p=0.1078>0.05 and p=0.3294>0.05).  Therefore, serial correlation 
does not exist in ROE regression.  Hence, there is no serial correlation in the 
original error of all three financial performance proxies     as desired.  
Table 7.6 column 4 shows regression results for ASSETS proxy and column 5 
shows regression results for DIVIDEND proxy.   The null hypothesis that 
   (            ) =   for k=1, 2 is rejected at a level of 0.05 if p>0.05, because 
the AR (1) and AR (2) values for ASSETS regression are reported as 0.3085 and 
0.8772 respectively.  Moreover, AR (1) for DIVIDEND is reported in Table 7.6 as 
0.2323, which is greater than 0.05 and AR (2) reported as 0.3255.  This value is 
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also greater than 0.05.   These results indicate serial correlation does not exist in 
agency costs proxies in order 1 and order 2.  Therefore in conclusion, LPCs’ 
financial performance regression results and LPC agency costs regression results 
show there is no evidence of order 1 and order 2 serial correlations between 
dependent variables and explanatory variables.  
Test for over-identification restrictions- In a GMM dynamic panel context, a 
Hansen-Sargan J-statistic test is used to identify over-identifying restrictions in 
financial proxies and agency costs proxies regressions.  Table 7.4 indicates J 
statistic for TOBIN’S Q regression as 7351.86, J statistic for ROA is 1719.94 and 
J statistic for ROE as 1830.51.  However, the J-statistic value is not significant at 
5% level.  This indicates the instruments are valid.  Table 7.6 reports dynamic 
panel GMM PA and PP agency costs regression J-statistics.  Table 7.6 column 4 
reports ASSETS and explanatory variable J-statistic value as 1480.98 and column 
5 reports DIVIDEND and explanatory variable J-statistic value as 18.73737.   
Nevertheless, these J-statistics values are not significant at 5% level indicating 
agency proxy regressions instruments are valid.  
Test for joint significance- A test for joint significance is used to test 
significance of subsets of regression coefficients in the regression model.  Table 
7.4 reports joint significance for explanatory variables and financial performance 
proxies.  Table 7.6, column 4 reports joint significance value is 38.97241 for 
TOBIN’S Q regression.  This is significant at 1% significance level indicating 
groups of all explanatory variables’ parameters associated with these variables are 
not zero, so that all independent variables can be included in model.  Column 5 
reports the joint significance value is 35.39037 for ROA regression and in column 
4 the joint significance value is 40.38474 for LNROE regression.  Moreover two 
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other financial performance proxies have joint significant values significant at the 
1% significance level, indicating that group of explanatory variables associated 
with these independent variables are not zero. Accordingly, all independent 
variables can be included in the model. 
Table 7.6 reports agency costs and explanatory variable regressions Chi test 
results.  In Table 7.6, column 4 the joint significance value for ASSETS 
regression is 20.31856 and it is denoted 1% significant.  Furthermore, Table 7.6 
column 5 reports joint significant value as 8321.05 for DIVIDEND regression.  
This value is also significant at 1% significance level for DIVIDEND proxy.  For 
both regressions, the Chi test is significant at 1% level, leading to the conclusion 
that the parameters associated with these variables are not zero.  Hence, all 
selected explanatory variables can be included in agency costs models.   Table 7.7 
reports Q-dummy free cash flow agency costs proxy, Tobit regression Chi test 
value.  Table 7.7, column 2 reports the joint significance value is 106.23.  This 
regression Chi test is significant at 1% level, and leads to the conclusion that the 
parameters associated with these variables are not zero.  Consequently, the group 
of all explanatory variables can be included in the panel Tobit regression model. 
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Table 19 Table 7.8 Summary of findings 
Variable  Issue 1   Interpretation 
Board Size 
(BOARD) 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in 
firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in 
firm ROA 
Positively effect in 
firm ROE 
Non 
significant 
Board size has non-
significant effect on 
LPCs financial 
performance. 
 
Non-executive 
directors (NONE) 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in 
firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in 
firm ROA 
Positively effect in 
firm ROE 
Confirm 
Non 
significant 
Non 
significant 
 
Non-executive directors 
increase  LPCs financial 
performance 
Insider ownership 
(INSIDE) 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in 
firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in 
firm ROA 
Positively effect in 
firm ROE 
Non 
significant 
Confirm 
Non 
significant 
High insider ownership 
increase LPCs financial 
performance 
Board diversity 
(DIVERSITY) 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in 
firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in 
firm ROA 
Positively effect in 
firm ROE 
Reject 
Confirm 
Confirm 
Board diversity decrease 
LPCs market based 
financial performance.  
Board diversity increase 
LPCs accounting based 
financial performance 
and shareholders’ value.  
Female board 
directors 
(FEMALE) 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in 
firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in 
firm ROA 
Positively effect in 
firm ROE 
Confirm 
Reject 
Reject 
 
Female directors’ 
increase LPCs market 
based financial 
performance.  
Female directors’ 
decrease LPCs 
accounting based 
financial performance 
and shareholders’ value.  
Minority board 
directors 
(MINORITY) 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in 
firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in 
firm ROA 
Positively effect in 
firm ROE 
Non 
significant 
Non 
significant 
Confirm 
Minority board directors 
increase LPCs financial 
performance 
CEO duality 
(CEO) 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in 
firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in 
firm ROA 
Positively effect in 
firm ROE 
Reject 
Non 
significant 
Non 
significant 
 
CEO duality decrease 
LPCs financial 
performance. 
Ownership type 
(OWNER) 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in 
firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in 
firm ROA 
Positively effect in 
firm ROE 
Reject 
Non 
significant 
Non 
significant 
 
Institutional ownership 
decrease LPCs financial 
performance 
Firms size 
(LNSALES) 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in 
firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in 
firm ROA 
Positively effect in 
firm ROE 
Non 
significant 
Non 
significant 
Confirm 
Large LPCs increase 
their financial 
performance. 
Firm age (AGE) Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in 
firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in 
firm ROA 
Reject 
Non 
significant 
Reject 
Mature LPCs decrease 
their market base 
financial performance 
and shareholders wealth. 
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Positively effect in 
firm ROE 
Firm leverage 
(DEBT) 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Positively effect in 
firm Tobin’s Q 
Positively effect in 
firm ROA 
Positively effect in 
firm ROE 
Reject 
Non 
significant 
Non 
significant 
Highly levered LPCs 
decrease their financial 
performance. 
Firm operating 
industry 
(INDUSTRY) 
Positively effect 
in firm financial 
performance 
Significantly effect in 
firm financial 
performance metrics 
Confirm LPCs operating industry 
has significant impact on 
their financial 
performance. 
Variable Issue   Interpretation 
Board Size 
(BOARD) 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in 
firm assets utilisation 
ratio 
Positively effect in 
firm Q dummy free 
cash flow 
confirm 
 
Non 
significant 
Large boards’ decrease 
LPCs PA agency 
conflicts.   
Non-executive 
directors (NONE) 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in 
firm assets utilisation 
ratio 
 
Positively effect in 
firm Q dummy free 
cash flow 
Non 
significant 
 
Reject 
Non-executive directors 
decrease LPCs PA 
agency costs 
Insider ownership 
(INSIDE) 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in 
firm assets utilisation 
ratio 
Positively effect in 
firm Q dummy free 
cash flow  
Non 
significant 
 
confirm 
 
High insider ownership 
increase LPCs PA 
agency costs 
Board diversity 
(DIVERSITY) 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in 
firm assets utilisation 
ratio 
Positively effect in 
firm Q dummy free 
cash flow  
Confirm 
 
Non 
significant 
Board diversity decrease 
LPCs PA agency costs. 
Female board 
directors 
(FEMALE) 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in 
firm assets utilisation 
ratio 
Positively effect in 
firm Q dummy free 
cash flow  
Non 
significant 
 
Non 
significant 
Female directors have no 
significant impact on 
LPCs PA agency 
conflicts. 
Minority board 
directors 
(MINORITY) 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in 
firm assets utilisation 
ratio 
Positively effect in 
firm Q dummy free 
cash flow  
Non 
significant 
 
Non 
significant 
Minority directors have 
no significant impact on 
LPCs PA agency 
conflicts 
CEO duality 
(CEO) 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in 
firm assets utilisation 
ratio 
Positively effect in 
firm Q dummy free 
cash flow  
Non 
significant 
 
Non 
significant 
CEO duality has no 
significant impact on 
LPCs PA agency 
conflicts  
Ownership type 
(OWNER) 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in 
firm assets utilisation 
ratio 
Positively effect in 
firm Q dummy free 
cash flow  
Confirm 
 
Non 
significant 
Institutional ownership 
increase MNCs PA 
agency costs. 
Firms size 
(LNSALES) 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in 
firm assets utilisation 
ratio 
Positively effect in 
Confirm 
 
Reject 
 
Large LPCs  decrease 
their PA agency costs 
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firm Q dummy free 
cash flow  
Firm age (AGE) Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in 
firm assets utilisation 
ratio 
Positively effect in 
firm Q dummy free 
cash flow  
Not 
significant 
 
Not 
significant 
 
LPCs age has no 
significant impact on 
LPCs PA agency 
conflicts 
Firm leverage 
(DEBT) 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Positively effect in 
firm assets utilisation 
ratio 
Positively effect in 
firm Q dummy free 
cash flow  
Confirm 
 
Reject 
Highly levered LPCs 
decrease PA agency 
conflicts. 
Firm operating 
industry 
(INDUSTRY) 
Positively effect 
in firm PA 
agency conflict 
Significantly effect in 
firm PA agency 
conflicts 
Confirm LPCs operating industry 
has significant impact on 
their PA agency 
conflicts. 
Variable Issue 3   Interpretation 
Board Size 
(BOARD) 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in 
firm Dividend pay-out 
ratio 
Non 
significant 
LPC board size has no 
significant impact on 
their PP agency conflicts.   
Non-executive 
directors (NONE) 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in 
firm Dividend pay-out 
ratio 
Reject Non-executive directors 
decrease MNCs PP 
agency costs 
Insider ownership 
(INSIDE) 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in 
firm Dividend pay-out 
ratio 
Non 
significant 
 
Insider ownership has no 
significant impact on 
their PP agency conflicts.   
Board diversity 
(DIVERSITY) 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in 
firm Dividend pay-out 
ratio 
Reject Board diversity decrease 
LPCs PP agency costs. 
Female board 
directors 
(FEMALE) 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in 
firm Dividend pay-out 
ratio 
Confirm Female directors increase 
LPCs PP agency 
conflicts. 
Minority board 
directors 
(MINORITY) 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in 
firm Dividend pay-out 
ratio 
Confirm Minority board directors 
increase LPCs PP agency 
conflicts. 
CEO duality 
(CEO) 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in 
firm Dividend pay-out 
ratio 
Confirm CEO duality increase 
LPCs PP agency 
conflicts. 
Ownership type 
(OWNER) 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in 
firm Dividend pay-out 
ratio 
Reject Institutional ownership 
decrease LPCs PP 
agency costs. 
Firms size 
(LNSALES) 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in 
firm Dividend pay-out 
ratio 
Not 
significant 
LPC size has no 
significant impact on 
their PP agency costs. 
Firm age (AGE) Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in 
firm Dividend pay-out 
ratio 
Not 
significant 
LPC age has no 
significant impact on 
their PP agency costs. 
Firm leverage 
(DEBT) 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in 
firm Dividend pay-out 
ratio 
Not 
significant 
LPC leverage level has 
no significant impact on 
their PP agency costs. 
Firm operating 
industry 
(INDUSTRY) 
Positively effect 
in firm PP 
agency conflict  
Positively effect in 
firm Dividend pay-out 
ratio 
Confirm LPCs operating industry 
has significant impact on 
their PP agency conflicts. 
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7.9 Conclusion 
This chapter details the results of the research and analyses the information and 
statistical methods applied in the sample LPC data.  The relationship between 
corporate governance, control variables, financial performance and agency costs is 
discussed in detail.  There is also discussion about the test of endogeneity of 
corporate governance variables and instrumental variable models. In addition, the 
econometric test for autocorrelation, over-identification restrictions and joint 
significance are also presented.  
Overall, this study indicates that board size is insignificant for three financial 
performance proxies.  Nevertheless, results, indicates large boards reduce LPCs’ 
PA agency conflicts.  This study reveals PP agency costs have no significant 
impact on LPCs’ board size.   
Non-executive directors’ show a positive and significant relationship with LPCs’ 
Tobin’s Q, indicating non-executive directors increases LPCs’ financial 
performance.  Furthermore, results indicate a significant negative relationship 
between non-executive directors, PA and PP agency costs.   
The INSIDE coefficient shows a significant positive relationship with LPCs ROA. 
The study results reveals Q-dummy free cash flow agency costs proxy indicates 
LPCs’ insider owners increase LPCs’ PA agency costs. However, the DIVIDEND 
coefficient shows a non-significant relationship between LPCs insider ownership 
and LPCs dividend pay-out ratio.   
Board diversity has positive and negative effects on LPCs’ financial performance.  
The DIVERSITY variable is significantly negatively related to LPCs’ TOBIN’S 
Q variable and it is positively and statistically significantly related with LPCs’ 
  
218 
 
ROA and ROE.  Moreover, results reveals diversified LPC boards reduce LPCs’ 
PA and PP agency costs.   
Table 7.4 shows, female board directors are significantly positively related with 
LPCs TOBIN’S Q and significantly negatively related with LPCs’ ROA and 
ROE.  However, PA agency costs proxies indicate female board directors have no 
significant impact on LPCs’ PA agency costs.  Nevertheless, this study indicates 
female board directors increase LPCs’ PP agency costs.   
The coefficient of MINORITY and ROE has a significant positive relationship, 
indicating ethnic minority directors increase LPCs’ shareholder wealth.  However, 
ethnic minority directors and LPCs’ PA agency costs proxies have no significant 
relationship.  Further, PP agency costs proxy shows a significant positive 
relationship with LPCs’ ethnic minority directors. 
Next, CEO duality has a significant negative impact on LPCs’ TOBIN’S Q.  
However, study reports there are no significant relationship between CEO duality 
and PA proxies.  Also, PP agency costs proxy shows a significant positive 
relationship between CEO duality and LPCs’ PP agency costs.   
This study shows institutional ownership has a significant negative impact on 
LPCs’ TOBIN’S Q value.  Table 7.6 reports institutional ownership increases 
LPCs’ assets utilisation ratio.  Moreover, result shows LPCs’ institutional 
ownership has a significant negative impact on LPCs’ dividend pay-out ratio.  
This indicates institutional ownership leads to reduce a LPCs’ PA and PP agency 
costs.   
LNSALES have a significant positive effect on LPC shareholder value creation.  
Firm size variables reported in Table 7.6 has a significant impact on ASSETS 
ratio.  However, Table 7.6 shows LPCs’ size variable has no significant impact on 
LPCs’ PP agency costs proxy.  Though LPC age has no significant impact on 
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LPCs’ ROA, this result indicates LPC age has a negative impact on LPCs’ 
TOBIN’S Q and shareholders’ value creation.  However, the age of an LPC has 
no significant relationship with LPCs’ PA and PP agency costs proxies.  Study 
reports LPCs’ leverage ratio has a significant negative relationship with LPCs’ 
TOBIN’S Q.  Furthermore, PA agency costs proxy and the debt variable show a 
significant positive relationship.  This indicates high leveraged LPCs have fewer 
PA agency conflicts.  However, this study couldn’t find any significant 
relationship between LPCs’ leverage ratios and PP agency costs proxy.  A 
significant relationship between INDSUTRY variables and financial performance 
leads to rejection of hypothesis about there being no impact on LPCs’ operating 
industries and LPCs’ financial performance.   
Finally, a robustness check results for all regressions results are reported. First, 
serial correlation of order 1 and order 2 indicates there is no serial correlation of 
all models.  Second, Hansen-Sargan J statistic accepts over identification 
restriction which means instruments are valid.  Third, joint significance test 
results suggest significance of explanatory variables in all financial performance 
and agency costs proxies.    
The next chapter compares MNC subsidiaries and LPCs and tests hypotheses 15-
18.  
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Chapter 8 
Comparison of multinational subsidiaries and local public 
companies in Sri Lanka 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the comparison study of MNCs and LPCs’ 
financial performance and PA and PP agency costs.  Econometric tests results for 
hypotheses 15, 16, 17 and 18 are also reported.   This chapter is organised as 
follows.  Section 8.1 shows ANOVA test results and discussion for hypothesis 15 
and hypothesis 16.  Section 8.2 provides a difference-in-difference test to analyse 
hypothesis 17 and further discussion.  Section 8.3 provides quantile regression 
tests’ results and discussion related to hypothesis 18 in this study. Section 8.4 
provides comparative information of MNCs and LPCs’ financial performance and 
agency costs from chapters 6 and 7. Section 8.5 concludes the chapter. 
8.1 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA test) 
In general, the purpose of using an ANOVA test is to check the significant 
difference of sample mean values.  This is the initial step in identifying factors 
that are influencing a given data set.  This study uses two study samples; MNCs 
and LPCs.  Hence, the F test performed by ANOVA is equivalent to the t-test.  As 
a first step, the one-way ANOVA test is used to test hypothesis H15.  Nine 
corporate governance variables are used by MNCs and LPCs tests using one-way 
ANOVA tests.  Board size (BOARD), non-executive directors’ percentage 
(NONE), inside ownership percentage (INSIDE), board diversity (DIVERSITY), 
female board director percentage (FEMALE), ethnic minority director percentage 
(MINORITY), CEO duality (CEO), ownership type  (OWNER) and leverage ratio 
(DEBT) is tested in one-way ANOVA.   If F> Fcritical and p<α, then this study the 
null hypothesis is not accepted, suggesting the two groups’ means are differ.   
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Table 20 Table 8.1 ANOVA test results for corporate governance variables 
Variable F F critical P-value 
BOARD SIZE 14.9385424 3.851402 0.0001187 
NONE 0.12690095 3.851789 0.7217504 
INSIDE 29.5928605 3.851328 6.792E-08 
DIVERSITY 6559.84562 3.851133 0 
FEMALE 2051.17159 3.851174 1.96E-240 
MINORITY 610.760213 3.851204 1.16E-104 
CEO 27.3798391 3.850907 2.042E-07 
OWNER 52.0727044 3.850907 1.066E-12 
DEBT 0.14335981 3.853659 0.7050687 
 
H15: There is no mean difference in MNC subsidiaries’ corporate governance 
variables and LPCs’ corporate governance variables. 
Overall, results show that apart from non-executive directors and leverage ratio, 
other corporate governance variables have significant mean differences.  This 
results leads to acceptance of the H15 of this study about there being significant 
difference between the governance mechanisms of MNCs and the governance 
mechanisms of LPCs.  
ANOVA test for corporate governance compliance of MNCs and LPCs 
This study employs ANOVA tests to analyse the next hypotheses H16a. Before 
introducing the mandatory code of best practice on corporate governance in 2008, 
the CSE had a voluntary code of best practice on matters relating to financial 
aspects of corporate governance, introduced in 1997.  This voluntary code has 
undergone several changes and in early January 2007 the SEC introduced a new 
voluntary code of best practice.  Up until the start of the 2008 financial year, firm 
could follow the voluntary code.  The second phase started on 1 April 2008 and 
required listed firms to comply with the code. To analyse the mean differences of 
corporate governance compliance, this study used figures from the year before the 
introduction of the mandatory code – 2007, and the year after its introduction – 
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2009. This study excludes 2008 (the year the code was introduced) to reduce 
statistical errors because in 2008 some companies may have been in transition.   
H16a: There is significant difference in corporate governance compliance of MNCs 
in Sri Lanka before and after the code of best practice on corporate governance 
was introduced in 2008. 
ANOVA       
Source of 
Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 570469.073 19 30024.68805 298.434 0 1.592811 
Within Groups 166304.1113 1653 100.6074479    
       
Total 736773.1843 1672         
ANOVA test results show F value is greater than F critical value. Moreover, P 
value (0) is less than alpha (0.05).  Therefore, this result significantly accepts the 
hypothesis- H16a. 
The H16b hypothesis analysed corporate governance compliance differences in 
LPCs before and after code of best practice on corporate governance was 
introduced (2008). 
H16b: There are significant differences in corporate governance compliance of 
LPCs in Sri Lanka before and after the mandatory code of best practice on 
corporate governance was introduced in 2008. 
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 189485.2 17 11146.19 135.1358 0 1.628098 
Within Groups 158199.3 1918 82.4814    
       
Total 347684.5 1935         
ANOVA test results show F value is greater than F critical value. Moreover, P 
value (0) is less than alpha (0.05).  Therefore, this result significantly accepts the 
hypothesis – H16b. 
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8.2 Difference-in-difference method (DID) 
The first step of DID method is to compute performance proxies for MNCs and 
LPCs using data for before and after the promulgation of the voluntary code of 
best practice in 2007.  Due to data constraints, this study constructs the 
performance measures for one year before and one year after the voluntary code 
date.   There are two dimensions for comparison. The first comparison is to 
compare the difference across two groups i.e. compliance and non-compliance 
groups (difference across category).  The second is to compare the difference 
before and after the compliance of code (difference across time).  The effect of the 
time period after the corporate governance best practice voluntary code became 
effective is captured by the dummy variable TIME.  To capture the effect of the 
corporate governance voluntary code the dummy variable TREAT is used.   TT is 
calculated by multiplying TIME by TREAT.  
Table 8.2 shows DID regression results of MNCs’ and LPCs’ financial 
performance proxies.  The coefficient of TT variable is positively and statistically 
significant at 10% level of MNCs’ TOBIN’S Q variable, and statistically 
significant at 5% level for MNCs’ ROA variable.  This indicates that complying 
with the voluntary code of best practice on corporate governance (2007) increases 
MNCs’ accounting-based financial performance.  This finding is consistent with 
the corporate governance survey in Sri Lanka (2007), which found a positive 
impact from applying best practice on businesses’ financial performance in Sri 
Lankan listed companies.  Hence, this study accept hypothesis H17a1.  Table 8.2 
shows the coefficient of TT variable positively and statistically significant at 1% 
level of LPCs’ ROA variable, indicating that complying with the Sri Lankan code 
of best practice on corporate governance voluntary code (2007) has a positive 
effect in LPCs accounting-based financial performance (ROA).  Hence, this 
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finding leads to acceptance of the hypothesis H17b1.  Table 8.3 shows DID 
regression results of MNCs’ and LPCs’ PA and PP agency proxies.  The 
coefficient of TT variable is positively and statistically significant at 1% level of 
MNCs’ ASSETS variable.  Hence, complying with the best practice code reduces 
MNCs’ PA agency conflict.  Moreover, MNCs’ TT variable is negatively and 
statistically significant at 5% level for MNCs’ DIVIDEND variable. This 
indicates that complying with the voluntary code of best practice (2007) decreases 
MNCs’ PP agency conflict.  This is consistent with the concept that the 
governance structure of a firm involves mechanisms to minimise agency conflicts 
between shareholders and managers and minority and majority shareholders.  
Further, this finding is in line with Dey (2008) who finds that the existence and 
level of corporate governance mechanisms in a firm determines the level of 
agency conflicts in the firm.   Therefore, this study accepts hypothesis H17a2  and 
H17a3.  Next, though the coefficient of TT variable is positively related with LPCs’ 
ASSETS variable, it is insignificant.  This indicates that the voluntary code of best 
practice on corporate governance (2007) has no significant impact on LPCs’ PA 
agency conflicts.  Hence, this study rejects hypothesis H17b2.  However, Table 8.3 
shows, the coefficient of TT variable negatively and statistically significant at 1% 
level of LPCs’ DIVIDEND variable and indicates that complying Sri Lankan code 
of best practice on corporate governance voluntary code (2007) decreases LPCs’ 
PP agency conflicts.  This is in line with John & Knyazeva (2006) who find that 
firms with weak corporate governance have high dividend pay-out policies.  This 
finding leads to acceptance of hypothesis H17b3. In summary, these regression 
results show that complying with the voluntary code of best practice has a more 
significant positive effect on MNCs than for LPCs. One possible explanation for 
that is there may be more MNCs applying the voluntary code. Therefore, 
  
225 
 
complying with the voluntary corporate governance code may show a more 
significant positive effect for MNCs than for LPCs. Another, possible explanation 
for that is that MNCs’ structure and operations is complex. Therefore, applying 
the voluntary code of best practice in corporate governance (2007) reduced 
conflicts between managers of MNCs and shareholders.  
Table 21 Table 8.2 DID regression of financial performance, MNCs and 
LPCs 
Variables MNCs 
TOBIN’S Q 
MNCs 
ROA 
MNCs 
ROE 
LPCs 
TOBIN’S Q 
LPCs 
ROA 
LPCs 
ROE 
Number of 
obs 
279 279 279 347 347 347 
TT .0400389* 
(.0438055) 
.0137428** 
(.0199062) 
16.21619 
(11.92801) 
4.72e-07 
(1.05e-06) 
.0947684*** 
(.0244308) 
-13.55267 
(11.95168) 
TREAT -.0578692 
(.0336099) 
-.0009952 
(.0152731) 
-.2820106 
(9.114212) 
-9.79e-07 
(1.42e-07) 
-.0805437** 
(.0330091) 
-21.27617 
(16.10346) 
TIME -.0425921 
(.0409565) 
-.0060852 
(.0186116) 
-18.03925 
(11.13188) 
-5.10e-07 
(9.70e-07) 
.0942208*** 
(.0225135) 
18.47777* 
(10.99272) 
BOARD SIZE .0031038 
(.0034055) 
.0002566 
(.0015475) 
1.607657** 
(.9491798) 
7.36e-08 
(9.60e-08) 
-.0004836 
(.002228) 
.9556853 
(1.105908) 
NONE -1.796798*** 
(.1922957) 
.0045403 
(.0873837) 
-12.37298** 
(5.26048) 
-5.90e-06 
(4.16e-06) 
-.0146881 
(.1070203) 
2.749651 
(52.95392) 
INSIDE .2580375*** 
(.0427466) 
.0473683** 
(.019425) 
-3.913271 
(12.23829) 
1.00001*** 
(.0012929) 
5.633396 
(30.01392) 
-19.99352 
(14.63791) 
DIVERSITY 7.520484*** 
(.9953438) 
.1188802 
(.4523075) 
8.411149*** 
(2.742508) 
9.13e-09 
(6.26e-09) 
-.0005325*** 
(.0001452) 
-.1810397** 
(.0734043) 
FEMALE -13.7504*** 
(1.668458) 
.0759625 
(.7581863) 
-12.94982*** 
(4.560802) 
-.4700764 
(.3488928) 
-3.91703 
(8.09908) 
12.80807 
(3.996523) 
MINORITY 1.61474*** 
(.1517967) 
.035102 
(.06898) 
9.442189** 
(4.178366) 
4.73e-06 
(4.04e-06) 
.0224237 
(.0938456) 
-3.013832 
(4.421033) 
CEO .0156859 
(.0282142) 
-.0160423 
(.0128212) 
6.264728 
(7.832297) 
-7.88e-08 
(6.85e-07) 
-.0078952 
(.015896) 
7.999873 
(7.835813) 
OWNER .0366676 
(.0270541) 
.0127518 
(.012294) 
3.386521 
(7.358217) 
-4.43e-07 
(1.57e-06) 
.0535884 
(.0363651) 
19.78603 
(17.73312) 
LNSALES -.0212819*** 
(.0062448) 
.0025596 
(.0028378) 
-1.127819 
(1.897334) 
-2.56e-07 
(1.74e-07) 
.0099804* 
(.0040436) 
7.253281*** 
(2.297853) 
LNAGE .0047988 
(.0105726) 
-.0051906 
(.0048044) 
-7.930493*** 
(2.889583) 
1.29e-07 
(2.95e-07) 
-.0102842 
(.006853) 
1.960385 
(3.417924) 
DEBT .0000191 
(.0005318) 
.0004985** 
(.0002417) 
.193079 
(.1534386) 
3.80e-08 
(1.10e-07) 
-.0034133 
(.0025474) 
-1.600974 
(1.265131) 
INDUS1 -.0164634 
(.0272394) 
-.0142206 
(.0123782) 
-2.920945 
(7.429365) 
2.40e-06 
(1.72e-06) 
-.0415863 
(.039894) 
-8.622358 
(19.48137) 
INDUS2 .0776499 
(.0532545) 
-.0253105 
(.0242001) 
20.37456 
(14.54402) 
4.79e-07 
(5.00e-07) 
.0600508*** 
(.0115965) 
-.0936992 
(5.715506) 
INDUS3 -.0671623*** 
(.0236052) 
.0549386*** 
(.0107268) 
-3.575421 
(6.423244) 
-4.20e-08 
(6.25e-07) 
.0274813** 
(.0145145) 
10.42897 
(7.416946) 
INDUS4 -.0367647** 
(.0151855) 
-.0141642** 
(.0069007) 
-7.366742** 
(4.198814) 
-4.29e-07 
(4.72e-07) 
-.0277689** 
(.0109557) 
-10.12832* 
(5.705776) 
INDUS5 -.0322568 
(.0197386) 
.0519223*** 
(.0089697) 
9.289719 
(5.875705) 
1.03e-6** 
(4.92e-07) 
.0169189 
(.0114153) 
-7.448055 
(5.797301) 
INDUS6 -.0983391** 
(.0534641) 
-.0208408 
(.0242953) 
.8271932 
(14.57417) 
-7.11e-07 
(1.04e-06) 
.0104842 
(.0240802) 
-5.137895 
(11.81559) 
INDUS7       
R2 0.6509 0.3677 0.2672 1.0000 0.3124 0.1311 
a
 unbalanced panel; 
*
 significant at 10% level; 
**
 significant at 5% level;
***
 significant at 1% level; 
This model provides standard errors which are in parentheses.  
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Table 22 Table 8.3 DID regression of agency costs, MNCs and LPCs 
Variables MNCs 
ASSETS 
MNCs 
DIVIDEND 
LPCs 
ASSETS 
LPCs 
DIVIDEND 
Number of obsa 279 279 348 347 
TT .4265082*** 
(.1572468) 
-.4064758** 
(.2378155) 
23.40337 
(28.85074) 
-.2061639*** 
(.0741145) 
TREAT -.0121694 
(.1206483) 
.2861132 
(.182465) 
14.93502 
(38.51458) 
-.4634243*** 
(.1001382) 
TIME -.3419199*** 
(.1470201) 
-.5692335** 
(.2223489) 
-26.41056 
(26.47346) 
-.1798103*** 
(.0682981) 
BOARD SIZE -.0159518 
(.0122245) 
-.0002563 
(.018488) 
-4.123603 
(2.825089) 
-.0029577 
(.0067589) 
NONE -.6897945 
(.6902765) 
-3.596447*** 
(1.043954) 
7.212115 
(12.46219) 
.5704618** 
(.3246623) 
INSIDE .0961943 
(.1534457) 
-.9859782*** 
(.2320669) 
4.96454 
(21.39381) 
-47.74044 
(91.05177) 
DIVERSITY 6.935486 
(5.989198) 
8.500694 
(9.057889) 
.0170264 
(.1712817) 
.00004529 
(.0004405) 
FEMALE -5.541261 
(3.572947) 
-4.941115 
(5.403621) 
24.41395 
(21.38683) 
-2.373066 
(2.456978) 
MINORITY .3333106 
(.5448987) 
3.362575*** 
(.824089) 
14.42032** 
(7.33577) 
-.39038 
(.2846949) 
CEO -.0623462 
(.1012795) 
-.0329391 
(.1531722) 
-21.24594 
(18.90753) 
-.0420668 
(.0482228) 
OWNER .1374126 
(.097115) 
.0845473 
(.146874) 
-18.2618 
(42.68486) 
.1186711 
(.110319) 
LNSALES .4987631*** 
(.0224168) 
-.1991938*** 
(.0339026) 
45.96449*** 
(4.573909) 
-.0323724*** 
(.012267) 
LNAGE .0423555 
(.037952) 
.0256474 
(.0573975) 
-24.28568*** 
(8.522702) 
-.0750958*** 
(.0207895) 
DEBT -.0016421 
(.0019091) 
.0003617 
(.0028872) 
-3.400018 
(2.975014) 
-.0446165*** 
(.0077279) 
INDUS1 .3037934*** 
(.0977803) 
-.0836283 
(.14788) 
-48.45819 
(46.64791) 
.017667 
(.1210245) 
INDUS2 1.452482*** 
(.1911657) 
.2971129 
(.2891134) 
7.85027 
(13.82713) 
.109351*** 
(.0351796) 
INDUS3 .5165126*** 
(.0847346) 
-.3286951** 
(.1281502) 
68.54867*** 
(16.99164 ) 
-.0030568 
(.0440318) 
INDUS4 -.0086114 
(.054511) 
-.187243** 
(.0824408) 
52.74075*** 
(13.06793) 
.0136813 
(.0332357) 
INDUS5 .2600933*** 
(.0708548) 
-.0041703 
(.1071587) 
4.585236 
(13.79513) 
-.0012612 
(.0346301) 
INDUS6 .1068588 
(.1919179) 
.2233889 
(.2902511 ) 
-22.33046 
(31.76355) 
.0198263 
(.0730508) 
INDUS7     
R2 0.7921 0.3791 0.2568 0.3472 
a
 unbalanced panel; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level;*** significant at 1% level; 
This model provides standard errors which are in parentheses.  
 
 
8.3 Quantile regression  
The quantile regression results show that the effects of corporate governance 
variables differ across the quantiles in the conditional distribution of firm market-
based performance (TOBIN’S Q).  Figure 8.1 (a) shows MNCs’ corporate 
governance variables differ across the quantiles in the conditional distribution of 
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firm TOBIN’S Q and figure 8.1 (b) shows LPCs’ corporate governance variables 
differ across the quantiles in the conditional distribution of firm TOBIN’S Q. 
Board size and quantile regression- Figure 8.1 (a) shows that size of board has 
the largest positive effect around θ=0.50 for MNCs, being significantly smaller in 
θ=0.95. However, figure 8.1 (b) shows that size of board has the largest positive 
effect around θ=0.95 for LPCs, being significantly smaller in θ=0.50.  This shows 
that board size effects are almost opposite between MNCs and LPCs in different 
quantiles of performance proxy. This indicates a large board is an appropriate for 
moderately performing MNCs and high performance LPCs.  
None executive directors and quantile regression- Figure 8.1 (a) reveals that the 
proportion of non-executive directors has the largest positive effect around θ=0.05 
to 0.3 for MNCs, being significantly smaller in θ=0.95. However, figure 8.1 (b) 
reveals that the proportion of non-executive directors has the largest positive 
effect around θ=0.95 for LPCs, being significantly smaller in θ=0.3. This shows 
the effect of non executive directors in MNCs and LPCs is almost opposite in 
different quantiles of performance proxy. This indicates that non-executive 
directors are an appropriate corporate governance mechanism for low 
performance MNCs and high performance LPCs.  
Insider ownership and quantile regression- Figure 8.1 (a) reveals that the 
proportion of insider ownership has the largest positive effect around θ=0.95 for 
MNCs, being significantly smaller in θ=0.05 to 0.6. However, figure 8.1 (b) 
reveals that the proportion of insider ownership has the largest positive effect 
around θ=0.35 for LPCs, being significantly smaller in θ=0.05. This shows the 
insider ownership affects MNCs and LPCs differently in different quantiles of 
performance proxy. This indicates insider ownership is an appropriate corporate 
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governance mechanism for high performance MNCs and moderate performance 
LPCs.  
Board diversity and quantile regression-Figure 8.1(a) indicates percentage of 
board diversity has the largest positive effect around θ=0.05 to 0.5 for MNCs, 
being significantly smaller in θ=0.95. However, figure 8.1 (b) reveals that the 
percentage of board diversity has the largest positive effect around θ=0.8 for 
LPCs, being significantly smaller in θ=0.95. Results indicate that board diversity 
has significant impact on low financial performance MNCs and high financial 
performance LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
Female board directors and quantile regression- Figure 8.1(a) indicates 
percentage of female board directors has the largest positive effect around θ=0.95 
for MNCs, being significantly smaller in θ=0.05 to 0.6. However, figure 8.1 (b) 
reveals that the percentage of female board directors has the largest positive effect 
around θ=0.75 for LPCs, being significantly smaller in θ=0.25. Results indicate 
that female board directors have significant impact on high performance MNCs 
and LPCs.  
Ethnic minority board directors and quantile regression-Figure 8.1(a) indicates 
percentage of ethnic minority board directors has the largest positive effect around 
θ=0.95 for MNCs, being significantly smaller in θ=0.05 to 0.30. However, figure 
8.1 (b) reveals that the percentage of ethnic minority directors on a board has the 
largest positive effect around θ=0.1 for LPCs, being significantly smaller in 
θ=0.75. This shows the minority board directors’ have the opposite effect in 
MNCs and LPCs. Results indicate, ethnic minority directors have significant 
impact on high performance MNCs and low performance LPCs.  
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CEO duality and quantile regression-Figure 8.1(a) indicates percentage of CEO 
duality has the largest positive effect around θ=0.95 for MNCs, being significantly 
smaller in θ=0.05. However, figure 8.1 (b) reveals that the percentage of CEO 
duality has the largest positive effect around θ=0.5 for LPCs, being significantly 
smaller in θ=0.15. This indicates CEO duality is an appropriate corporate 
governance mechanism for high financial performance MNCs and LPCs with 
moderate performance.  
Institutional ownership and quantile regression-Figure 8.1(a) indicates 
ownership type has the largest positive effect around θ=0.95 for MNCs, being 
significantly smaller in θ=0.05 to 0.50. However, figure 8.1 (b) reveals that the 
percentage of institutional ownership has the largest positive effect around θ=0.05 
for LPCs, being significantly smaller in θ=0.50. This shows the institutional 
ownership has different effects in MNCs and LPCs in lower quantiles of  financial 
performance proxy and has similar behaviour in moderate to high quantiles of 
financial performance proxy.    
Company size and quantile regression-Figure 8.1(a) indicates firm size has the 
largest positive effect around θ=0.05 to 0.3 for MNCs, being significantly smaller 
in θ=0.95. Moreover, figure 8.1 (b) reveals that the firm size has the largest 
positive effect around θ=0.05 for LPCs, being significantly smaller in θ=0.95. 
Results indicate, firm size has significant impact on low performance MNCs and 
LPCs.   
Company age and quantile regression-Figure 8.1(a) indicates firm age has the 
largest positive effect around θ=0.95 for MNCs, being significantly smaller in 
θ=0.8. However, figure 8.1 (b) reveals that firm age has the largest positive effect 
around θ=0.5 for LPCs, being significantly smaller in θ=0.3. This shows the firm 
age has different effects on MNC subsidiaries and LPCs in quantiles of 
  
230 
 
performance proxy, measured as Tobin’s Q. Results indicate, firm age has 
significant impact in high financial performance MNCs and moderate 
performance LPCs.   
Leverage ratio and quantile regression-Figure 8.1(a) indicates firm leverage has 
the largest positive effect around θ=0.05 to 0.2 for MNCs, being significantly 
smaller in θ=0.95. However, figure 8.1 (b) reveals that firm leverage has the 
largest positive effect around θ=0.5 for LPCs, being significantly smaller in 
θ=0.05. Results indicate firm leverage has significant impact on low performance 
MNC subsidiaries and moderate performance LPCs.   
Overall, the results as displayed below indicate corporate governance variables 
have significant different effects in MNCs and LPCs in different quintiles of 
performance proxy.  This leads to acceptance of hypothesis H18. Therefore, any 
bundle of corporate governance mechanisms needs to be varied for MNCs and 
LPCs.  
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Figure 4 Figure 8.1 (a) Estimates for MNCs Tobin’s Q and corporate governance 
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Figure 5 Figure 8.1 (b) Estimates for LPCs Tobin’s Q and corporate governance 
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8.4 Comparison of MNCs and LPCs financial performance and 
agency costs 
8.4.1. Comparison of MNCs’ and LPCs’ financial performance  
Table 8.3 shows three financial performance proxies and corporate governance 
and control variable regression results for MNCs and LPCs.   
Table 23 Table 8.4 Comparison of MNC and LPCs’ financial performance 
regression summary 
Variable TOBIN’S Q ROA ROE 
 MNC LPC MNC LPC MNC LPC 
BOARD Positive   Negative  Positive  
NONE Negative Positive Negative  Negative  
INSIDE Positive   Positive   
DIVERSITY Positive Negative  Positive Positive Positive 
FEMALE Negative Positive  Negative Negative Negative 
MINORITY Positive  Positive  Positive Positive 
CEO Negative Negative Negative  Positive  
OWNER  Negative Positive    
FOREIGN   Negative    
LNSALES Positive    Positive Positive 
AGE Positive Negative   Negative Negative 
DEBT  Negative   Positive  
REGION1   Negative    
REGION2       
REGION3   Negative  Positive  
REGION4     Negative  
INDUSTRY1   Positive  Positive  
INDUSTRY2  Negative     
INDUSTRY3   Positive Negative Positive Positive 
INDUSTRY4   Positive  Positive  
INDUSTRY5   Positive  Positive  
INDUSTRY6       
INDUSTRY7   Positive  Positive Positive 
 
Board size and financial performance 
Results indicate board size has both positive and negative impacts on MNCs’ 
financial performance.  However, board size has no significant impact on LPCs’ 
financial performance proxies.   
Board composition and financial performance 
Non-executive directors have negative impacts for all three financial performance 
proxies in MNCs, indicating non-executive directors reduce MNCs’ financial 
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performance. This indicates that non-executive directors on boards are not 
appropriate corporate governance mechanisms for MNCs in Sri Lanka.  
Conversely non-executive directors have significant positive impact on LPCs’ 
financial performance. This result indicates that non-executive directors on boards 
are an appropriate corporate governance mechanism for LPCs. The inside 
ownership variable shows significant positive impacts on MNC market-based 
financial performance proxy and LPCs accounting-based financial performance 
proxy, indicating inside ownership is an appropriate corporate governance 
mechanism for MNCs and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  This may be because Sri Lanka’s 
high uncertainty environment leads companies to prefer more internal corporate 
governance mechanisms than external ones.  The diversity variable shows 
significant positive relationship between MNCs’ Tobin’s Q and ROE indicating 
board diversity is an excellent corporate governance mechanism for MNCs.  
However, results indicate that board diversity reduces LPCs’ market-based 
financial performance and increases shareholders’ value.  Next, female board 
directors show significant negative impact on MNCs’ financial performance 
proxies.  This result indicates female board directors are not appropriate corporate 
governance mechanism for MNCs in Sri Lanka.  On the other hand, female board 
directors have significant positive impact on LPCs TOBIN’S Q and have a 
significantly negative impact on the other two financial performance proxies 
(ROA and ROE). Therefore, the issue of selecting female board directors as 
corporate governance mechanisms for LPCs, needs to be examined further.  
Ethnic minority directors show significant positive impact on MNCs’ all three 
financial performance proxies.  This indicates ethnic minority board directors are 
a perfect corporate governance mechanism for MNCs.   Ethnic minority directors 
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have significant positive effect in firm ROE. This indicates minority directors are 
also good corporate governance mechanisms for LPCs.    
Board leadership and financial performance 
Unitary board leadership shows significant negative impact on MNCs’ market-
based financial performance proxy and accounting-based financial performance 
proxy.  However, CEO duality generates more value to shareholders.  Therefore, 
selecting CEO duality as a corporate governance mechanism for MNCs requires 
further consideration.  Nevertheless, CEO duality has significant negative impact 
on LPCs’ market-based financial performance proxy. Therefore, unitary board 
leadership is not a suitable corporate governance mechanism for LPCs in Sri 
Lanka.  Institutional ownership has a significant positive relationship with MNCs’ 
financial performance indicating institutional ownership is an appropriate 
corporate governance mechanism for MNCs in Sri Lanka.   However, institutional 
ownership and LPCs’ Tobin’s Q shows a significant negative relationship, 
indicating board ownership is more appropriate for LPCs in Sri Lanka.  Table 8.3 
reveals foreign managers have significant negative impact on accounting-based 
financial performance proxy in MNCs.  This leads to the conclusion that foreign 
managers are not an effective corporate governance mechanism for MNCs in Sri 
Lanka.  MNCs’ leverage ratio has significant positive impact on MNCs’ financial 
performance, indicating high leveraged MNC subsidiaries have high financial 
performance. Therefore, debt works as an appropriate external corporate 
governance mechanism for MNCs and increases MNCs’ financial performance.  
Conversely, the leverage variable has significant negative impact on LPCs’ 
financial performance, measured as TOBIN’s Q.  This indicates highly leveraged 
LPCs’ financial performance is lower than for low leveraged LPCs.   This result 
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concludes that debt is not an appropriate corporate governance mechanism for 
LPCs in Sri Lanka.  
Control variables and firm financial performance 
The control variable indicates that overall, large MNCs and LPCs have higher 
financial performance than their smaller counterparts.  Furthermore, MNCs’ age 
has both positive and negative impacts on financial performance proxies.  
However, results indicate that mature LPCs have less financial performance than 
young LPCs.  Results indicate that MNCs’ parent locations have significant 
impact on MNCs’ financial performance.  Furthermore, industry factors play a 
significant role in MNCs’ and LPCs’ financial performance. 
 8.4.2. Comparison of MNC subsidiaries’ and LPCs’ agency costs  
Table 8.5 reveals the relationship between corporate governance and agency costs 
proxies value for MNC subsidiaries and LPCs in Sri Lanka. 
24 Table 8.5 Comparison of MNCs’ and LPCs’ agency costs regression 
summary 
Variable ASSETS QFCF DIVIDEND 
 MNC LPC MNC LPC MNC LPC 
BOARD Positive Positive     
NONE   Negative Negative Negative Negative 
INSIDE Positive   Positive Negative  
DIVERSITY  Positive Positive  Negative Negative 
FEMALE   Negative  Positive Positive 
MINORITY   Positive  Positive Positive 
CEO Negative    Positive Positive 
OWNER  Positive Positive  Negative Negative 
FOREIGN Negative      
LNSALES Positive Positive  Negative Negative  
AGE   Negative  Positive  
DEBT Negative Positive  Negative Negative  
REGION1 Negative      
REGION2       
REGION3       
REGION4 Negative      
INDUSTRY1   Positive    
INDUSTRY2  Negative  Negative  Positive 
INDUSTRY3    Negative Negative  
INDUSTRY4    Negative Negative  
INDUSTRY5     Negative  
INDUSTRY6    Negative   
INDUSTRY7    Negative Negative  
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Board size and financial performance 
The board size variable shows significant positive relationship with both MNCs 
and LPCs’ assets utilisation ratio.  This leads to the conclusion that larger boards 
reduce MNCs’ and LPCs’ PA agency conflict.   However, board size has no 
significant impact on MNCs’ and LPCs’ PP agency conflicts.  Therefore a large 
board is not an appropriate corporate governance mechanism for MNCs and LPCs 
from a PP agency costs aspect. 
Board composition and financial performance 
Results show that non-executive directors have significant negative impacts on 
MNCs’ and LPCs’ PA and PP agency costs proxies indicating non-executive 
directors reduce PA and PP agency conflicts in MNCs and LPCs.  Therefore 
having non-executive directors on a board is an excellent corporate governance 
mechanism for MNCs and LPCs in Sri Lanka. Insider ownership shows 
significant positive relationship with MNCs’ assets utilisation ratio, indicating 
insider ownership decreases MNCs’ PA agency conflict. Moreover, results 
indicate a significant negative relationship between MNCs’ dividend pay-out ratio 
and inside ownership.  This shows that inside ownership reduces MNCs’ minority 
and majority shareholder conflicts.  Therefore, from both PA and PP agency 
perspective, inside ownership is an appropriate corporate governance mechanism 
for MNCs in Sri Lanka.  In contrast, results reveal inside ownership increases PA 
agency conflicts in LPCs in Sri Lanka and there is no significant impact on insider 
ownership and LPCs’ PP agency conflicts.  Therefore, inside ownership is not an 
appropriate corporate governance mechanism for LPCs from an agency 
perspective.  Table 8.4 indicates that though board diversity increases MNCs’ PA 
agency conflicts; it reduces MNC subsidiaries’ PP agency conflicts.  Therefore, 
for MNCs with high PP agency conflicts, a diversified board is an appropriate 
corporate governance mechanism. However, results indicate that board diversity 
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increases LPCs’ assets utilisation ratio.  Hence, highly diversified LPCs have 
fewer PA agency conflicts.  The results reveal board diversity reduces LPCs’ PP 
agency conflicts. This indicates highly diversified LPC boards reduce conflict 
between majority and minority shareholders.  Overall, results indicate board 
diversity is an appropriate corporate governance mechanism for LPCs because it 
reduces both PA and PP agency conflicts in LPCs.   Though female board 
directors’ decrease MNCs’ PP agency conflicts, they lead to increased MNCs’ PA 
agency conflicts.  Therefore, selecting female board directors as a corporate 
governance mechanism for MNCs requires further attention at company PA and 
PP agency conflict levels.   However, female directors have no significant impact 
on LPCs’ PA agency costs and they significantly positively affect LPCs’ PP 
agency conflicts.  This leads to the recommendation that female board directors 
are not an appropriate corporate governance mechanism in LPCs in Sri Lanka.   
The ethnic minority variable has a significant positive relationship with MNCs’ 
Q-dummy free cash flow, indicating ethnic minority directors increase MNCs’ PA 
agency conflicts.  Furthermore, the minority variable shows significant positive 
impact on MNCs’ DIVIDEND variable, indicating ethnic minority directors 
increase MNCs’ PP agency conflicts.  This result leads to the conclusion that 
ethnic minority directors are not an appropriate corporate governance mechanism 
for MNCs’ from agency perspective.   
Board leadership and financial performance 
The CEO duality variable shows a significant negative relationship with MNCs’ 
assets utilisation ratio which indicates unitary boards reduces MNCs’ asset 
utilisation. Hence, unitary boards increase MNCs’ PA agency costs.  Furthermore, 
results reveal, CEO duality has significant positive relationship with dividend 
pay-out ratios.  This indicates CEO duality increases MNCs’ PP agency conflicts.  
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Therefore, CEO duality is not an appropriate corporate governance mechanism for 
MNCs from an agency perspective. Though CEO duality has no significant 
impact on LPCs’ PA agency conflicts, results show CEO duality increases LPCs’ 
PP agency conflicts.  Therefore CEO duality is not an appropriate corporate 
governance mechanism for LPCs in Sri Lanka.   Institutional ownership shows a 
positive effect on MNCs and LPCs’ PA agency costs, which indicates institutional 
ownership increases PA agency costs in MNCs and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  However, 
results indicate that institutional ownership decreases MNCs’ and LPCs’ PP 
agency conflicts. Therefore, before assigning institutional ownership as corporate 
governance mechanism for MNCs and LPCs there needs to be further analysis of 
company PA and PP agency cost levels. Table 8.4 indicates foreign managers 
have a negative and significant relationship with MNCs’ assets utilisation ratio. 
This indicates foreign managers increase PA agency conflicts.  Therefore, based 
on the above results, the foreign manager is not an appropriate corporate 
governance mechanism for MNCs in Sri Lanka.   
Control variables and firm financial performance 
MNCs leverage ratios show a significant negative relationship with assets 
utilisation, indicating high leveraged MNCs increase PA agency conflicts. 
However, results indicate that high leveraged MNCs have fewer PP agency 
conflicts.  Therefore, before determining leverage as an external corporate 
governance mechanism for MNCs it needs further consideration.  In contrast, 
results indicate high leveraged LPCs have high assets utilisation.  Hence high 
leveraged LPCs have fewer PA agency conflicts than low leveraged LPCs.  
However, debt has no significant impact on LPCs’ PP agency conflicts.  
Therefore, the results conclude that debt is an appropriate external corporate 
governance mechanism for LPCs in Sri Lanka in PA agency context. Considering 
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control variables, the results show that though mature MNCs have fewer PA 
agency conflicts, they have high PP agency conflicts.  The results also indicate 
firm size has negative impacts on PA and PP agency costs in MNCs and LPCs.  
Results indicate MNCs’ parent location can determine PA agency conflict.  
However, PP agency cost has no impact on MNCs’ parent location.   Finally, 
results indicate MNCs’ and LPCs’ operating industry can determine their PA and 
PP agency conflicts.       
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter mainly explored the comparison of MNCs and LPCs operating in Sri 
Lanka.  Using the ANOVA test, study findings indicate that, except for non-
executive directors and leverage ratios in MNCs and LPCs, other corporate 
governance mechanisms have significant mean differences in MNCs and LPCs in 
Sri Lanka. Therefore, this study accepts H15 hypothesis.  Further, using the 
ANOVA test, this study finds there are differences in corporate governance 
compliance in MNCs and LPCs before and after the introduction of the corporate 
governance voluntary code in 2007. Hence, this study accepts hypothesis H16a and 
H16b. The next hypothesis in this study was analysed using the difference-in-
difference method. This study finds significant differences in both financial 
performance and agency costs of MNCs before and after complying with the 
voluntary code of best practice on corporate governance (2007).  Hence, this study 
accepts hypotheses H17a1.   Further, this study finds that complying with the code 
of best practice on corporate governance positively and significantly increases 
MNCs’ assets utilisation ratio and significantly decreases MNCs’ dividend pay-
out ratio.  This indicates that complying with the code of best practice on 
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corporate governance reduces MNCs’ PA and PP agency conflicts.  Therefore, 
this study accepts H17a2 and hypothesis H17a3.   
Moreover, this chapter reports there is significant positive effects of corporate 
governance practices and financial performance in LPCs in Sri Lanka.  This leads 
to accept of hypothesis H17b1.  However, this study couldn’t find any significant 
association between complying with the code of best practice on corporate 
governance in LPCs and their PA agency costs.  This leads to rejection of H17b2 
hypothesis.  Next, this study finds the coefficient of difference-in-difference 
variable is negatively and statistically significant for LPCs’ dividend pay-out ratio.  
This indicates that complying with the voluntary code of best practice on 
corporate governance decreases LPCs’ PP agency conflicts.  This leads to accepts 
H17b3. Finally, quantile regression results show there are significant differences 
between the effects of corporate governance variables across different quantiles of 
financial performance of MNC subsidiaries and LPCs.  Hence, this study accepts 
H18.  
The next chapter provides a summary of findings of the empirical studies  and a 
conclusion of the study.  
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Chapter 9 
Summary, conclusion and implications 
9.0 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the discussion about corporate governance, financial 
performance and agency costs in MNCs and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  The structure to 
be followed starts with section 9.1 summarising the thesis objectives.  Section 9.2 
provides a summary of the hypothesis and empirical study.  Section 9.3 presents 
the contribution to the literature.  Section 9.4 discusses the implications.  Section 
9.5 provides future directions for research with limitation of the existing study.  
Finally, section 9.6 provides the chapter conclusion.  
9.1 Summary of thesis objectives 
Studies of corporate governance have proliferated in recent years after the 
breakdown of large companies in Europe and Asia.   International competition, 
globalisation and subsidiary activities drive instructional convergence towards the 
best practice of corporate governance in Asia.  However, concentrated ownership, 
company pyramid structure, undeveloped capital markets, weak rules and 
regulations and high government intervention create a corporate governance 
situation in Asian companies that is different from the Anglo-American corporate 
governance model.  
In Sri Lanka corporate governance initiatives commenced in 1997, with a 
voluntary code of best practice on matters relating to financial aspects of 
corporate governance.  Since 1997 this code was revised several times with the 
new code of best practice on corporate governance completed in 2006.  This 
enabled best practices in many jurisdictions and had practical implications for Sri 
Lanka.  First, this new code was introduced as a voluntary code in 2007 but from 
1
st
 April 2008 it becomes mandatory for complying corporate governance rules 
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that formed part of the listing rule on the CSE.  A country’s legal system plays an 
important role in creating an effective corporate governance mechanism. In Sri 
Lanka in 2007 the Companies Act 7 was enacted.  This new Act replaced the 25-
year-old Companies Act and provided significant development in investor 
protection.  
This thesis first provides an examination of the impact of corporate governance 
practices, financial performance and agency costs associated with MNCs.  
Second, the impact of corporate governance practices, financial performance and 
agency costs associated with LPCs are considered. Multiple governance attributes 
are next revaluated including board size, board composition structure (i.e. non-
executive directors, insider ownership, board diversity, female board directors and 
minority board directors), board leadership structure (i.e. CEO duality, ownership 
type and foreign managers) and control variables (i.e. firm size, firm age, firm 
debt, firm location and industry) effects on MNCs’ and LPCs’ financial 
performance and agency costs.   
Third, consideration is given to differences between the governance mechanisms 
of MNCs and the governance mechanisms of LPCs in Sri Lanka.  This included 
any differences in corporate governance compliance between in MNCs and LPCs 
before and after the mandatory code of best practice on corporate governance 
code was introduced in 2008.  Fourth an examination of whether voluntary 
compliance with the new corporate governance code had an effect on financial 
performance and agency costs in MNCs and LPCs is provided.  Finally, the 
difference between the effects of MNCs’ and LPCs’ corporate governance 
variables across the quintiles of firm performance is discussed.    
The study concentrated on secondary data collected from the Handbook of listed 
Companies, Fact Book and the data library CD issued by CSE and the individual 
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companies’ respective audited annual reports.  For the LPCs and MNCs, the 
sampling period is 2006 through 2010.  As at 30
th
 September 2010, the CSE has 
203 listed companies across all business sectors except the financial sector.  
However, from that 203 there are 4 companies that did not provide all relevant 
data.  All remaining companies, which represent 86 MNC subsidiaries and 113 
LPCs are included as the sample for analysis. In order to control the endogeneity 
effect and reverse causality effect of corporate governance variables, this study 
mainly employed a dynamic panel GMM estimator to find out the relationship 
between corporate governance variables, financial performance and agency costs. 
To overcome endogenity problem most previous studies used a 2SLS regression 
technique.  However, the inconsistency of finding instrumental variables, dynamic 
panel model, using the GMM has become an important tool in the recent panel 
data analysis.  Several diagnostic tests including auto-correlation test, test of over 
identification restrictions and test for joint significance use to check the validity of 
this model. Various other statistical techniques include an ANOVA test, panel 
tobit regression, difference-in-difference method and quantile regression also used 
to check hypotheses relevant in this study.  
9.2 Summary of results and hypothesis testing 
9.2.1 Corporate governance mechanisms, financial performance and 
agency costs in MNC subsidiaries and LPCs 
Table 9.1 shows a summary of hypotheses tested regarding corporate governance 
mechanisms, financial performance, PA and PP agency costs of MNCs.  
Similarly, Table 9.2 shows a summary of hypotheses tested regarding corporate 
governance mechanisms, financial performance, PA and PP agency costs of LPCs. 
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Table 25 Table 9.1 Summary of hypotheses results regarding corporate 
governance variables, financial performance and agency costs in MNCs  
Variable Financial performance PA agency costs PP agency costs 
Board size 
(BOARD) 
Reject H1a1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between board 
size and financial 
performance in MNCs 
Reject H1a2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
board size and PA 
agency costs in MNCs 
Accept H1a3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
board size and PP 
agency costs in MNCs 
None executive 
directors 
(NONE) 
Reject H2a1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between non-
executive directors and 
financial performance in 
MNCs 
Reject H2a2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
non-executive directors 
and PA agency costs  
in MNCs 
Reject H2a3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
non-executive directors 
and PP agency costs  in 
MNCs 
Inside ownership 
(INSIDE) 
Reject H3a1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
insider ownership and 
financial performance in 
MNCs 
Reject H3a2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
insider ownership and 
PA agency costs  in 
MNCs 
Reject H3a3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
insider ownership and 
PP agency costs  in 
MNCs 
Board diversity 
(DIVERSITY) 
Reject H4a1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between board 
diversity and financial 
performance in MNCs 
Reject H4a2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
board diversity and PA 
agency costs in MNCs 
Reject H4a3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
board diversity and PP 
agency costs in MNCs 
Female directors 
(FEMALE) 
Reject H5a1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
female board directors 
and financial performance 
in MNCs 
Reject H5a2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
female board directors 
and PA agency costs in 
MNCs 
Reject H5a3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
female board directors 
and PP agency costs in 
MNCs 
Minority 
directors 
(MINORITY) 
Reject H6a1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
minority board directors 
and financial performance 
in MNCs 
Reject H6a2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
minority board 
directors and PA 
agency costs in MNCs 
Reject H6a3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
minority board 
directors and PP 
agency costs in MNCs 
CEO duality 
(CEO) 
Reject H7a1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between CEO 
duality and financial 
performance in MNCs 
Reject H7a2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
CEO duality and PA 
agency costs in MNCs 
Reject H7a3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
CEO duality and PP 
agency costs in MNCs 
Ownership type 
(OWNER) 
Reject H8a1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
ownership type and 
financial performance in 
MNCs 
Reject H8a2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
ownership type and PA 
agency costs  in MNCs 
Reject H8a3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
ownership type and PP 
agency costs  in MNCs 
FOREIGN 
manager 
(FOREIGN) 
Reject H9a1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
expertise manager and 
financial performance in 
MNCs 
Reject H9a2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
expertise manager and 
PA agency costs  in 
MNCs 
Accept H9a3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
expertise manager and 
PP agency costs  in 
MNCs 
Firms size 
(LNSALES/ 
LNASSETS) 
Reject H10a1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between firm 
size and financial 
performance in MNCs 
Reject H10a2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
firm size and PA 
agency costs in MNCs 
Reject H10a3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
firm size and PP 
agency costs in MNCs 
Firm Age (AGE) Reject H11a1 regarding Reject H11a2 regarding Reject H11a3 regarding 
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there is no significant 
association between firm 
age and financial 
performance in MNCs 
there is no significant 
association between 
firm age and PA 
agency costs in MNCs 
there is no significant 
association between 
firm age and PP 
agency costs in MNCs 
Firm Debt 
(DEBT) 
Reject H12a1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between firm 
leverage and financial 
performance in MNCs 
Reject H12a2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
firm leverage and PA 
agency costs in MNCs 
Reject H12a3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
firm leverage and PP 
agency costs in MNCs 
Firm Location 
(LOCATION) 
Reject H13a1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
MNCs parent location and 
financial performance in 
MNCs 
Reject H13a2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
MNCs parent location 
and PA agency costs in 
MNCs 
Accept H13a3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
MNCs parent location 
and PP agency costs in 
MNCs 
Industry 
(INDUSTRY) 
Reject H14a1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between firm 
operating industry and 
financial performance in 
MNCs 
Reject H14a2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
firm operating  
industry and PA 
agency costs in MNCs 
Reject H14a3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
firm operating  
industry and PP agency 
costs in MNCs 
 
Table 26 Table 9.2 Summary of hypotheses results regarding corporate 
governance variables, financial performance and agency costs in LPCs 
Variable Financial performance PA agency costs PP agency costs 
Board size 
(BOARD) 
Accept H1b1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between board 
size and financial 
performance in LPCs 
Reject H1b2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
board size and PA 
agency costs in LPCs 
Accept H1b3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
board size and PP 
agency costs in LPCs 
None executive 
directors 
(NONE) 
Reject H2b1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between non-
executive directors and 
financial performance in 
LPCs 
Reject H2b2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
non-executive directors 
and PA agency costs  
in LPCs 
Reject H2b3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
non-executive directors 
and PP agency costs  in 
LPCs 
Inside ownership 
(INSIDE) 
Reject H3b1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
insider ownership and 
financial performance in 
LPCs 
Reject H3b2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
insider ownership and 
PA agency costs  in 
LPCs 
Accept H3b3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
insider ownership and 
PP agency costs  in 
LPCs 
Board diversity 
(DIVERSITY) 
Reject H4b1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between board 
diversity and financial 
performance in LPCs 
Reject H4b2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
board diversity and PA 
agency costs in LPCs 
Reject H4b3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
board diversity and PP 
agency costs in LPCs 
Female directors 
(FEMALE) 
Reject H5b1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
female board directors 
and financial performance 
in LPCs 
Accept H5b2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
female board directors 
and PA agency costs in 
LPCs 
Reject H5b3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
female board directors 
and PP agency costs in 
LPCs 
Minority 
directors 
(MINORITY) 
Reject H6b1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
minority board directors 
and financial performance 
in LPCs 
Accept H6b2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
minority board 
directors and PA 
agency costs in LPCs 
Reject H6b3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
minority board 
directors and PP 
agency costs in LPCs 
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CEO duality 
(CEO) 
Reject H7b1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between CEO 
duality and financial 
performance in LPCs 
Accept H7b2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
CEO duality and PA 
agency costs in LPCs 
Reject H7b3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
CEO duality and PP 
agency costs in LPCs 
Ownership type 
(OWNER) 
Reject H8b1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
ownership type and 
financial performance in 
LPCs 
Reject H8b2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
ownership type and PA 
agency costs  in LPCs 
Reject H8b3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
ownership type and PP 
agency costs  in LPCs 
Firms size 
(LNSALES/ 
LNASSETS) 
Reject H9b1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between firm 
size and financial 
performance in LPCs 
Reject H9b2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
firm size and PA 
agency costs in LPCs 
Accept H9b3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
firm size and PP 
agency costs in LPCs 
Firm Age (AGE) Reject H10b1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between firm 
age and financial 
performance in LPCs 
Accept H10b2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
firm age and PA 
agency costs in LPCs 
Accept H10b3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
firm age and PP 
agency costs in LPCs 
Firm Debt 
(DEBT) 
Reject H11b1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between firm 
leverage and financial 
performance in LPCs 
Reject H11b2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
firm leverage and PA 
agency costs in LPCs 
Accept H11b3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
firm leverage and PP 
agency costs in LPCs 
Industry 
(INDUSTRY) 
Reject H12b1 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between firm 
operating industry  and 
financial performance in 
LPCs 
Reject H12b2 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
firm operating  
industry and PA 
agency costs in LPCs 
Reject H12b3 regarding 
there is no significant 
association between 
firm operating industry  
and PP agency costs in 
LPCs 
9.2.2 Compliance differences and financial performance 
ANOVA test results confirm that, except for non-executive directors’ percentage 
and leverage ratio variables, all other corporate governance variables have 
significant differences between MNCs and LPCs in Sri Lanka.  Hence this study 
accepts hypothesis H15 - there is significant difference between governance 
mechanisms of MNC subsidiaries and LPCs.  The next hypothesis examined 
whether there was any significant differences in corporate governance compliance 
of Sri Lankan listed companies before and after the 2008 introduction of the 
mandatory code of best practice on corporate governance.  ANOVA test results 
confirm there is a significant difference of MNCs and LPCs mean values before 
and after complying with the corporate governance mandatory code in 2008.  
Hence, this study accepts  Hypothesis16.    
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Using a difference-in-difference method, this study found there is significant 
impact on corporate governance practices, MNC financial performance and PA 
and PP agency costs.  This leads to accepts of H17a1, H17a2 and H17a3 of this study.  
The second part of this hypothesis checked the impact on corporate governance 
practices, in LPCs’ financial performance, PA and PP agency costs. The finding 
accepts hypotheses H17b1 and H17b3 that there is significant impact on corporate 
governance practices and financial performance/ PP agency costs associated with 
LPCs.  However, a result rejects H17b2 because there is no significant impact on 
corporate governance practices and PA agency costs associated with LPCs.   A 
quantile regression is used method to test the last hypothesis.  Results indicated 
that corporate governance variables have different impacts on different financial 
performance quantiles in MNCs and LPCs.  According hypothesis H18 regarding 
there are significant differences between the effects of MNCs’ and LPCs’ 
corporate governance variables across the quantiles of firm financial performance 
is accepted.    
9.3 Contribution to the literature 
The principal aim of this research as outlined in the first chapter is to identify the 
relationship between corporate governance practices, financial performance and 
PA and PP agency costs in MNCs and LPCs. This study makes a number of 
contributions to the understanding of corporate governance practices, financial 
performance and agency costs and the linkages between them.  First, it adds to the 
empirical evidence concerning the relationship of corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm financial performance, PA and PP agency costs.  In 
addition, by studying a wider range of corporate governance variables than prior 
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studies, it will enhance the understanding of how different corporate governance 
mechanisms collaborate with company financial performance.  
Second, PA and PP cost have been articulated in the context of listed public 
companies in mature capital markets and both have recently been tested in 
emerging markets. This study extends an understanding of the extent to which PA 
and PP are applicable in emerging markets especially in relation to operating 
MNCs and LPCs.  Most strikingly is the observation that PP is more significant 
than PA in Sri Lanka due to concentrated ownership structure, family ownership, 
weak institutional protection and lack of information disclosure.  
Third, this study extends corporate governance related theories relating to the 
emerging economy.  Sri Lanka’s cultural and institutional factors are crucial for 
shaping the development of management and organisational form of companies. 
Therefore, theories derived from developed and mature markets only partially 
represent corporate governance relationship in emerging economies. This study 
extends current literature with implications for agency theory, stewardship theory, 
transaction costs theory, resource based theory, institutional theory and theory of 
tokenism for developing countries with consideration given to their cultural and 
institutional differences.  Inclusion of context variable percentage of female board 
directors, percentage of ethnic minority directors and board diversity was found to 
be important in terms of explanatory power. 
Finally, this study adopts GMM dynamic panel technique to control the 
endogeneity effect of corporate governance variables and reverse causality on 
financial performance and agency costs to provide robust results.  Most of the 
previous studies do not explore the endogeneity effect of corporate governance 
variables, although they use 2SLS regression technique. The current research 
extended the econometric robustness of analysis using quantile regression 
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analysis; panel tobit regression and difference-in-difference method.  Through 
these econometric tools, which are being used more frequently in microeconomics 
data analyses; this thesis can be seen as a pioneering study in the corporate 
finance sphere. 
9.4 Implications  
The findings of this research lead to several practical implications for LPCs and 
MNCs operating in Sri Lanka and other emerging markets. Sri Lanka’s existing 
corporate governance best practice code was mandatory from 1
st
 April 2008 for all 
listed companies on the CSE.  However, this study shows some mandatory 
corporate governance mechanisms have a negative impact on firm financial 
performance or they increase company agency costs. Therefore, the corporate 
governance framework may need to be tailored to each organisation’s structure as 
“one size does not fit all”.   Rather than having a corporate governance code 
mandatory by the law, the Sri Lankan code of best practice on corporate 
governance may need to be a more flexible as a “ comply or explain” type code.  
Firms can then apply a relevant bundle of corporate governance mechanisms to 
enhance their firm value.  
Aguilera et al. (2008) argue that the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms is determined by the firm’s critical environmental variables. 
Although Sri Lanka basically followed the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance, various country institutional and cultural differences have created a 
unique corporate governance environment in Sri Lanka. As an example, due to 
more than 64% of businesses listed on the CSE being family businesses (Masulis 
et al., 2009), CEO duality may be a positive characteristic for family businesses in 
Sri Lanka.  As a country with many ethnic groups, board diversification may 
  
251 
 
create a positive impact on Sri Lankan firm financial performance. Therefore, 
further development of the corporate governance code is required to consider 
country-specific characteristics rather than inheriting and adopting a bundle of 
corporate governance mechanisms from other developed countries.   
Furthermore, results also show that a bundle of corporate governance mechanisms 
impact LPCs’ and MNCs’ financial performance and/or agency costs differently. 
Implementation of these corporate governance mechanisms incurred both benefits 
and costs.  The results also show that the impacts of corporate governance 
mechanisms upon firm financial performance levels vary from firm to firm. 
Therefore, to enhance performance, a different bundle of corporate governance 
mechanisms for LPCs and MNCs is required, based on their financial 
performance levels. 
Transparency, responsibility, accountability and fairness are four concepts that are 
now widely quoted as key principles of good corporate governance.   However, 
high political intervention leads to a high level of informality surrounding the 
corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka. It is requiring reduce agency costs 
through strengthening corporate governance practices.   
The results of this study have important implications for the ownership structure 
and company performance in Sri Lanka and other countries that have similar 
institutional settings.  It confirms that the effect of inside ownership on firm 
performance is more positive and significant where legal protection of investors is 
weak.  It suggests that although new legislative reforms have been enacted, Sri 
Lankan companies are highly dependent on internal governance mechanisms.  
Due to high inside ownership, managerial expropriation is very likely to exist.  
There is potential merit in promulgating new rules and regulations to control the 
expropriation of minority shareholders. 
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O'Donovan (2003) explains that the quality of a company’s corporate governance 
can influence the cost of raising capital. “Investment Climate Statement - Sri 
Lanka” (2009) explains access to finance is costly and limited in Sri Lankan 
companies. There is potential merit in promulgating new polices to enhance the 
private commercial banks’ role as major financial suppliers, especially in rural 
sectors, reduce constraints on long-term finance access of family firms and 
increasing the availability of low costs financing.  Given evidence of the global 
financial crisis relating to curtailment of bank credit, it is important to enhance 
fund diversification and develop the debt market in Sri Lanka.  
Next, the new corporate governance best practice code (2008) only relates to 
shareholders’ right and firm efficiency. Firm performance and accountability 
measures are missing from the rules.  Moreover, the new code expects limited 
transparency.  The next corporate governance changes in Sri Lanka need to 
promote more transparency and accountability.  
As a multicultural country, it is essential to introduce new board diversity 
orientation programs.  This program creates a two-way socialisation process, i.e. 
bias is reduced and  minority perspectives influence organisational norms and 
values (Cox, 1991).  Additionally, promulgating new polices that increase 
women’s contribution for higher managerial positions or specialisation will lead 
to better financial performance of companies.  
Results shows complying with the code of best practice on corporate governance 
positively affects listed companies’ value.  However, the code of best practice on 
corporate governance is still a new concept for Sri Lankan investors and 
stakeholders. To attract new foreign and local investors and enhance the 
advantages of complying with the best practice code there needs to be more 
education and information about the code and its application.  This can be 
  
253 
 
achieved through creating corporate governance networks including regulatory 
bodies, business leaders and stakeholders.  Also trained and certified managers 
and directors regarding corporate governance practices are important.  
Establishment of institute for this corporate governance training is another 
requirement.  Through capacity building, enforcement and follow-up corporate 
governance practices, creating a corporate governance rating system for investors 
and building corporate governance awareness among business leaders will 
improve the corporate governance practices in Sri Lankan companies.  
9.5 Future research  
This section presents recommendations for future research and limitations of the 
current study.  
The data used for current study were derived from five years for MNC 
subsidiaries and LPCs.  A larger time expansion may result in finding a different 
corporate governance relationship between CSE listed companies, financial 
performance and agency costs.  Further inclusion of additional corporate 
governance variables or control variables could reveal a new relationship between 
corporate governance, financial performance and agency costs. CEO 
characteristics, banking efficiency, political regime and executive remuneration 
are still an open ground for future research.  This study excluded financial sector 
companies, because of the nature of their liabilities which are different from those 
of non-financial sector firms.  Due to financial firm scandals in recent years, 
research regarding complying with the corporate governance code and its impact 
on financial sector firms is important.  This provides a rich vein for future 
research. 
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Next, while this study has provided useful insights into corporate governance, 
financial performance and agency costs in Sri Lankan listed businesses, the 
findings are based on research in a single country.  It is suggested that future 
research tests this corporate governance relationship beyond Sri Lanka.  
Moreover, more than 64% of Sri Lankan listed businesses are family businesses.  
Therefore, focusing future research on family-owned firms and corporate 
governance impacts on their financial performance and agency costs is important.  
Furthermore, this study considered only the MNC parent locations and their 
impact on financial performance and agency costs. Future research needs to 
consider more the characteristics of MNC parent companies and their influence of 
corporate governance practices of MNC subsidiaries.  
9.6 Conclusion  
The current chapter has discussed the summary, conclusion and implication of 
results from empirical analysis. This research focused on the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms, firm financial performance and agency costs 
in LPCs and MNCs in Sri Lanka.  Findings support the view that there is a 
positive relationship between corporate governance and firm financial 
performance and a negative relationship between corporate governance and firm 
agency costs.  However, the process by which the firm financial performance and 
agency costs are affected in MNCs and LPCs is different.  This result also 
supports the central argument in corporate governance that the institutional and 
cultural differences determine the effect of complying with corporate governance 
and financial performance and agency costs.    
This study contributes to current literature in several ways, i.e. this is first direct 
study of corporate governance, firm performance and agency costs of listed Sri 
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Lankan companies representing all industries except the financial sector.  This 
study controlled the ambiguity of corporate governance variables, financial 
performance and agency costs using a dynamic panel GMM estimator.   The 
results of this study lead to important policy implications for corporate 
governance practices, financial performance and agency costs in Sri Lanka and 
other similar emerging markets.  Finally, this study suggests that spanning the 
research in other markets and extending the time period could result in still better 
understanding of the relationship between corporate governance, firm financial 
performance, agency costs and new policy implications.  
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